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Abstract 
 
 
 
This thesis looks at how the long-standing battle between liberalism and populism in 
Argentina manifested in the 1990s in the struggles between neoliberalism and 
populism to hegemonise the discourse on civil society in national poverty reduction 
policy. It traces how, through their struggles to remain or become hegemonic, 
neoliberalism and the concrete form that populism took in the country – henceforth 
Argentinean populism – each incorporated some of the other’s views, made the other 
change, and transformed. 
 
Neoliberalism and Argentinean populism are considered antagonistic political projects 
that struggle to become hegemonic. Each project has normative viewpoints at its core, 
but also includes contingent characteristics acquired in specific historical contexts. 
For example, the package of market-liberalisation measures and the model of inward 
economic development are contingent characteristics of neoliberalism and 
Argentinean populism respectively. 
 
Civil society is seen as both a discourse emerging from struggles to hegemonise its 
meaning and the arena where struggles for political hegemony take place and, thus, 
where hegemony and counter-hegemony are manufactured (Gramsci, 1998 [1971]: 
12, 13, 15, 204). Defining a discourse on civil society is, therefore, a fundamental 
hegemonic operation, which entails setting limits to the possibilities of hegemonic 
struggles that can take place in that arena.  
 
The thesis argues that the discourse on civil society in the poverty reduction policy 
area in the Argentina of the 1990s was neopopulist, understood here as the articulation 
of neoliberal and Argentinean populist discourses on civil society. The neopopulist 
discourse, however, was not fixed throughout the decade. It emerged (1990-1994), 
turned into what this thesis characterises as technopopulism (1995-1999) and was then 
challenged by populist views (2000-2001). While neoliberalism predominated during 
the decade, the mutations of the neopopulist discourse reflected the gradual 
colonisation of the predominantly neoliberal discourse by populism and the attempts 
of neoliberalism to retain its predominance. 
 
The conclusion stresses that the centrality of technical and institutional aspects in the 
neoliberal logic of hegemonic construction created a crucial interstice through which 
the intrinsically political populist discourse could permeate the neoliberal hegemony. 
As dislocations in the hegemonic discourse emerged, domestic factors and actors 
enabled the Argentinean populist discourse on civil society to grow within the 
neopopulist discourse, partially colonise it, and eventually challenge it. Policy-makers 
and implementers, whose profiles combined technical skills with deeply embedded 
populist views, were crucial in this process. Additionally, changes in the neoliberal 
discourse of the Multilateral Development Banks during the 1990s, as well as 
differences between these banks and between their official positions and their staff 
views, were contributory factors in this colonisation. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
Hegemonic struggles between liberalism and populism have marked the history of 
Latin American countries since their independence. In Argentina these struggles 
appeared in historical events such as the battles between the Federals and Unitarians 
between 1810 and 1852. They were portrayed as the struggle between civilisation and 
barbarism, which dominated political ideology in the late 19th century, and 
underpinned the antagonism between the masses and the oligarchy that emerged 
during Perón’s first governments (Svampa, 1994).  
 
In the early 1990s, Argentina’s newly elected president Carlos Menem (1989-1995 
and 1995-1999) adopted neoliberal economic reforms focused on reducing the state, 
achieving fiscal balance and liberalising markets (Keeler, 1993; Grindle, 1996: 4; 
Gerchunoff and Torre, 1996: 737-8; Acuña 1994: 47). Throughout the 1990s the 
country was committed to the neoliberal reform agenda, with the international 
financial community widely applauding these economic policies (Mussa, 2002: 1). 
However, Argentina had experienced one of the most studied cases of populism to 
date – Peronism – and, until the 1980s, populism had remained hegemonic in the 
country. How did neoliberalism, the 1990s version of liberalism, challenge that 
existing populist hegemony?  
 
The thesis looks at how the longstanding battle between liberalism and populism in 
Argentina manifested in the 1990s in the struggles between neoliberalism and 
populism to hegemonise the discourse on civil society in national poverty reduction 
policy. It traces how, through their struggles to remain or become hegemonic, 
neoliberalism and the concrete form that populism took in the country – henceforth 
Argentinean populism – each incorporated some of the other’s views, made the other 
change, and transformed. 
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The thesis’ main argument is that the discourse on civil society in the poverty 
reduction policy area in the Argentina of the 1990s was neopopulist, understood here 
as the articulation of neoliberal and Argentinean populist discourses on civil society. 
The neopopulist discourse, however, was not fixed throughout the decade. It emerged 
(1990-1994), turned into what this thesis characterises as technopopulism (1995-
1999) and was challenged by an attempt to articulate a different discourse (2000-
2001). While neoliberalism predominated in the neopopulist discourse during the 
decade, the mutations of the neopopulist discourse reflected the gradual colonisation 
of this discourse by Argentinean populism and the attempts of neoliberalism to retain 
its predominance. 
 
The first section of this introduction looks at the definitions of neoliberalism and 
Argentinean populism. The second section justifies the focus on poverty reduction 
and civil society, and the third section explains the importance of the Multilateral 
Development Banks (MDBs) and Argentinean populism in the analysis of the 
neopopulist discourse of the 1990s. The fourth section details the contribution made 
by the thesis vis-à-vis the literature on topics related to it. The fifth section explains 
the theoretical perspective and analytical framework adopted here, and the final 
section outlines the thesis structure and addresses methodology issues. 
 
 
1.1. Neoliberalism and populism 
 
Neoliberalism and Argentinean populism are considered here antagonistic political 
projects that struggle to become hegemonic. Each project has normative viewpoints at 
its core, a logical component, and contingent characteristics acquired in specific 
historical contexts. They are antagonistic not only because their historical struggles 
for hegemony constituted them as such, but also because their normative and 
contingent components, as well as their predominant logic of discursive formation, are 
opposed. 
 
Neoliberalism is usually referred to as a package of economic reforms famously 
labelled by Williamson as the “Washington Consensus”. These reforms called for 
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fiscal discipline, tax reform and privatisation, interest rate and trade liberalisation, a 
competitive exchange rate, and an economy open to foreign investment (Williamson, 
1990: 1993). In this thesis, neoliberalism is a political project not in terms of being a 
class-project (Veltmeyer et al., 1997), nor simply because it pursues a specific 
political system such as pluralist liberal democracy (Philip, 1999; Santiso, 2001; 
Leftwich, 1993), but because neoliberalism involves a particular normative view of 
how society works and aims to make it hegemonic. Neoliberal economic reforms are 
part of the contingent component of this political project. 
 
Economic reforms are the most visible, and are a crucial, contingent element of the 
neoliberal political project, but the core of this project is its normative component, 
which draws on the two central tenets of liberalism: the primacy of the individual 
over the community and the division between the private and public spheres. The 
contingent component of neoliberalism includes economic and institutional reform 
measures and the democratic pluralist system of government that the latter seeks to 
establish. Yet, while liberalism is concerned with both political and economic factors 
that may guarantee individual freedom, neoliberalism focuses on liberalism’s 
economic premises. Therefore, economic reform packages emerge as the most visible 
element of neoliberalism. These reforms also play a crucial role in this project’s 
struggle for hegemony. 
 
The logical component of neoliberalism refers to the manner in which political 
projects process population’s demands and seek to become or remain hegemonic. 
Neoliberalism’s distinctive logic of discursive construction is the logic of difference, 
since population’s demands are expected to be addressed through institutionalised 
responses to each individual claim and thus reflect the neoliberal normative 
preference for individuals over the community. The use of techniques and methods is 
key in emphasising that demands are addressed according to each individual’s need 
and in a systematised manner that is not based on political aims but on an objective 
reading of the social reality. In turn, due to neoliberalism’s focus on economic 
liberalism — liberalism’s tenet of the social and economic spheres as equal and the 
conception of the economic sphere as a realm that can be objectively scrutinised and 
known — economic knowledge emerges as the main source legitimating the 
techniques and methods used to address social demands. 
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There is less agreement among scholars about what populism is. Until the 1980s, 
populism was associated with socio-historical aspects and a specific model of 
economic development –import substitution industrialisation (ISI) (Germani, 1962; 
Murmis and Portantiero, 1971; Cardoso and Faletto (1990 [1969]). In the 1990s, 
scholars were puzzled by the coexistence of populism with economic neoliberalism 
(Panizza, 2000: 179) and “purely political” definitions of populism emerged (Roberts, 
1995; Weyland, 1996; 1999). In these writings, populism was usually defined using 
lists of characteristics and regarded frequently as a “style of leadership” (Conniff, 
1999: 7; Drake, 1999: 223-4; Knight, 1998; Panizza, 2001: 441). 
 
Here, populism is a political project the normative component of which comprises the 
sovereignty of the people over individuals and the dissolution of the barriers that 
separate the people from the institutions that govern them. The focus on the political 
constitution of the people, rather than on a particular social base or economic 
programme, is what differentiates populism from other political projects with similar 
normative components, such as republicanism or grass-roots politics (Panizza, 2005a, 
Panizza, 2008: 79). This focus reflects the centrality of the logic of equivalence in 
populism because it is through highlighting the commonalities of people’s different 
social demands that populism constitutes the people as political actors. This focus also 
reinforces the project’s anti-institutionalism because populism constitutes political 
identities by direct appeals to the people that ignore established institutions, and by 
identifying the people with unsatisfied demands as neglected or oppressed by the 
established institutions. This focus and populism’s anti-institutionalism, makes 
populist political projects vary significantly according to the historical circumstances 
in which they exist. In Argentina, the success of the Peronist populist appeal in the 
mid-20th century defined largely the content of the populist political project. Thus, 
most of what analysts include in lists of populism’s characteristics, such as its 
association with an inward model of development or the primacy of corporatist state-
society relations, are contingent elements of Argentinean populism. 
 
Neoliberalism and Argentinean populism are inherently antagonistic. Yet, antagonism 
does not presuppose incompatibility. A fundamental possibility for their combination 
lies in their logical components. While the prevalent logic of discursive construction 
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is different in each project – difference in neoliberalism and equivalence in populism 
–, as political projects both need to apply the logic of equivalence to struggle for 
hegemony. In order to universalise its normative views, neoliberalism needs to apply 
the logic of equivalence by highlighting how different demands from population are 
equal to each other and how the political project can meet them. However, neoliberal 
claims that its views are apolitical and draw on the objective observation of the 
natural sphere of the economy leave the political side of the project unarticulated and 
available for other political projects to articulate it. Populism, especially successful 
populist appeals, needs to acquire a certain level of institutionalisation, thus it also 
needs to implement the logic of difference. Additionally, because of its highly 
contingent character, populism can adopt a variety of institutional forms. 
 
 
1.2. The focus on poverty reduction policy and civil society 
 
An analysis of Argentinean poverty reduction policy exposes how neoliberalism and 
populism struggled for hegemony in the 1990s. First, poverty reduction was a key 
element of the neoliberal reform agenda of that decade. In a first stage, started in the 
1980s, neoliberal reforms focused on the macroeconomic sphere and consisted mainly 
of economic adjustment measures. Poverty and inequality in the region1 worsened 
during those years. In a second stage – usually referred to as “second generation 
reforms” (Naim, 1995; Pastor and Wise, 1999; Nelson, J. 2001) – the reforms 
expanded their area of concern beyond the macroeconomic realm to include state and 
social sectors reform (Vellinga, 1998: ix). In the early 1990s, poverty became the 
central concern of two key institutions promoting neoliberal reform in the country — 
the World Bank (WB) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) – which 
significantly increased their loans for the social sectors (World Bank, 1990; IDB, 
1994; Annex I, figs. 1, 2). Second, poverty is also a key issue in populist projects. 
Populism’s focus on the political constitution of the people as the oppressed or 
neglected usually leads to the populist appeal being associated with the poorest 
                                                 
1
 Many analysts indicated that in the 1980s poverty and inequality in the region worsened as a consequence of the market reform 
measures and adjustment implemented in that decade, which came to be known as the “lost decade” for development in Latin 
America. Morley shows that income per capita fell by 11% and income poverty, in terms of living on less than US$2 a day, went 
up from 26.5% in 1980 to 31% in 1989 (Morley, 1995a). For more on poverty and inequality in the region in the 1980s see 
Altimir 1994, 1996; Londoño and Szekely 1997; Lustig 1995; Morley 1994; 1995a and b; Rosenthal, 1996; Veltmeyer et al., 
1997. 
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sectors of the population. In Argentina, as populism acquired its most crystallised 
features alongside the emergence and development of Peronism, the appeal was 
chiefly associated with workers. 
 
Concentrating attention on civil society discourse is especially relevant for the 
analysis of the struggles between neoliberalism and populism in the 1990s. First, 
during the second stage of neoliberal reform, including civil society actors in the 
design or implementation of policies became a central objective in MDBs’ strategies 
(World Bank, 1992; 1997; 2000a; Bresser Pereira and Cunill Grau, 1998: 52-4). As 
the MDBs focused on poverty issues, the number of projects with some form of civil 
society involvement grew, key publications on participation were published and 
changes in the Banks’ internal structure reflected an increasing concern with civil 
society (chapter 4). Second, civil society organisation was central in the Argentinean 
populist project as a form of opposing the liberal institutions of individuals’ 
representation — political parties. After this, their centrality in the poverty reduction 
area was consolidated via the role that organisations played vis-à-vis the ISI model of 
development that prevailed until the 1970s, in which organisations would provide 
social services until the model bore fruit. Despite the weakening hegemony of 
populism in the 1970s and 1980s, civil society organisations continued to play key 
roles in poverty reduction. During the military dictatorship (1976-1983), civil society 
organisations emerged as the main resistance to the dictatorship and tried to 
compensate for the state withdrawal from social assistance while still expecting the 
state to eventually resume intervention in that field. During the government of Raúl 
Alfonsín (1983-1989), these organisations played a role in the delivery of poverty 
reduction policies and later emerged as crucial actors in coping with the effects of 
hyperinflation on the poor (Moreno, 2002: 291-303, 318-320; Iñigo Carerra and 
Cotarelo, 2003: 204). 
 
Crucially, to focus on civil society is to focus on the heart of where hegemonic 
struggles take place. Most of the studies of civil society in Argentina that emerged in 
the 1990s focused on measuring or categorising civil society (eg Campetella, et al., 
1998; Roitter, et al., 1999; Luna, 1997, 2000; GADIS-PNUD-BID, 2000; Filmus et 
al., 1997) and thus adopted a priori definitions of what constitutes civil society. In 
contrast, this thesis is interested in exploring how the understanding of civil society 
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was shaped in a particular context. Civil society is hence seen as a discourse shaped 
by the struggles for the definition of its meaning. Additionally, following Gramsci, 
civil society is seen as the arena where struggles for political hegemony take place, 
and thus where hegemony and counter-hegemony are manufactured (Gramsci, 1998 
[1971]: 12, 13, 15, 204). Therefore, defining a discourse on civil society — or what 
civil society is in a given context — is a fundamental hegemonic operation, which 
entails setting limits to the possibilities of hegemonic struggles that can take place in 
that arena. 
 
 
1.3. The MDBs, Argentinean populism and the analysis of the 
neopopulist discourse 
 
In Argentina, the implementation of poverty reduction policies with civil society 
involvement went hand in hand with the increasing presence of the MDBs in this 
policy field. Initially, Menem’s government neglected poverty-related problems, but 
in 1993 it started to address them, creating a national agency for that purpose — the 
Secretaría de Desarrollo Social (SDS – National Secretariat for Social Development). 
Yet, the government’s focus on reducing state expenditure resulted in low levels of 
expenditure for assistance to the poor compared to expenditure in other countries2 and 
other areas of the budget.3 Facilitated by the government’s explicit commitment to 
neoliberalism, SDS functionaries’ personal connections with international financial 
organisations and those organisations’ increasing interest in poverty-related issues, 
MDBs’ funds became crucial for this new agency. The importance of the MDBs in 
Argentina increased in the 1990s, not only with respect to the volume of loans but 
also with respect to their capacity to direct and support the policies adopted by the 
national government (Acuña and Tuozzo, 2000b: 433). MDB loans for Argentina in 
the 1990s soared from an approximate average of US$2,000 million in the 1980s to 
US$13,000 million (Figures 0 and 00, Annex I).4 In particular, the most notable study 
on the influence of the MDBs’ views on social policy in Argentina asserts that the 
                                                 
2
 According to Lo Vuolo et al. (1999: 174-5) expenditure on poverty reduction actions in Argentina was around 17% of the 
national budget in the 1990s, compared to an average of 32% in developed countries.  
3
 Consolidated expenditure on targeted programmes was on average $2,268.41 million between 1990 and 2001, which represents 
approximately 10% of all social expenditure (Vinocur and Halperin, 2004: 20). 
4
 Regarding the WB, whose first loan dates from June 1961, 65% of loans for Argentina were approved in the 1990s (including 
one in December 2001). See: http://tinyurl.com/2vj4g6. 
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only social area in which the MDBs’ recommendations were heard was poverty 
reduction (Acuña and Tuozzo, 2000a: 124; 2000b: 453; also in Tussie and Tuozzo, 
2001: 111). By the mid-1990s, the SDS’s most influential policies or programmes5 
were MDB-funded and most of its policies included a role for civil society 
organisations. Only eight of the 24 national poverty reduction programmes with civil 
society involvement that emerged during the 1990s never had MDB funds.6 
 
The MDBs encountered in Argentina a discourse on civil society in poverty reduction 
action that had developed within a framework of the populist hegemony, which 
started with Peronism in the 1940s and is labelled here as Argentinean populism. By 
the 1980s, the discourse had incorporated some features linked to liberalism but was 
still predominantly populist. The discourse reflected a view of inextricability between 
the private and public realms, the preference for community over individuals, and the 
political logic as more prevalent than the institutional one. This could be seen in the 
tendency of social organisations dealing with poverty to supplement the state but only 
temporarily, assuming that the state would eventually resume its role as provider of 
social services, and in their tendency to seek and accept state funds and guidance 
rather than to protect themselves against state interferences in the private realm. Also, 
these organisations preferred non-hierarchical structures and, in order to keep the 
bases in direct contact with the leaders, who nevertheless were usually strong and 
detached from the bases, participatory governing mechanisms rather than those of 
individual representation predominated. Catholicism and political identities rather 
than individual will and interests were key in guiding social organisations’ 
preferences, and discretionary and weakly institutionalised modes of dealing with 
poverty were common. However, the advance of liberalism – the increasing support 
for liberal democracy, the growth of voluntary organisations, and the increasing 
technification and institutionalisation of actions for tackling poverty – emerged as an 
avenue for the neoliberalism that arrived in the 1990s to colonise this populist 
discourse. 
 
                                                 
5
 Policies are taken here as synonymous with programmes. It is worth noting that what the MDBs call projects are called 
“programmes” by the states (or policies here). Sometimes, one MDB project can finance more than one programme and a 
programme can obtain funds from more than one project loan. For instance, the Social Protection Project loans (WB) 
corresponded to more than one programme, including FOPAR, SIEMPRO and TRABAJAR (Annex II). 
6
 See Annex II. 
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The MDBs’ discourse on civil society presented a fully articulated operationalisation 
of the neoliberal political project. This discourse comprised a view of civil society as 
social organisations, especially technically skilled organisations, which would 
eventually become a permanent supplement of the state. Civil society was located in 
the private sphere alongside the market, and separated from the political sphere. 
Organisations were envisaged as emerging from individual will and interests, which 
implied that the organisations’ preferred form of internal government would be a 
system of individual representation. The scope of these organisations’ involvement 
with poverty reduction policies was conceived of as having to be restricted to state-
funded sub-projects7 and, as technical organisations, they were expected to follow 
standardised technical methods to address poverty. These views operationalised the 
normative and logical components of neoliberalism because, ultimately, they aimed at 
redrawing the dividing line between the private and public spheres and stressed 
efficiency and the technical profile of social organisations, rather than the political 
purposes behind the inclusion of civil society in poverty reduction actions. However, 
the MDBs’ focus on efficiency that neglected the political dimensions of social 
organisation  was a fundamental avenue that opened up the possibility for non-
neoliberal projects, such as the populist one, to colonise neoliberalism. Changes to the 
MDBs’ discourse on civil society after the mid-1990s, and historical and institutional 
differences between the WB and the IDB, further facilitated the advancement of the 
Argentinean populist discourse on civil society in poverty reduction in Argentina in 
the 1990s. 
 
The thesis argues that the mix of the Argentinean populist and the MDBs’ neoliberal 
discourses on civil society resulted in a neopopulist discourse that was hegemonic in 
the country during the 1990s in the poverty reduction area. Therefore, neopopulism is 
seen here as the result of the struggles between the neoliberal and the populist 
political projects with regards, in particular, to the discourse on civil society in 
poverty reduction policy. This marks a difference between this thesis and the analyses 
that use the term neopopulism to refer to the broad characteristics of the first years of 
Menem’s rule (Szusterman, 2000; Weyland, 1998, 1999, 2002: 168-209; 2003; 
                                                 
7Sub-projects are the initiatives at the grass-roots level funded by policies or programmes. 
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Cammack, 2000).8 This thesis differs also, and more strikingly, from those holding 
that neopopulism is the combination of populist politics and neoliberal economics 
(Weyland, 1996; Roberts, 1995; chapter 2) because here the economic and political 
aspects of neoliberalism and populism are seen as inseparable. 
 
The thesis also argues that while the neopopulist discourse was predominantly 
neoliberal throughout the 1990s, the discourse was not fixed and the mutations 
reflected the Argentinean populist project gradual colonisation of the neopopulist 
discourse and neoliberalism’s attempts to retain that predominance. In order to 
analyse how neopopulism emerged (1990-1994), evolved into technopopulism (1995-
1999) and was challenged by attempts to articulate a different discourse on civil 
society (2000-2001) the thesis focuses on specifying the changes that occurred in the 
neopopulist discourse throughout the decade. It analyses the political struggles 
underpinning the formation and changes of the neopopulist discourse and expounds 
which of the political projects struggling for hegemony – neoliberalism and 
Argentinean populism – became predominant in each of the periods analysed. 
 
The analysis shows that while contextual factors created opportunities for the 
emergence of and changes to the neopopulist discourse, the national government, the 
state actors involved in the poverty reduction area, and the WB and the IDB and their 
staff, were crucial in moulding the discourse. The MDBs were key promoters of the 
neoliberal discourse on civil society, but also facilitated the permeation of the 
discourse by Argentinean populism. State actors shaped the discourse in accordance 
with their technical profile, political allegiances and personal experiences, infusing 
the discourse with both neoliberal and populist features. Influential state actors in the 
poverty reduction area were policy makers – the head of the SDS its Secretaries and 
Under-Secretaries, and programme coordinators involved in programme design – as 
well as policy implementers – programme coordinators and programme area 
coordinators.  
 
 
                                                 
8
 Analysts highlighted the combination of bypassing democratic institutions such as Congress and political parties and the 
centralisation of power in the executive branch (eg Novaro, 1994; Palermo and Novaro, 1996; O’Donnell, 1994 and 1996) with 
the new feature of disarticuling organised actors that had traditionally supported populism, such as unions (eg Torre, 1998; 
Murillo, 2001) in order to seek support among the disorganised and marginal sectors (eg Cheresky, 2001; Cavarozzi, 1992a; 
1994). 
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1.4. The thesis contribution 
 
This research enriches the academic debate at three levels. Empirically, it provides an 
unprecedented analysis of a particular aspect of a key policy area in the 1990s – the 
discourse on civil society of poverty reduction policies. Theoretically, the thesis 
applies recent developments in discoursive institutionalism and, thus, seeks to 
contribute towards that development. At the level of policy practice, the research 
emphasises the politically constructed character of such a fundamental term as civil 
society. It deals with the unmet expectation that strengthening civil society was going 
to help to not only make poverty reduction policies more efficient but also to foster a 
liberal, pluralist and representative democracy (Pearce, 2004: 203-4). Instead, by the 
end of 2001, after a decade of a predominantly neoliberal discourse on civil society, 
Argentina witnessed a massive mobilisation of people, which re-established 
distinctive features of the Argentinean populist discourse on civil society in the form 
of popular assemblies, street blockades and other non-institutionalised forms of 
advancing popular demands (Dinerstein, 2001; 2003; Iñigo Carerra and Cotarelo, 
2003). This thesis shows that in the construction and re-construction of the discourse 
on civil society, populism was constantly present and gradually gained ground during 
the decade within the state discourse that was trying to modify civil society. 
 
In order to emphasise the politically constructed character of civil society, this thesis 
rejects idealised conceptions of civil society and focuses on the role of state and 
international actors in shaping the understanding of civil society. By the mid-1990s, 
the inclusion of civil society actors in poverty reduction policies led to the spread of 
studies of the impact of this innovation on the transformation of state-society 
relations. Unlike this thesis, these studies not only concentrated on analysing the 
impact of policies, rather than the formation of the perspectives embedded in them, 
but also adopted a normative understanding of civil society and contrasted it with 
reality. 
 
These studies suggest two main reasons why an “ideal” civil society does not appear 
in the reality of the country: the resilience of inherited habits and the persistence of 
inequality. Most studies highlight the positive effects of the implementation of 
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policies with civil society participation. Some argue that collaborating with the state 
could lead to the successful advancement of social movements’ views (Jelin, 1997: 
94-97) or foster healthy debate between organisations and the state (Thompson, 
1995). They underscore the negative persistence of clientelism – or the use of policy 
resources to garner votes (Auyero, 2001) – in the implementation of these policies, as 
in the influential studies of Cavarozzi and Palermo (1995) and Martínez Nogueira 
(1995). Yet, they argue that that persistence drew on inherited practices associated 
with the state-centred matrix of development that prevailed between the 1930s and the 
1980s (Cavarozzi, 1992a and 1994) and that it was not a problem inherent to civil 
society. Also, some students suggest that inequality prevents the expansion of the rule 
of law, allowing the continuation of the political manipulation of the poor (Vellinga, 
1998: 12; see also O’Donnell (1998: 51, 61). 
 
Like this thesis, many studies emphasise the importance of the state in shaping state-
society relationships. Yet, still assuming an a priori, and idealised, definition of civil 
society, they consider that state reform can overcome the difficulties posed by 
inherited practices and inequality. In their views, state reform is crucial (Nogueira, 
1999: 5; Bresser Pereyra and Cunnil Grau, 1998) to provide better services and to 
guarantee that interaction with civil society organisations does not lead to co-option 
and clientelism (Jelin, 1997; Garland, 2000: 5) allowing the channelling of social 
demands that seek to end inequality (Jelin, 1997; Roxborough, 1997). Even a study 
looking at the state discourse in poverty reduction policies and its effects on the 
formation of the poor’s identity suggest managerial solutions to overcoming obstacles 
for the channelling of the poor’s social demands (Cardarelli and Rosenfeld, 2000; 
1998: 127-134) and, ultimately, assume that these reforms would allow that idealised 
civil society to become a reality. This thesis, instead, not only avoids a priori 
definitions of civil society but also holds that state promotion of civil society 
organisation is not necessarily conducive to the erosion of the discourse in which 
social organisations are embedded, especially because state policy makers and 
implementers are themselves influenced by that discourse. 
 
The thesis’ focus on state policy makers and implementers relates it to studies that 
focus on the role of “experts” in shaping policy or, as in this thesis, a discourse. It 
draws on the literature on technocracy to define state actors involved in discourse 
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moulding and to understand the role of technical language in the discourse on civil 
society of the 1990s. The definition of technocrats as individuals in governing 
positions who have highly professional and specialised training (Centeno, 1997: 230) 
is used here to refer to the technical profile of policy makers and implementers. Yet, 
technocrats are seen not merely as technicians, because being in decision-making 
positions entails dealing with politics (Centeno, 1997: 221). Moreover, they are not 
just “technopols” (Domínguez, 1997). This thesis looks at state actors’ influence in 
shaping discourses by taking into account their identities, which are seen as made up 
of not only their technical expertise and decision-making role, as the “technopols”. 
Their identities also include their engagement in other discursive practices within 
which they occupied “subject positions” (section 1.5) linked to their political 
allegiance, their participation in social organisations, or their personal lives. Also, as 
students of technocracy have argued, the thesis assumes that state actors can resort to 
technical language to look politically appropriate. Furthermore, it agrees that 
economics has not always been the most valued specialised knowledge in 
technocracies (Markoff and Montecinos, 1994: 9, 10) and technocrats and 
technocracies are not necessarily neoliberal (Centeno, 1997: 225; Markoff and 
Montecinos, 1994: 5). Nevertheless, the increasing centrality of economic questions 
contributed to the ascent of economists and their knowledge within governments in 
the 1990s (Markoff and Montecinos, 1994: 6-9). 
 
Few studies look at the role of the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) dedicated 
to social issues — the MDBs – in shaping the poverty reduction policies. The essays 
authored and collected by Diana Tussie (Tussie, 2000; Casaburi and Tussie 2000b; 
Casaburi et al., 2000, Tussie and Tuozzo, 2001) are an exception but they still assume 
an idealised view of civil society. Analyses of the factors that led to the 
implementation of economic neoliberal reform widely acknowledge the role of the 
IFIs (Vacs, 1994: 67-73; Gerchunoff and Torre, 1998: 115, 116; Canitrot, 1994: 82; 
Acuña and Smith, 1994: 28-30). Yet, the role of the MDBs is only mentioned, if at all, 
as a facilitating factor in mainstreaming civil society involvement in social 
programmes (Cardarelli and Rosenfeld, 1998: 71, 90; 2000: 32). This neglect was 
particularly striking when the role of the MDBs grew so significantly in the poverty 
reduction area in the 1990s, as described in the previous section. In Tussie’s 
collection, however, Acuña and Tuozzo (2000a and 2000b) analyse how the MDBs’ 
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views of civil society participation affected reforms in three social areas in Argentina 
– labour, health and poverty reduction. Many of that work’s insights are incorporated 
in the thesis. Yet, their point that a limited participation could preclude needed 
transformations in state-civil society relations (Acuña and Tuozzo, 2000a: 125) 
suggests they assume that civil society participation is ideal but MDBs’ proposals to 
promote it could be negatively affecting it – an assumption that differs from this 
thesis’ accent on the politically constructed character of civil society. 
 
This thesis tangentially engages with an important stream within international 
relations that studies IFIs’ influence on their borrower countries’ agendas. Analyses of 
the relationship between IFIs and national states are taken into account here, such as 
the insightful work of Ngaire Woods (2006), particularly her views about the way in 
which these organisations operate and the factors that affect their leverage in their 
borrowing countries – such as isolated policy-making, shared views and the technical 
skills of the bureaucracy (Woods, 2006: 10, 73). This thesis’ focus is not, however, 
the study of the mechanisms of influence of the MDBs but the extent to which and the 
way in which the MDBs’ views shaped the state discourse and how domestic actors 
were able to reshape this influence. Furthermore, while most of these analyses adopt a 
political economy perspective, this thesis proposes a different theoretical perspective. 
In analysing the shaping and re-shaping of the discourse on civil society, this thesis 
does not neglect the traditional question of political economy, “in whose interest?” 
(Woods, 2000: 1) – it addresses it from a different angle. Material interests may have 
shaped this discourse, but the thesis’ theoretical assumption is that interests, as well as 
ideas, can only influence the social and political world if they are politically 
constructed and articulated as a discourse that seeks to become hegemonic. 
 
 
1.5. Analytical framework: Relational Discursive Institutionalism 
 
 
a. A relational ontology 
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The theoretical approach chosen in this thesis falls within discursive institutionalism 
(DI) but it proposes a more radical ontology. The thesis agrees with most DI stances, 
yet it objects to its neglect of the political struggles underpinning processes of 
institutional formation and transformation. Therefore, it proposes a relational 
discursive institutionalist approach. The differences between a relational and a non-
relational discursive institutional approach stem from a different understanding of 
discourse. 
 
Discursive institutionalism (DI) draws on two versions of new institutionalism9 – 
normative or organisational institutionalism (N/OI) (eg March and Olsen, 1984, 1989; 
Powell and Di Maggio, 1983, 1991) and historical institutionalism (HI) (eg Steinmo et 
al., 1992; Rueschmeyer and Skocpol, 1996; Hall, 1993). This section focuses on the 
versions of institutionalism that inform discursive institutionalism. It leaves aside 
rational choice versions (eg North, 1990; Ostrom, 1990) because their ontological and 
epistemological positions – positivism and methodological individualism respectively 
– are thoroughly different from the relational ontology and social constructivist 
epistemology that guides this thesis. 
 
As with all new institutionalisms, DI’s definition of institutions includes a wide 
variety of “social conventions”, either formal or informal, which, following empirical 
observation, are noted as crucial. The only prerequisite is that institutions must have 
some stability over time and must affect individuals’ behaviour (Peters, 1998: 146; 
Campbell and Pedersen, 2001: 13). In line with HI, DI prefers inductive approaches to 
the testing of theories and is interested in tracing the effects of the past in the 
formation of new institutions. Like N/OI, DI emphasises the importance of 
meanings10 in the analysis of socio-political phenomena and how actors’ strategic 
actions are “bounded” by systems of rules and values in particular organisational 
arrangements (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Fligstein 1990; Dobbin, 1994 in Strand and 
Bradburn, 2001: 131). 
 
                                                 
9
 New institutionalism started to emerge in political science in the mid-1980s. Incorporating traditional institutionalism, it holds 
that institutions are the structures against which actors interpret reality and take decisions. However, unlike traditional 
institutionalism, institutions are not defined merely in a formal and legalistic manner and they include informal structures such as 
“norms and values”, “rules and constraints” and “regularized patterns of interaction” (Peters, 1998: 1-8, 18-19, 146).  
10
 According to normative institutionalism “political life is organized around the development of meaning through symbols, 
rituals, and ceremonies.” (March and Olsen, 1984: 3, 7, 8). 
 29 
DI also criticises HI and N/OI, however. Most notably, DI prefers the terms 
“meaning” to ideas, and “discourses” to paradigms. A number of institutional analyses 
have recently included a “discursive dimension” by considering that ideas influence 
the formation and transformation of institutions and policies (Hall, 1993; Hay, 2001; 
Sikkink, 1991; Risse et al., 1999).11 The DI critique of these studies is that ideas are 
seen as fully finished concepts, exogenous to the phenomenon under analysis, and as 
independent or supplementary variables to structural or interest-based variables. 
Differently, discursive institutionalism asserts that ideas are meaningful only by 
reference to a certain system of interpretation or discourse (Kjaer and Pedersen, 2001: 
220), and hence cannot be conceived as fully finished realities external to the 
discourses that embody them. Discourse, therefore, acquires a central role in this 
theory. The concept of paradigm appears to perform a similar role in ideational 
versions of HI (Hall, 1993; Hay, 2001). DI regards positively ideational HI’s notion of 
paradigm, because it underscores the existence of ideas and values beyond 
institutionalised ones. DI notes, however, that paradigms do not account for the 
historical processes behind their own formation, and thus, ideational HI grants 
paradigms the same theoretical level – ultimate causes – as institutions. In contrast, DI 
stresses the different temporality of ideational and institutional change (Hay, 2001: 
193) and that paradigms, redefined as discourses, should be theoretically situated as 
key shapers of institutions as they affect crisis narratives and their solutions (Hay, 
2001: 203-4), the perception of change, and actors’ behaviour (Kjaer and Pedersen, 
2001: 225). 
 
This thesis agrees with the epistemological and analytical insights of DI, but it differs 
in its ontological basis and proposes additional analytical tools to supplement those of 
DI. At the epistemological level, focusing on meaning and discourses asserts the need 
of inductive methods to map events that construct meanings rather than establishing 
causal links between variables. Analytically, DI looks at processes of “translation” of 
loosely defined discourses into particular contexts focusing on the selection, 
displacement and innovation processes involved in these “translations” (Kjaer and 
Pedersen, 2001: 219, 241). Despite agreeing with DI epistemological and analytical 
proposals, this thesis holds that the DI understanding of discourse needs to be “de-
                                                 
11
 For more positivist perspectives see Haas, 1992; Goldstein and Keohane, 1993). 
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positivised”. Consequently, the thesis differs from DI in the conceptualisation of 
structure-agent relations, and in the notions of institutions, actors, interests and social 
change. Moreover, a “de-positivised” ontology requires other analytical tools in 
addition to those linked to the notion of “translation”.  
 
DI’s definition of discourse retains traces of positivism. DI defines discourse as a 
“system of meaning that orders the production of conceptions and interpretations of 
the social world in a particular context” (Kjaer and Pedersen, 2001: 220). This 
definition assumes a moment of representation of the real, which sidelines the 
intrinsically relational character of the social and the necessary political operations 
behind the articulation of that relational reality. Therefore, DI analyses do not include 
accounts of the political struggles entailed in the operations of “translation”, 
“displacement” and “triggered innovation”. 
 
The notion of discourse12 adopted here entails a relational ontology in which political 
struggles are crucial – discourses here are relational systems of signification that are 
politically constructed. In this understanding of discourse, social objects have 
meanings in terms of differences and equivalences within discourses and the 
construction of discourses is intrinsically political, as it involves the construction of 
antagonisms13 and the articulation of chains of equivalence and differences within the 
discourse. The construction of antagonisms defines the “outside” and “inside” of the 
discourse and the articulation of chains involves the partial fixation of meaning 
around nodal points (Howarth, 2000: 9). Therefore, the objects of the socio-political 
life do not have meaning independently from the discourses that constitute them as 
objects and discourses are the result of political struggles about the partial fixation of 
meaning. However, the centrality of politics in this ontology makes this approach 
different from other anti-foundational theories14 because it does not deny the reality 
beyond thought. What this ontology denies is that reality can have any social 
significance beyond discourse (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 107). Furthermore, this 
                                                 
12
 The account of discourse theory presented here draws on the work of Laclau and Mouffe. It includes insights from studies by 
Howarth and Torfing that operationalised their concepts (Howarth, 1995 and 2000; Torfing, 1999a) and other studies that 
employed them in empirical analyses (eg Torfing, 1999b; Howarth, 1997, Howarth et al. (eds.), 2000, Panizza, 2005 (ed.)). 
13
 This understanding of social antagonist draws on Schmitter’s conception of politics, whereby its essence is the construction of 
“enemies”. However, from the perspective adopted here, since politics is intrinsic to the social, social antagonists should be 
tolerated, not eliminated (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 165; Mouffe, 1993: 4). 
14
 Mainly postmodernists, see Rosenau, 1992, Rorty, 1989, Lyotard, 1984 [1979] 
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ontology does not deny the possibility of “foundational politics”. In fact, it considers 
politics as the foundation of social existence. 
 
 
b. Three levels of analysis and the understanding of institutions and actors 
 
In view of this ontological position, this thesis analyses the discourse on civil society 
on three levels. First, it concentrates on tracing the fundamental discursive 
articulations behind partially fixed meanings. Second, it looks at the contextual factors 
involved in the political struggles that led to these articulations. Third, levels one and 
two framed in a hegemonic analysis. 
 
A further explanation of the concepts introduced with the definition of discourse will 
be helpful to identify what is taken into account when tracing the creation and 
recreation of this discourse. If meaning is about differences and equivalences, a 
system of signification (discourse) must exist. For this system to exist there must be 
limits and for these limits to exist there must be something beyond the limits – there 
must be an exclusion (Laclau, 1996: 37). This exclusion is politically created by the 
discursive construction of an antagonist and the concomitant emergence of empty 
signifiers that triggers the construction of chains of equivalence and difference that 
seeks to fill those signifiers. The operation of generating an “inside” and “outside” of 
the discourse leads to the emergence of empty signifiers because previous relations of 
difference and equivalence that fixed the relation between signifier and the signified 
(social) object are broken when a different social antagonist is constituted (Laclau, 
1996: 38-9). These empty signifiers are floating signifiers in that they broke the 
chains of equivalences and differences that made them part of the discourse in which 
they existed. 
 
The re-articulation of empty or floating signifiers entails the transformation of some 
of them into nodal points capable of fixing the content of a range of floating signifiers 
by articulating them within a chain of equivalences (Torfing, 1999a: 98, 99; Zizek, 
1989: 95-97; Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 113). Constructing chains of equivalence 
consists of the dissolution or redefinition of existing chains within a discourse by the 
recreation of that purely negative identity – the social antagonist. That is, A, B and C 
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are all equivalent with respect to antagonist D. But discourses are also articulated 
using the logic of difference, which aims to expand a certain discourse and its chains 
of equivalence by incorporating disarticulated elements into the discourse. The use of 
this logic tends to weaken antagonisms (Howarth, 2000: 106, 107). 
 
Hence, one level of the analysis carried out here entails the “de-construction” of fixed 
meanings, in an attempt to identify empty and floating signifiers and unveil how 
social antagonists, chains of equivalences and differences and nodal points have been 
constructed. This de-constructive analysis can include the identification of operations 
of “overdetermination”, which comprise “displacement”, an operation that “involves 
the transferral of the meaning of one particular discursive moment to another 
discursive moment” (Torfing, 1999a: 301), and “condensation”, which consists of 
“the fusion of a variety of identities and meanings into a single unity” (Torfing, 
1999a: 299). Other discoursive operations that can be observed are “conceptual 
bridges” and “iterations”. The former occurs when, in a signifying chain, a position is 
determined partly through logical associations and partly through illogical 
associations (Laclau, 2000: 71). The latter refers to the Derridean statement that 
language presupposes the repeatability and alterability of signs: “…traces exhibit a 
minimal sameness in the different contexts in which they appear, yet are still modified 
in the new contexts in which they appear” (Howarth 2000: 41, also 42-3). This level 
of analysis is undertaken in this thesis through the examination of policy documents 
and interview transcriptions. 
 
A second level of analysis consists of the mapping of the contexts in which discourses 
are stabilised or redefined. This is similar to most institutional analysis and thus 
insights from the new institutionalism that informs DI are used in this stage. Yet, the 
relational ontology and the primacy of politics entailed in this thesis’ definition of 
discourse leads to fundamental divergences from these approaches’ understanding of 
core concepts – institutions, actors and change. 
 
Here, institutions are highly routinised and sedimented discourses that crystallise the 
result of political struggles. Partially fixed meanings can sediment and become 
institutionalised in more or less formal practices, policies, rules and concepts. In this 
respect, this thesis aligns with HI, N/OI and DI definition of institutions as “both 
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formal organizations and informal rules and procedures that structure conduct” 
(Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 2). Yet, here there is no qualitative difference between 
discourses and institutions, only a difference of stability (Howarth, 2000: 12). As 
such, state institutions in this thesis are not static. They are a conjunction of more or 
less sedimented processes of discoursive struggles that form the space from which 
these discourses can attain a status of universality by hegemonising society at large. 
 
The analysis of institutions as sedimented discourses calls for a focus on the processes 
of sedimentation “whereby contingent discoursive forms are institutionalized into 
social institutions that exist in oblivion of their political ‘origin’” (Torfing, 1999a: 
307). Therefore, this institutional analysis constitutes a form of genealogical analysis 
since the focus is not on the search for causes but on details and accidents that 
accompanied the formation of discourses, including institutions. Mapping the factors 
that affect the formation of a discourse shows precisely this interest in details and 
accidents and is based on the assertion that “[w]hat is found at the historical beginning 
of things is not the inviolable identity of their origins, it is the dissension of other 
things” (Foucault, 1977: 142). The presentation of the Argentinean populist discourse 
on civil society and the MDBs’ neoliberal one are underpinned by this genealogical 
approach. Also, the analysis of the disputes around the formation and transformations 
of the national agency dealing with poverty reduction presented in this thesis echoes 
this understanding of institutions, and informs the mapping of factors affecting the 
formation and characteristics of the neopopulist discourse. 
 
At the same time, institutions are not trans-historical and objective entities made up of 
actors endowed with fixed capacities that enable them to advance their interests 
(Howarth, 2000: 119). This thesis’ consideration of actors assimilates notions of new 
institutionalism but re-frames them in the relational ontology adopted here and the 
corresponding understanding of institutions just described. In the institutionalist 
versions informing DI, the structure (institutions) usually prevails over the agent 
(individual or collective actors). In N/OI institutions shape actors’ preferences as 
institutional settings limit the range of possibilities for rational decision – what is 
defined as “bounded rationality” (Peters, 1998, 26). N/OI states that individuals make 
choices “appropriate” to the values prevailing in the institutions they belong to. The 
lack of space for change in the “logic of appropriateness” is counterbalanced by the 
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notion of “interpretation” and the “garbage can” argument. The former states that 
individuals interpret rules and values, potentially leading them to question the status 
quo and induce some change (March and Olsen, 1989: 38). The latter holds that 
institutions count on sets of alternative solutions for situations in which routine 
procedures seem to be in need of adjustment, and that from these alternatives change 
can emerge. Yet, overall, N/OI emphasises the role of institutions in shaping 
individuals’ behaviour and leaves little space for actors influencing institutions 
(Peters, 1998: 33). Similarly, HI’s main claim is that policy choices made at the 
moment of institutional formation or the initiation of a policy – “path shaping” – have 
a continued and strong influence over future policy decisions. This is known as “path 
dependency” (Peters, 1998: 63; Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 2). The centrality of this 
concept usually results in assigning a crucial role to actors at the moment of “path 
shaping” and leaves little space for agency after institutions are formed. 
 
In ideational versions of HI, however, the concepts of “policy diffusion”, “policy 
learning” (Hall, 1993; 278) and “punctuated evolution” (Hay, 2001: 213) suggest that 
actors and ideas can induce changes after institutional formation. HI, while it stresses 
that historical-based analysis explain which goals are maximised by actors, and why, 
they consider that actors can induce changes as they act not only in accordance with 
rules and values but also strategically and based on rational decisions15 to achieve 
ends16 (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 9). The DI focus on discourses also leads to a 
conception of agents freer from structures than agents in N/OI and HI are. While the 
“logic of appropriateness” is central in DI, the appropriate rules and values do not 
correspond only to the institutions but to broader systems of signification on which 
basis “interpretations” are made and “garbage can” resources can emerge. 
Additionally, the DI concept of “translation” is a development of the HI concepts of 
policy diffusion, policy learning and punctuated evolution. The difference is that DI 
stresses the need to analyse how actors learn and contribute to the evolution of 
unfinished discourses by reshaping them according to particular circumstances rather 
than according to ideas crystallised in institutions or policies. 
 
                                                 
15
 However, HI criticises rational choice versions of institutionalism because they view institutions as a contextual constraint 
upon individuals and their choices, and not as influencing choice and preference. 
16
 For instance, Steinmo’s empirical work on tax policy in the UK, Sweden and the US does not deny that political actors’ 
interests may guide their choices, yet their rationality may be limited by lack of information or time due to institutional 
arrangements (Kato, 1996: 570). 
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The approach taken here holds that actors act strategically, interpret, resort to 
alternative sets of values and norms, shape paths and are shaped by the past, all in 
agreement with N/O, HI and DI (Kjaer and Pedersen, 2001: 244). This is possible 
because actors are conceived of as both subjects and agents that are part of “open” 
social structures.17 Social structures exist as discourses that emerge from a discursive 
field (Torfing, 1999: 102; Derrida, 1988 [1977]), which provides the differential trace 
structure that every fixation of meaning presupposes but is “undecidable” because it 
can never be fully incorporated into a particular discourse. This undecidability makes 
discourses “open” (to change) (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 113) and, therefore, the 
political moment and the agent necessary to partially close – or “suture” – it. Thus, the 
construction of antagonists and chains of equivalences and difference closes only 
partially a discourse because a meaning is inevitably never fully exhausted by 
discourse (Howarth, 2000: 103) since the discursive field “flows and subverts the 
attempts to fix a stable set of differential positions within a particular discourse” 
(Torfing, 1999a: 92 from Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 111). At the same time, agents 
exist in accordance with the discourses that provide them with identity, so they are 
subject to the structure. But the undecidability of discourses results in the 
incompleteness not only of structures but also of the subjects that exist in those 
structures occupying subject positions. Therefore, subjects construct illusionary full 
identities through processes of identification that consist of recreating discursive 
elements that traverse them. Subjects’ strategic actions, either to preserve the closure 
of a discourse or subvert it, reflect these processes of identification, but also turn 
subjects into agents since these actions transform the discourses in which they occupy 
subject positions. Actors’ ability to re-articulate meanings may depend on interests, as 
political economists argue, but the articulation of these interests is permeated by 
discourses.18 Therefore, the structure persists through the contamination of the agent’s 
decision but the decision persists through the subversion or modification of the 
structure, which is possible because of the inevitable openness of discourses. The 
thesis’ analysis of the role of policy makers and implementers, in shaping the 
                                                 
17
 This post-structuralist stance does not claim that subjects are free from structures, but notes the latter’s precariousness. The 
emphasis is not, as with the postmodernists, on the fluidity of meaning but on the partiality of the fixation of meanings (Howarth, 
1995: 131). 
18
 Barros and Castagnola made this point clear in their analysis of the political stagnation of Argentina after 1955. They show that 
most studies of this period reduced the political significance of Peronism “to some kind of economic logic or institutional 
rationality”. They explain the political stagnation of Argentina after Peronism, tracing back “the particular way in which the 
formation of political identities shaped the political frontiers in the wake of the irruption of Peronist populism.” (Barros and 
Castagnola, 2000: 29) 
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discourse on civil society, reflects this double character of actors as agents and 
subjects. 
 
The undecidability of discourses thus affects the thesis’ view of change. Ideational 
innovation and crisis are the most important sources of change in new 
institutionalism. In this thesis, ideational innovation cannot be treated as external to 
the context and the innovators’ subject positions, and crises occupy a central role as 
moments in which discourses can be redefined. Within HI perspectives, the notion of 
“critical juncture” (Collier and Collier, 1991: 772-4) refers to crises, and Hay 
highlights the importance of the “narration” of crises and the availability of alternative 
discourses to determine the depth of the change that crises can produce. Likewise, 
dislocations are the moments in which the openness of the social appears evident, 
providing the opportunity for discourses to change. The notion of dislocation, 
however, permits an analysis that takes into account fundamental change beyond the 
moments of crisis, similarly to the notion of “punctuated evolution” but without its 
teleological connotation. Since discourses are “always vulnerable to those political 
forces excluded in their production, as well as the dislocatory effects of events beyond 
their control” (Laclau 1990: 31-6), political subjects can “narrate” dislocations in a 
manner that the established discourse cannot domesticate and thus break down that 
discourse and generate the need and opportunity for new operations of discursive 
articulation. 
 
Hegemonic analysis constitutes the third level of analysis undertaken in this thesis. 
Hegemony is achieved when a particular political project or discourse becomes the 
universal framework of meaning for a certain social formation (Laclau, 2000: 54; 
Howarth, 1995: 124). Counter-hegemonic discourses challenge these universal 
frameworks, entering into a political struggle for definitions. Hegemony, however, is 
not stable. Although a level of stability can be achieved, counter-hegemonic 
discourses can emerge both from outside the hegemonic discourse and from the 
rearticulation of the hegemony. Hegemonic articulations are the political struggles in 
which discourses engage in their search for hegemony or its maintenance. These 
articulations are path-dependent, as political construction always occurs in a relatively 
structured terrain and is about a selection of sedimented discourses.  
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Hegemony is a term usually attached to class- and interests-based theories, but here 
hegemony is not seen as necessarily linked to a determinant material base. Following 
Gramsci, who noted the need for political leadership for the working classes to 
become a hegemonic force (Gramsci, 1998 [1971]: 12), Laclau and Mouffe continued 
the move towards highlighting the political moment and eliminated the last remnant 
of economic necessity from Gramsci’s understanding. These authors defined 
hegemony as the articulation of a dominant discourse around a nodal point (Laclau 
and Mouffe, 1985: 75-88). Hegemony in these terms is  
 
“a moral, intellectual and political leadership [achieved] through the 
expansion of a discourse that partially fixes meaning around nodal points. 
Hegemony involves more than a passive consensus (…). It involves the 
expansion of a particular discourse of norms, values, views and 
perceptions through persuasive redescriptions of the world” (Torfing, 
1999a: 302). 
 
 
Hegemonic analysis complements the de-constructive and institutional analyses. 
Hegemonic analysis entails the unveiling of the power struggles behind hegemony 
formation, at the same time as it reveals the persistence of counter-hegemonic 
discourses, showing the constant reproduction and production of power and how 
“[p]ower is not stable or static, but is remade at various junctures within everyday 
life….” (Butler, in Butler et al., 2000: 14). As de-construction “discovers the role of 
the decision out of the undecidability of the structure” (from identity to difference) 
and hegemonic analysis is about observing how a particularity became a universal that 
veils undecidability (from difference to identity), the theory of hegemony implies a 
de-constructive analysis (Laclau, 1993: 283). By the same token, hegemonic analysis 
points out how in highly sedimented discourses (institutions) hegemonic articulation 
is about the reproduction of partially fixed meanings, but in this reproduction there is 
a reactivation of hegemonic practices and a reconstruction of the outside and inside of 
the discourse where the political construction behind everyday decisions (actors) 
transpires. 
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At this level of analysis, the thesis seeks to identify whether hegemonic articulations 
have tended toward “transformism” or “expansionism”. According to Gramsci, 
transformism is the strategy of the bourgeoisie in times of crisis, and expansionism is 
the hegemonic strategy of the proletariat (Torfing, 1999a: 111). Here, these strategies 
are emptied of class references but retain their dominant-subversive meaning. 
Transformism is a strategy that aims to neutralise antagonist forces through cooption 
of, or minor concessions to, excluded discourses. It can consist of appropriating a 
concept from a past or opposite discourse and transforming it into one’s own (Torfing, 
1999a: 111). Expansionism is an offensive strategy, which aims to unite discursive 
elements that share something (metonymy) by constructing a “metaphor” or operating 
a “displacement” that entails losing part of a previous identity but highlights their 
common features, providing the discourse with hegemonic potential (Torfing, 2003; 
Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 141). Hence, transformism incorporates discursive 
elements that a given discourse leaves off-limits and expansionism consists of internal 
re-articulations. These strategies can complement each other and can be implemented 
by both dominant and counter-hegemonic discourses as they engage in struggles for 
hegemony. 
 
In summary, while the insights of discursive institutionalism and its sources are useful 
for this thesis’ analytical purpose, the concern with the political struggles defining the 
discourse on civil society suggests the need of a definition of discourse that entails a 
relational ontology. The analytical framework presented here led to the development 
of the threefold analytical model that guides this thesis. This model consists of a 
relational analysis, a mapping of the contextual factors and political struggles that 
attempted to fixate the discourse, and a hegemonic analysis aimed at defining which 
particular political project managed to hegemonise the definition of civil society, and 
through which strategies. 
 
 
1.6. Thesis structure and sources 
 
The thesis traces the construction of the discourse on civil society in the poverty 
reduction policy area in Argentina through the analysis of policy documents and 
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interviews. It is divided into two parts. The first part sets out the conditions of the 
discursive struggle. Chapter 2 depicts the political projects that disputed the definition 
of civil society in the 1990s – neoliberalism and Argentinean populism – and specifies 
the thesis’ understanding of civil society. Chapters 3 and 4 provide further details 
about Argentinean populism and MDBs’ neoliberalism, respectively, and examine, in 
particular, their discourses on civil society. The second part of the thesis shows how 
the MDBs’ neoliberal and the Argentinean populist discourses mixed in the formation 
of the neopopulist discourse on civil society. Chapter 5 looks at the formation of 
neopopulism (1990-1994), chapter 6 deals with the re-articulation processes triggered 
when the neopopulist discourse was put to work (1995-1999), and chapter 7 focuses 
on the period of “contested hegemony” (2000-2001). 
 
The first part of the thesis makes use of genealogical analysis. Although the accounts 
of the MDBs’ neoliberal and the Argentinean populist discourses, in chapters 3 and 4 
respectively, focus on specifying the main features of the discourses, they also refer to 
the contextual details that shaped and re-shaped them. Chapter 3 uses secondary 
sources, mainly historical studies. In chapter 4, the main sources are policy documents 
from both MDBs. Interviews helped to contextualise and interpret the documents’ 
contents. Secondary sources were also used, mainly analyses of the MDBs’ approach 
to working with civil society and those explaining the functioning of the institutions 
mentioned above. 
 
The second part presents the empirical case. It consists of three chapters that detail the 
construction and the main characteristics of the discourse on civil society in the 
poverty reduction policy area of the Argentinean national state in the 1990s. To 
achieve this objective, the chapters draw on newspaper articles, personal interviews 
and key documents from programmes with civil society participation. These chapters 
look at ten programmes that were selected if MDB or national state documents 
showed that the projects gave significant importance to civil society involvement; if 
they were linked to the SDS; and if they had a broad geographical coverage and a 
sizeable budget. While chapter 5 concentrates on the emergence of the SDS, chapters 
6 and 7 focus on programmes. Chapter 6 looks at the programmes implemented 
during Menem’s second presidency: PROMIN (Programa Materno-Infantil de 
Nutrición – Mother and Child Nutrition Programme) and FOPAR (Fondo 
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Participativo de Inversión Social – Participatory Social Investment Fund), funded by 
the World Bank; PROMEBA (Programa de Mejoramiento de Barrios – Programme 
for Neighbourhood Improvement), PAGV (Programa de Atención a Grupos 
Vulnerables – Programme for Support of Vulnerable Groups) and PROAME 
(Programa de Atención a Menores en Situaciones de Riesgo – Programme to Assist 
Minors at Risk) funded by the IDB; and PFSC (Programa de Fortalecimiento de la 
Sociedad Civil - Programme for the Strengthening of Civil Society) and CENOC 
(Centro Nacional de Organizaciones Comunitarias – National Centre of Community 
Organisations), funded by the national budget. Chapter 7 looks at these programmes 
and at the Plan Solidaridad (Solidarity Plan), comprising Unidos (United) 
Programme, at Jefas de Hogar (Female Heads of Households) and at SI, (Seguro 
Infantil – Childhood Insurance), all programmes aimed at absorbing MDB-funded 
programmes.19 
 
Chapter 5 looks at the formation of the neopopulist discourse (1989-1994), showing 
that when the neoliberal discourse came onto the scene there was an initial moment of 
disjointed co-existence of the neoliberal and populist discourses on civil society, 
followed by a non-conflictive articulation of these discourses when neopopulism 
emerged and in which neoliberalism predominated. Chapter 6 analyses the changes 
introduced to the neopopulist discourse, put into practice in a number of poverty 
reduction policies (1995-1999). It shows that at the same time as the discourse was 
being colonised by the more political discourse of populism, it acquired an 
increasingly technical character and remained predominantly neoliberal. Chapter 7 
focuses on the Alianza government’s attempts to challenge the neopopulist discourse. 
That challenge paved the way for the domestic populist discourse to contest the 
neoliberal hegemony over the discourse on civil society (2000-2001). 
 
The second part applies the threefold analytical model derived from the theoretical 
framework presented here – relational discursive institutionalism. Relational analysis, 
empirical mapping and hegemonic analyses cut across these chapters. The first 
sections of the chapters map the events and actors that contributed to the stabilisation 
or re-articulation of the discourse on civil society in poverty reduction action. The 
second and third sections focus on the discourses on poverty and civil society 
                                                 
19
 For more details on the selection of programmes see Annex II. 
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respectively, considering that the government’s approaches to poverty prepared the 
ground in which the discourse on civil society took root. These sections attempt to de-
construct the partially fixed meanings of poverty and civil society by identifying 
discursive articulations, for example nodal points and chains of equivalences, and by 
mapping institutions and actors involved in poverty reduction policy-making and 
implementation, since these were embedded in the political struggles underlying the 
discursive articulations. The conclusions of these chapters aim to define which 
political project hegemonised – and with which strategies – the discourse on civil 
society in poverty reduction action in each period. 
 
The thesis shows that the centrality of technical and institutional aspects in the 
neoliberal logic of hegemonic construction created a crucial interstice through which 
the intrinsically political populist discourse could permeate the neoliberal hegemony. 
As dislocations in the hegemonic discourse emerged, domestic factors and actors 
allowed the Argentinean populist discourse on civil society to grow within the 
neopopulist discourse, partially colonise it and eventually challenge it. Policy makers 
and implementers, whose profiles combined technical skills with deeply embedded 
populist views, were crucial in this process. Additionally, the changes in the MDBs’ 
discourse on civil society during the 1990s, and the differences between the Banks 
and between their official positions and their staff’s views contributed to allowing this 
colonisation to happen. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Neoliberalism, populism and civil society 
 
 
 
This chapter details the understanding of neoliberalism, populism and civil society 
adopted in this thesis. The first section defines neoliberalism and Argentinean 
populism as two antagonistic political projects and describes their normative, 
contingent and logical components. These projects are antagonistic to each other 
because of their opposing normative views, contingent components and prevalent 
logics of discursive formation and, as political projects, they aim to universalise their 
particular views. The last part of the first section compares these projects, 
summarising their main features and pointing out their opposing characters and the 
possibilities of combining them. The second section explains the understanding of 
civil society used in the thesis. Civil society is seen as the arena in which the 
struggles for hegemony take place and as a discourse that defines what that arena is. 
The discourse on civil society thus delimits the possibilities of the political struggles 
for hegemony, and a focus on civil society is therefore particularly interesting for the 
analysis of the struggles between the neoliberal and populist political projects. 
 
 
2.1.Neoliberalism and populism: two antagonistic political projects 
 
 
a. Neoliberalism 
 
Neoliberalism is usually defined by reference to economic measures and is taken as 
synonymous with “market-oriented reform” or the list of measures that Williamson 
presented as the “Washington Consensus”. These included a focus on fiscal 
discipline, tax reform and privatisation, interest rate and trade liberalisation, a 
competitive exchange rate and the fostering of an economy more open to foreign 
investment (Williamson, 1990; 1993). 
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Numerous studies of neoliberalism that took a political perspective adopted this 
economic definition. Some of them concentrated on analysing the political counter-
face of neoliberal economic reform and others highlighted the political character of 
such reform. 
 
The studies concerned with the political counter-face of neoliberalism look at the 
socio-political conditions and consequences of the reforms. Regarding the conditions, 
until the 1980s academic wisdom was that regimes with cohesive technocratic elites 
and powerful executives that could control popular protest were a necessary condition 
for the implementation of neoliberal reform (Kaufman and Stallings, 1989). By the 
early 1990s, however, neoliberal reforms were no longer tied to authoritarian policy-
making (Philip, 1993: 556) and scholars had to consider again what conditions 
favoured the implementation and success of these reforms. The studies started to 
highlight the importance of domestic support for the success of reforms (Remmer, 
1991; Dominguez, 1997; Silva, 1997; Edwards, 1995; Philip, 1993) and international 
politics in the form of policy diffusion (Kahler, 1990) or imposition (Stallings, 1992; 
for Argentina Vacs, 1994).20 When the neoliberal agenda incorporated institutional 
reform objectives in the mid-1990s, scholars’ attention turned to bureaucratic issues, 
such as state capacity, and political factors, including the ability to negotiate 
consensus and the determination of political leaders (Grindle, 2000: 19). Many noted 
the importance of state bureaucracies’ isolation from socio-political influences and 
the defective functioning of representative institutions. Some of them asserted that 
countries with technocracies (Silva, 1997; 1998; Silva and Centeno, 1997; Centeno, 
1993; Teichman, 1997), or highly technically trained bureaucracies, with strong 
connections with the relevant social sectors (Evans, 1992), were the most capable of 
advancing reform. Others noted that centralised decision-making (Philip, 1993: 556) 
and elitist types of democracies accompanied neoliberalisation processes (Cammack, 
2000: 157). Some pointed out Presidents’ departures from their voters’ mandates 
(Stokes, 2001) and their taming of the ruling party (Corrales, 2003). 
 
                                                 
20
 This account excludes the studies that focus on the economic causes of neoliberal reforms, which usually highlight the role of 
the 1982 debt crisis (eg Bulmer Thomas, 1996: 11; Naim, 1993: 133-50). 
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The studies that focused on the political consequences of neoliberal reform were 
concerned with the transformations of socio-political actors that the reform triggered. 
In an influential work, Cavarozzi argued that the return to democratic rule and 
economic neoliberal reform was leading to the demobilisation and atomisation of 
society (Cavarozzi, 1994). Yet, by the mid-1990s new studies were pointing to the 
emergence of new actors in a context modified by neoliberal reforms (Oxhorn and 
Duncatezeiler, 1998; Smith and Korzeniewicz, 1997). Other analyses looked at how 
existing actors redefined themselves. In the case of Argentina, the studies by Levitsky 
(2001; 2003) on the Peronist party and Murillo (2001) on trade unions are 
noteworthy. 
 
However, these studies looking at the political counter-face of neoliberal reform fail 
to challenge the “end of history” thesis behind neoliberalism. They show that 
neoliberal reform redefines decision-making processes and the institutionalised 
distribution of power. Yet, they disregard a crucial belief that lies behind neoliberal 
reforms – that what guides them are logical analyses of the functioning of the social 
and not political preferences. The political outcomes of neoliberal reform are then the 
consequence of the rationality that governs free markets and not the triumph of a 
particular normative position. For instance, withdrawing the state from markets and 
the sphere of individuals would create the economic progress and free environment 
favourable to a democratic political system.21 The spread of neoliberal reforms in the 
1990s signified, it was claimed, the “end of history” because they were evidence of 
the triumph of liberal ideas (Fukuyama, 1989: 107), which appeared indisputable 
because the reforms drew on supposedly objective analyses of the social. Studies of 
the political counter-face of neoliberalism usually define the latter as an economic 
strategy and place political variables in relation to but outside of the economic realm, 
leaving unchallenged this neoliberal claim of apoliticism. 
 
In contrast, highlighting the political character of neoliberalism implies a challenge to 
the “end of history” thesis. Several studies noted that neoliberal reforms are not only 
economic but political. Looking at the WB good governance strategies, which reflect 
                                                 
21
 This view reflects a revival of modernisation theory which, outlined in the mid-20th century, held that economic growth would 
generate socio-economic conditions, such as education and a high level of urbanisation, in which democracy thrives (Lipset, 
1960; Rostow, 1960). 
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the neoliberal institutional reform agenda,22 scholars showed that in the search for the 
construction of a favourable environment for the development of market-based 
economies, these reforms favoured the establishment of a particular political system – 
liberal and pluralist democracy. The reforms’ accent on individual pluralist 
representation and a system of checks and balances between state and society were 
evidence of that (Philip, 1999: 240-1; Santiso, 2001: 4; Leftwich, 1993). While the 
“end of history” thesis argues that democracy would derive from the rationality of the 
markets, these students observe that democracy is an actively pursued model of 
political organisation guiding the neoliberal institutional reform plans. Class-based 
analyses depict neoliberalism as a political project pursued by the state for the benefit 
of the domestic and international capitalist class (Veltmeyer et al, 1997: 3, 122). In 
these students’ view, neoliberalism “is a product of US economic policy-makers, 
bankers and TNCs allied with Latin American transnational capitalists.”23 (Veltmeyer 
et al, 1997: 122). Neoliberalism is an ideology in the Marxist sense since “selling and 
marketing” neoliberalism as economic and institutional reforms of benefit to all veils 
the capitalists’ interests (Veltmeyer et al, 1997: 4). 
 
This thesis considers that the economic definition of neoliberalism, and its political 
counter-face and character, should be understood as part of the neoliberal political 
project, which consists of three components – normative, contingent and logical. 
Rather than economic reforms, the core of the neoliberal political project is its 
normative content. This content affects both the prevalent logic with which 
neoliberalism struggles for hegemony and, together with the given historical 
circumstances, the contingent elements of neoliberalism. Neoliberal economic 
measures are one of these contingent elements which, simultaneously, play a crucial 
role as a nodal point around which the neoliberal political project organises its logic 
of hegemonic articulation. 
 
Neoliberalism’s normative component draws on the two core tenets of classic 
liberalism – the primacy of individuals over the community and the division between 
the private and public spheres, where the latter’s interference with the former should 
be minimal (see Taylor, 1992: 29-30; Hodgson, 1989: 251). However, neoliberalism 
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 Chapter 4 considers these strategies further. 
23
 TNCs – Transnational Corporations. 
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is not the same as liberalism. First, plural organisations gained a central role in 20th 
century liberalism (eg Dahl, 1971) but in the initial versions of neoliberalism society 
equalled the sum of its atomised individuals and so governments adopting 
neoliberalism sought to build support from multi-class coalitions of non-organised 
actors (Weyland, 1999: 382). Second, prioritising individuals over community 
ensures that state intervention is minimal and so individuals’ freedom is preserved. In 
the late 20th century, analyses of less-developed countries that linked their economic 
problems to excessive state interventionism reinforced this view. Yet, neoliberal 
reforms were pursued using the state as the agent for effecting change (Weyland, 
1996: 17). Third, liberalism was concerned with not just economic but political 
aspects. The social contractualism24 that lies at the origins of liberalism was 
especially concerned with defining the most appropriate form of government for free 
individuals. Nowadays, debates about democracy express that concern. 
Neoliberalism, in contrast, accentuates the economic side of liberalism and seems to 
revive only the principles of economic liberalism: free trade and minimal state 
intervention in the economy (Helleiner, 2003: 686; O’Toole, 2003: 270). However, 
neoliberalism attempts to re-create the features of the bourgeois society (Jessop, 
2002: 452) in which those economic principles emerged. State retraction is an attempt 
to reinstall the divide between private and public spheres that was emerging when 
liberal thought was developing (Habermas, 1989; Gellner, 1994). Therefore, while 
liberalism reflected an emerging social mutation, neoliberalism takes the liberal 
reading of that mutation – the emergence of the individual and the separation of the 
private from the public sphere – as a normative horizon. 
 
The normative components of political projects constitute a threshold for their 
contingent variations, and the contingent elements consist of the projects’ policies and 
institutional preferences. In neoliberalism the contingent elements include the 
Washington consensus set of measures, and other policy recommendations such as 
those aimed at good governance, including the aim of constructing liberal and 
pluralist democracy. The consequences of neoliberalism identified by students of the 
political counter-face of neoliberal reform are not contingent elements of the 
neoliberal project but part of the continuously changing context in which the 
                                                 
24
 In particular, Locke, (1986) {1690}. 
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neoliberal project struggles for hegemony. The contingent elements are the most 
visible part of neoliberalism. As they are highly variable in accordance with the 
spatio-temporal circumstances in which neoliberalism is advanced, many claim that 
neoliberalism is just a loosely tied set of policy recommendations that take different 
forms in different contexts (Jessop, 2002: Campbell and Pedersen, 2001: 1). Yet, the 
preference for minimal state intervention in economic and social affairs underpins 
these contingent elements, which indicates that the normative component links and 
frames these elements. 
 
Economic reforms are the most prominent element of the neoliberal contingent 
component. This prominence reflects the neoliberal adaptation of liberalism in the last 
decades of the 20th century, emphasising its economic aspects more than its political 
ones. This adaptation echoed the predominant readings of the context of that time. 
After the oil crisis of the early 1970s prompted the liberalisation of international 
markets, the perception spread that the origin of the succession of economic crises 
that developing countries suffered from then on was their state-led economies. The 
debt crisis of 1982 and the hyperinflation of the late 1980s in Latin America provided 
new grounds for this perception. Additionally, neoliberalism took its first steps in the 
region in the context of authoritarian governments (Kaufman and Stallings, 1989) and 
therefore it needed to appear detached from political positions. Later, increasingly 
under democratic governments, international organisations became key promoters of 
these reforms. These organisations, as external actors and to avoid interference with 
democratic mechanisms, had to appear politically neutral.25 
 
The logics of discursive articulation reflect the manner in which political projects 
address social demands. In this way, political projects seek to become or remain 
hegemonic. The prevalent logic of discursive articulation in neoliberalism is 
differential in accordance with its normative component, particularly the stress on 
individuals. That is, neoliberalism addresses social demands in a differentiated 
manner through routinised techniques and institutions. This highlights the 
particularity of the demands and de-emphasises what each individual demand has in 
common with other demands (Laclau, 2005a: 98, 103-104). Yet, at the same time, 
                                                 
25
 This also related to the rules of these institutions (chapter 4). 
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neoliberalism, as a political project, tries to present its particular normative views as 
universal in order to become or remain hegemonic. 
 
The universalisation of a particularity entails the implementation of the logic of 
equivalence, which highlights how different demands are equal to others and how the 
given political project can meet them. The universalising of a particular project 
resembles the “selling and marketing” of neoliberalism suggested in class-based 
analyses (Veltmeyer et al, 1997: 4). Yet, this universalisation is not merely the 
imposition of an ideology that veils an objective reality, as those analyses assume. 
Since discourses are open, their articulation as ideologies represents the success of a 
particular view in temporarily closing a discourse – or suturing it. Neoliberalism 
presents its solutions to social demands as the outcome of objective analyses and 
technical language and experts’ voices are central in supporting these objectivity 
claims. Drawing on its normative components and on these analyses, neoliberalism 
connects different social demands through chains of equivalence that converge in 
what emerges as the project’s nodal point: economic reform based on state reduction. 
This discursive articulation of equivalences is key to helping neoliberalism to both 
close the discourse and hegemonise its views. The logical component of 
neoliberalism, thus, is mainly differential, but it includes the logic of equivalence 
since, as a political discourse, neoliberalism aims to become hegemonic. 
 
Therefore, economic reforms are a crucial element of the neoliberal project in two 
respects. First, they are the most visible contingent element of neoliberalism and, 
second, they play a critical role as a nodal point around which the project constructs 
its hegemony. Due to the liberal conception of the economy as the realm of natural 
law and the neoliberal accent on economic liberalism, economic knowledge rose 
above other expert knowledge. As the “end of history” thesis holds, the rationality of 
the markets dictates neoliberal economic measures and thus, these experts can present 
their recommendations as neutral and beyond political disagreement. Economic 
knowledge and language applied the logic of difference, by justifying institutionalised 
responses to the population’s demands, and were crucial in creating the chains of 
equivalences necessary to universalise the normative views of neoliberalism by 
showing that all demands converged in the inadequacy of state interventionism. Yet, 
as the conception of the economy as natural and rational is part of the liberal 
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worldview, the alleged rationality and neutrality of the measures that follow market 
dictates are at the core of the fundamentally political operation of making the 
neoliberal particular views universal, that is, constructing hegemonic power. In other 
words, the “end of history” thesis is at the core of neoliberal hegemonic operations. 
 
To summarise, neoliberalism is a political project because it involves a particular 
reading of how the social works and should be governed – the normative component 
– and it aims to universalise this particular view. While the normative component 
prioritises the logic of difference in addressing social demands, in its attempts to 
become hegemonic neoliberalism applies the logic of equivalence. Economic 
prescriptions, at the same time as constituting a contingent element of the project, 
play, together with institutional recommendations for reform, a crucial role in 
achieving the project’s universalising aims. Consequently, neoliberal institutional 
reform revolves around the priority of market-oriented reforms. In turn, both 
economic and institutional reforms are based on the normative liberal tenets of private 
and public division and the prioritisation of the individual over the community. 
Neoliberalism is a political project not in terms of being the project of a particular 
class, nor just in terms of the political practices and social dynamics it entails and 
triggers, but because it aims to become the hegemonic view of how the social should 
be conceived. Chapter 4 provides more details of the neoliberal political project in the 
1990s and its specific discourse on poverty and civil society. 
 
 
b. Populism 
 
While neoliberalism is usually defined with reference to its economic measures, there 
is less agreement in the literature about what populism means.26 Moreover, the word 
populism usually has pejorative connotations (Canovan, 1999: 2; Mackinnon and 
Petrone, 1998: 12). This thesis regards populism as a political project and, to avoid 
such connotations, it builds its understanding of populism on a formal definition. Yet, 
in understanding it as a political project, the thesis cannot be limited to a formal 
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 The wide variety of definitions of populism meant that some questioned the conceptual usefulness of the term (de la Torre, 
1992, 386-7; Viguera, 1993: 49; Flynn, 2000: 239). 
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definition and requires the inclusion of the particular form in which populism existed 
in the country under study. 
 
As Latin American populism attracted the bulk of scholarly attention on the theme 
and as that is the region that this thesis is concerned with, the following review of the 
main approaches to populism is restricted to analyses focused on Latin America.27 
These approaches can be divided into four – socio-historical, economic, dimensional 
and discursive. 
 
Up until the 1980s, populism was associated with socio-historical aspects and a 
specific stage of economic development. Studies at that time explained rather than 
defined populism, but it is possible to identify some definitions in them. 
 
The socio-historical approach is two-tiered – cultural and sociological. Cultural 
approaches emphasise the importance of the patrimonial political culture inherited 
from the colonial past in explaining populism in Latin America. Populism is a type of 
leadership, which in the 20th century replaced the 19th century’s caudillismo (Stein, 
1980). Sociological approaches focused on issues of manipulation by leaders as 
opposed to autonomous popular mobilisation. A key debate here regarded the study 
of Peronism. Germani, influenced by structural functionalism28 and modernisation 
theory,29 argued that populism was a form of political manipulation made possible 
because the rapid industrialisation of the country paved the way for workers’ political 
participation. Yet, still attached to traditional worldviews and not used to the new 
modernity, workers became “available masses” for manipulation (Germani, 1978 
chapters 4-5; Germani, 1962; see also Mackinnon and Petrone, 1998: 24).30 Murmis 
and Portantiero (1971) saw populism also as a form of political participation but, 
from a Gramscian perspective, contested Germani’s thesis. They held that workers 
                                                 
27
 Before becoming a social studies concept, populism was a self-denomination adopted by two disparate movements outside of 
Latin America: American agrarian populism and the early utopian socialism of tzarist Russia (for both cases see Canovan, 1981: 
chapters 1 and 2; Mackinnon and Petrone, 1998: 16-19 and Vilas, 1988: 325-8; on Russia Blakely, 1999 and on America, Szasz, 
1999 and Goodwin 1978). Noteworthy among social analyses of populism outside of Latin America are those focused on right-
wing populisms in Europe (see Betz, 1994 and, from a different perspective, selected articles in Panizza, 2005) and theoretical 
works such as Gellner and Ionescu, 1969; Laclau, 1977a, 2005a, 2005b; and Westlind, 1996. 
28
 Structural functionalism is a post-Second World War theory and, as such, is concerned with the restoration of order. Developed 
by Parsons (1955), its core tenet is that, to understand how societies work, social systems and the roles of actors within them are 
more important than individuals’ rationality. 
29
 See note 2 in this chapter. 
30
 Numerous studies followed Germani. Noteworthy is the work of Di Tella, which pointed out the multi-class character of 
populist coalitions (Di Tella, 1965). Other works in this vein were Dix (1985), who studied the differences between authoritarian 
and democratic populisms, taking into account not only the coalitions’ characteristics but also the characteristics of the mass 
bases – ideologies, and organisation and leadership style – and Mouzelis (1985). 
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were politically engaged and populism emerged because of the inability of the 
national bourgeoisie to reconstruct their hegemony after the process of 
industrialisation had weakened it (Murmis and Portantiero, 1971).31 
 
Linking populism with economic development, Cardoso and Faletto argued that 
populism was an ideology that enabled the legitimisation of the import substitution 
industrialisation (ISI) model of development. Drawing on economic structuralism,32 
they maintained that Latin American countries needed to adopt this model because 
the incipient industrialisation of the early 20th century had led to increasing internal 
demand and the countries were unable to import goods. The model required the 
collaboration of two sectors with opposing interests – workers and industrialists. 
Populism was shaped by the need to establish harmony between these sectors and 
maintain their support for the model of development, which the state did by 
responding to pressure from the popular sectors with redistributive measures and 
supporting national industry with the creation of internal markets (Cardoso and 
Faletto, 1990 [1969]: 104-106). More recent Marxist accounts argue that populism 
emerged as a response to a crisis of the model of capitalist accumulation (Cammack, 
2000), and they define populism as economic policies aimed at the “expansion of 
consumption” to overcome this crisis (Vilas, 1988: 324). By the 1990s, these versions 
argued that populism was born at a specific stage of capitalist development but 
survived its conditions of emergence and became an ideology and a project for 
society (Vilas, 1995; Tarcus, 1992). 
 
In the 1990s, when most of the region’s governments adopted neoliberalism, 
populism was defined in macroeconomic terms as “an approach to economics that 
emphasizes growth and income distribution and deemphasizes the risks of inflation 
and deficit finance...” (Dornsbusch and Edwards, 1991: 9, see also Sachs, 1989).33 
The macroeconomics of populism is, in this view, what constitutes the core of 
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 The socio-historical approach took a third turn in the late 1980s. Succinctly put, the “conjuncturalists” focused on the 
opportunities available to and the restrictions faced by different classes in the historical setting in which populisms emerged, 
holding that the labour sectors that supported populist movements were not weak and were involved in political activity 
(Adelman, 1992: 243, 248, 252; see also Matsushita, 1987; Torre, 1990; James, 1989). 
32
 Economic structuralism is based on the work of Prebisch (1950) and argues that the causes of Latin American 
underdevelopment are to be found in longstanding social and economic structures. Its advocates proposed a recipe for 
development that stressed the role of the state in changing this unfavourable structure (Sunkel and Zuleta, 1990). For concise 
explanations of economic structuralism and the dependency theory version, see Palma, 1988; Sunkel 1990; Pinto (1965; 1970) 
and Hirschman (1963). 
33
 A predecessor of this view of populism can be found in Canitrot (1975), written when neoliberalism was first making inroads 
in the region. 
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populism – while its politics may vary, the economic policy remains constant. This 
notion of populism is principally but not purely economic. Populist economic policies 
are seen as designed to serve political goals (Kauffman and Stallings, 1991: 16) rather 
than as following an economic rationality. The policies are usually conceived of as 
inseparable from the model of inward development that had prevailed in the region 
since the 1930s and the institutions that had developed around that state-centred 
model (Cavarozzi, 1992a; 1994). Thus, institutions can be labelled as populist, for 
example the populist state (Burki and Edwards, 1996), statist-populist parties 
(Corrales, 2003) and populist trade unions (Murillo, 2001). 
 
Dimensional definitions also gained supporters in the 1990s, as the academic focus 
was shifting from explanation to definition. A number of multidimensional 
definitions reflected an attempt to systematise and provide further evidence of the 
most salient observations made about populism from both the socio-historical and 
economic perspectives. Bringing together the various dimensions of populism that 
this literature produced, populism consists of: (1) a personalistic and paternalistic 
style of leadership – not necessarily charismatic – possibly influenced by the colonial 
past; (2) a political practice in which the leader appeals to “the people”, usually 
bypassing institutions; (3) a multi-class political coalition whose social bases are the 
subaltern sectors of society and tend to be urban; (4) a rhetoric that exalts popular 
culture and is anti-establishment; (5) a programme of proposals that is eclectic, 
ambiguous and reformist rather than revolutionary; (6) an economic programme that 
is functional to political objectives, is redistributive, and is associated with processes 
of accelerated industrialisation and inwards strategy for economic development; (7) 
the use of clientelistic methods to create material foundation for popular support; (8) 
an expression of a nationalist defence of popular sovereignty against foreign 
exploitation; (9) a preference for state intervention in both economic and social 
affairs; and (10) whatever its definition, it seems to emerge in situations of crisis (see 
Knight, 1998: 225; Roberts, 1995: 88; Drake, 1982: 190; 1999: 224-233; Conniff, 
1982). However, these dimensions describe the characteristics of populism but do not 
say what populism ultimately is. Is populism a movement, an ideology, or a regime 
with all these characteristics? A second type of dimensional definitions throws some 
light on this. 
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Politico-dimensional definitions emerged as a response to scholars’ surprise at seeing 
populism co-existing with neoliberalism in the 1990s. The neoliberal understanding 
of populism in economic terms assumed that the neoliberal fiscal discipline of 
neoliberalism would erode populism by curtailing its central feature of fiscal 
indiscipline (Sachs, 1989: 7-11). Thus, the economic neoliberal definition of 
populism seemed to be inadequate to explain this co-existence (Panizza, 2000a: 179) 
and some authors suggested focusing on the political dimensions of populism 
(Roberts, 1995; Weyland, 1996; 1999). A “purely political”34 definition of populism 
maintains that there is populism when (1) a personalistic leader appeals to a 
heterogeneous mass of followers; (2) the leader approaches the followers, bypassing 
established institutions; and (3) the leader builds new organisations or revives earlier 
populist organisations which remain at a low level of institutionalisation (Weyland, 
1999: 381). These studies argue that while these dimensions are constant in all 
populisms, mass constituencies and economic policies vary and should be the object 
of empirical research (Weyland, 1996: 5).35 If these dimensions indicate what 
populism is, then populism is a “style of leadership” (Conniff, 1999: 7; Drake, 1999: 
223, 224; Knight, 1998; Panizza, 2001: 441). Therefore, this approach highlights the 
centrality of the political rather than the economic character of populism and, unlike 
the economic and multidimensional approaches, it sees style rather than content as 
defining what populism is (Knight, 1998). But what is it that unites the empirically 
observed characteristics of this style? The discursive approach provides insights that 
help to answer this. 
 
The discursive approach holds that populism is a mode of discursive articulation in 
which the logic of equivalence prevails. This discursive articulation consists of a 
direct and anti-status quo appeal to the people. In this appeal, populism constitutes the 
people politically by identifying them as the oppressed or neglected and dividing 
them from what and who oppresses or neglects them (Panizza, 2005b: 3; 2000: 179; 
Laclau, 2005b: 38). This moment of political constitution reveals the anti-status quo 
character of populism because people are constituted as different from those whose 
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 The main problem with Weyland’s “purely political” definition is that he understands the fusion of neoliberalism with 
populism as circumstancial to the special situation of hyperinflation that led to the need for populism to adopt neoliberalism. 
When he argues that with the end of this extraordinary situation a “backlash of populism” is not unlikely (Weyland, 1999: 396, 
398) it is evident that he still sees populism in both political and economic terms. 
35
 Accordingly, what makes classical populism different from neo-populism is that it no longer appeals to the working classes and 
does not apply redistributive economic measures. 
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power is crystallised in the institutionalised system, and because the appeal addresses 
people directly and not through those established institutions (Laclau, 1977a: 173). In 
constituting the people politically, populism applies the logic of equivalence. When 
established institutions fail to satisfy a number of demands, the dislocation of a social 
system becomes apparent and the opportunity emerges to form equivalential chains 
that connect these demands beyond their differences (Laclau, 2005b: 35-37) and to 
attempt a new form of closure of the social. In Barros’ words,  
 
"a dislocation of the existing structures of meaning forces the emergence of 
different demands that will seek to resignify the political context by advancing a 
specific solution to the critical situation provoked by the dislocated structure" 
(2005: 252-253). 
 
The populist appeal points out that different demands are equivalent in terms of being 
equally non-satisfied by the established institutions. While the logic of equivalence is 
inherent in all political operations of hegemonisation, its expansion is what makes an 
appeal populist (Laclau, 2005b: 45). The above explanation shows that this expansion 
is linked to crises of the established institutional system36 (Panizza, 2005b: 14). 
According to this view, therefore, populism is the purest form of politics because, by 
rupturing with “politics as usual”, it reveals the politically constructed character of 
the social, and because it does so by dividing the political terrain into friends and 
enemies, it is the political gesture par excellence (Zizek, 2000: 182). 
 
The understanding of populism as a political project in this thesis builds on the formal 
definition of populism suggested by the discursive approach. However, as a political 
project, populism here includes a normative component and the content with which 
this logic is filled in the specific context in which it exists – the contingent 
component. Moreover, this thesis considers that the logical component of populism is 
so distinctive of this political project that it acquires a meta-normative status. 
 
                                                 
36
 The emergence of populism is associated in most analyses with some form of crisis – crisis of the capitalist model of 
accumulation, crisis of the hegemonic bloc, the overlapping of traditional and modern systems, crisis of the political party 
systems, or crises of democracy (Cammack, 2000; Vilas, 1988; Murmis and Portantiero, 1971; Germani, 1969; Weyland, 1999: 
383-85, 393-4 and Szuzterman, 2000: 194, respectively). 
 55 
The normative horizon of populism consists of the sovereignty of people over 
individuals and the dissolution of the separation between the people and the 
institutions that represent them. However, what differentiates populism from other 
political projects with similar normative components, such as republicanism or grass-
roots politics (Panizza, 2005a, Panizza, 2008: 79), is not a particular social base or 
economic programme. Rather, its distinctiveness lies in its focus on the political 
constitution of the people via the creation of antagonists – the established institutional 
system and those sectors whose views are crystallised in this system – and 
equivalences – created by highlighting the commonalities of the people’s different 
demands. This logical component is so central to populism that it overlaps with the 
normative level of the project and operates as a meta-normative threshold – a value 
position that sustains its normative component. 
 
These logical and normative components set a framework for the possibilities of 
existing populisms. Yet, due to the anti-institutionalist logic of populism, the 
normative component of populism is rarely operationalised in institutional 
recommendations that are a fixed part of the project. Rather, these recommendations 
are highly dependent on the circumstances in which the populist project struggles to 
become hegemonic. Hence, the contingent component carries significant weight in 
defining what existing populisms are. 
 
The contingent component of populism consists of the manner in which a populist 
appeal institutionalises its direct link with the people, the themes it articulates in its 
appeal, and the content that fills the concepts of “the people” and “the others” – that 
is, its institutions, its policies and its social bases. Therefore, the contingent 
component of populism reveals the limitations of its anti-status quo character. The 
populist “moment” of the direct appeal is brief (Cammack, 2000: 157) and, if it 
succeeds, it needs to crystallise its success through some form of institutionalisation. 
The logic of populism conditions the contingent component of institutions. Yet, the 
anti-institutionalism inherent in that logic allows the context to define the content of 
the contingent component – the characteristics of the populist institutions. 
 
In Argentina, the success of the Peronist populist appeal fundamentally defined the 
elements that crystallised as the content of the populist political project. Although 
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these elements were contingent, the success of the Peronist appeal and its subsequent 
proscription meant that they obtained a higher level of fixation. Hence, most of what 
analysts include in lists of populism’s characteristics, such as its association with an 
inward model of development, the preference for corporatist state-society relations 
and the appeal to workers – particularly in the case of Peronism – are considered here 
as elements of the populist political project that engaged in struggles for hegemony 
with neoliberalism in the 1990s. Peronism filled the notion of “the people” with the 
workers and corporatism reflected the Peronist attempt to institutionalise its direct 
appeal to the people. These elements shared the common feature of state 
interventionism, which made them compatible with the populist logic because it 
enabled direct contact between the political sphere and the people. At the same time, 
the preference for these institutions was strongly influenced by the context in which 
the Peronist populist appeal succeeded – the international prevalence of ISI models of 
development since the 1930s, anti-liberal political systems in the inter-war years, and 
the situation at that time of the longstanding domestic disputes between liberalism 
and populism. Chapter 3 presents further details of the content of Argentinean 
populism. 
 
While Argentinean populism resembles many empirical descriptions of populism, the 
thesis understands the core of populism to be its logical and normative components. 
This understanding can better account for the ubiquity of populism, highlight its 
emancipatory potential beyond its contingent content, and avoid the usual pejorative 
connotations. If the contingent character of the manifestations of populism is 
acknowledged, it is not inconceivable that populism and neoliberalism can co-exist, 
influence each other and transform themselves. Also, acknowledging the politically 
constructed character of the content of populism reinforces the fact that the character 
that populism acquired in a given historical context is not fixed, opening up the 
possibilities of populism engendering a mode of politics highly responsive to people’s 
demands (Panizza, 2008: 80).37 This thesis includes the contingent elements in the 
definition of populism, especially because they were perceived as crucial parts of the 
project and hence affected the conditions in which populism struggled for hegemony 
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 This position is different to that of De Ipola and Portantiero, who sustain that the emancipatory potential of populism, or its 
equivalence with socialism, is jeopardised by the fact that populism has historically reified people in organicist and statist 
political forms that negate pluralism, dissent and difference (De Ipola and Portantiero, 1995: 533). 
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in the 1990s. But the definition used in this thesis emphasises the contingent rather 
than the constitutive character of those elements. 
 
In summary, populism is understood here as a political project, the distinctive feature 
of which is the prevalence of a logic of discursive formation characterised by its 
direct appeal to the people against established institutions, and by the construction of 
chains of equivalences within the political identity that that appeal constitutes. 
Because of its centrality, this logic operates as a normative horizon for the project that 
sustains its core normative component – the sovereignty of the people and the 
resistance to barriers that hinder direct contact between the people and their leaders. 
These logical and normative components condition the contingent manifestations of 
populism. In Argentina, the fundamental contingent elements of the populist project, 
crystallised during Peronism, include principally the economic model of inward 
development, the central role of the workers as part of “the people” and the 
prevalence of an interventionist state. 
 
The logical, normative and contingent components described above is the basis of the 
Argentinean populist project that antagonised with the neoliberal political project in 
struggles to become hegemonic. The next paragraphs look at the possibility that these 
two antagonistic projects had to combine their most fundamental constitutive 
components in order to start exploring how they co-existed, influenced each other or 
transformed themselves through hegemonic struggles in the context of defining the 
discourse on civil society in poverty reduction policies in the 1990s in Argentina. 
 
 
c. Comparing neoliberalism and populism 
 
As political projects, both neoliberalism and populism contain three components: 
contingent, normative and logical. Neoliberalism and populism are opposing political 
projects because of their divergent normative views and preferred logics of discursive 
formation, which result in the adoption of contrasting contingent elements. Figure 1 
compares the two political projects. 
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TABLE 1: Comparison of the Neoliberal and Populist Political Projects 
 
Components/Projects NEOLIBERALISM POPULISM 
   
 
LOGICAL 
 
Difference:  
 
Equivalence: 
 Institutions  
  Political constitution of the 
people 
NORMATIVE  
Primacy of individuals 
Private/public divide 
 
 
Sovereignty of the people  
Unmediated contact people-
politics 
 
CONTINGENT 
State withdrawal from  
private sphere  
Washington consensus: 
Institutional reform 
Pluralist Democracy 
State interventionism  
 
ISI model of development: 
Bypassing institutions  
Corporatism 
Keys: 
     Core component of each project 
     Overlapping components 
       Connection between neoliberal and populist project: appeal for support 
Connection between populism and neoliberalism: need for institutionalisation 
 
 
 
The contingent elements of neoliberalism include the Washington consensus 
economic measures and recommendations for institutional reforms aimed at the 
construction of a democratic system of individuals’ pluralist representation. In the 
populist project, the contingent component refers specifically to the fundamental 
characteristics that this project acquired in its historical existence in Argentina: the 
ISI model of development; the content given to “the people”, in which the working 
class played a central role; and the attempt to institutionalise the populist appeal to the 
people through corporatism. The crosscutting issues of state interventionism and 
withdrawal in the populist and neoliberal projects respectively appear as distinctive 
contingent elements of these projects, but also reflect their different normative 
perspectives. 
 
Normatively, these projects entail different conceptions of the social and how it 
should be governed. The neoliberal normative horizon is the separation of the private 
and public spheres and the defence of the individual rather than the community. The 
core of populism is its appeal to the people and the attempt to break down all the 
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barriers that separate them from their governments or leaders, which involves a fusion 
of the liberal notion of the private and public spheres and an accent on the identity of 
“the people” rather than on individuals. In both populism and neoliberalism the 
normative component defines the prevalent logic of discursive construction, but in the 
case of populism the normative and the logical component are mutually linked. 
 
The logical level presents a key avenue for the combination of these two projects. 
While the prevalent logic of discursive constructions is diverse in each project – 
difference in neoliberalism and equivalence in populism – as political projects they 
both need to apply the logic of equivalence to universalise their particular project and 
become hegemonic. Neoliberalism resorts to the alleged neutrality of economic 
rationality to build political support, thus making the “end of history” thesis the core 
of the political character of the neoliberal project. This paves the way for a possible 
co-existence of liberalism with populism, particularly because neoliberalism focuses 
only on the economic aspects of the liberal doctrine and leaves the political aspect 
available for other political projects to re-articulate. At the same time, populism, 
especially successful populist appeals, needs to acquire a certain level of 
institutionalisation, thus also implementing the logic of difference. Moreover, because 
of its highly contingent character, it can adopt a variety of institutional forms. 
However, because a key part of the distinctive character of populism is its anti-
institutionalist logic, if populism acquires a certain level of institutionalisation it can 
be absorbed by other political projects with different normative views and in which 
the logic of difference – or institutionalised mode of dealing with demands – prevails. 
 
 
2.2.Civil society as discourse and arena 
 
Following an account of the re-emergence of the study of civil society and the main 
theoretical debates that informed the 1990s’ perspectives, this section specifies the 
understanding of civil society used in this thesis. 
 
 
a. Perspectives on civil society 
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After having disappeared from the social studies field between the 1920s and the 
1980s,38 the study of civil society re-emerged in the last decade of the 20th century 
(Gellner, 1994; Keane, 1998; Taylor, 1995; Fine, 1997; Cohen and Arato, 1994) 
among social theorists, social analysts and policy practitioners, bringing about a 
multiplication of definitions and perspectives. Crucial events leading to this return 
started in the 1960s, with feminist movements, anti-war protests and student 
mobilisations, and continued with civil society groups that formed in Eastern Europe 
to confront the Soviet order in the 1980s.39 The international economic crisis of the 
1970s was associated with the exhaustion of the welfare states created after the war 
(Keane, 1998: 6) and produced a marked shift of focus in social studies from the state 
to society. In Latin America, a growth of social organisations accompanied the 
region’s implementation of the Alliance for Progress plans to attack poverty in the 
1960s (Cardarelli and Rosenfeld, 1998: 29). In the 1970s, these organisations 
continued to develop because they became a space in which political participation 
could continue despite military or limited democratic regimes (Jelin 1994; Jelin and 
Hershberg 1996; Pearce 1997; Roberts 1998). From the mid-1980s onwards, the 
gradual adoption of neoliberalism continued to foster the growth of social 
organisations, which supplemented the reduction of state intervention. By the early 
1990s, neoliberal poverty reduction plans started to include actions for civil society 
strengthening, and policy makers became interested in civil society debates 
(Chandoke, 1995; Pearce 1997; 2000: 4; Bresser Pereira and Cunill Grau, 1998). 
 
Although this revival led to a multiplication of definitions and perspectives on civil 
society (Keane, 1998, 36), many scholars noted that the 1990s’ views on civil society 
could be categorised according to the long-standing theoretical debates they built on 
(eg Foley and Edwards, 1996; Howell and Pearce, 2001: 25-38; Taylor, 1995; Fine, 
1997). Reflecting these scholars’ suggestion, the debates on civil society in the 1990s 
are grouped here into three perspectives – neo-conservative, neo-Gramscian and neo-
pluralist, which incorporate, respectively, the writings of Tocqueville, those of 
                                                 
38
 This assertion draws on Keane’s observation that social movements emerged in Japan and Latin America but civil society 
disappeared from social studies as a concept after the first decades of the 20th century (Keane, 1998). 
39
 These events strongly influenced the writings on civil society in the field of political theory, notably Kumar (1993); Gellner 
(1994); Cohen and Arato (1994). 
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Gramsci, and a debate begun in the mid-20th century in the social studies arena 
regarding individualism and pluralism. 
 
Tocqueville (1994 [1839]) wrote during the monarchic reaction to the French 
revolution, trying to explain the reaction by observing the experience of democracy in 
the USA. His view of civil society were based on the ideas of the late 18th century 
Scottish Enlightenment political economists, particularly Adam Smith and Adam 
Ferguson, who conceived of civil society as different from the political sphere and as 
the realm of plurality (Gellner, 1994). The political economists’ ideas drew on 
Locke’s contractualism40 but, in contrast, did not conceive of “civil society” as 
equivalent to “political society” and the result of a contract between rational 
individuals. Rather, these thinkers maintained that civil society was harmonious 
because it was equal to the economic sphere, the natural order of which emerged from 
the division of labour (Taylor, 1995; Varty, 1997; Lively and Reeve, 1997). 
Tocqueville, however, concerned with the “terror” that followed the French 
Revolution, was wary of the conflicts that could emerge if one social group attempted 
to dominate the others. Observing the USA, he concluded that autonomous and 
voluntary associations could limit both state excesses and groups’ domination 
aspirations (Hall, 1995). These associations were “schools for democracy” because 
participating in them prepared society’s members to participate in political affairs. 
Thus, as schools of political participation, associations were at the service of the state 
but were autonomous from it because they came about due to the need of individuals 
to protect their liberties against tyranny. 
 
Gramsci (1998 [1971]) wrote in the 1920s as a political prisoner of fascism in Italy 
and in the aftermath of Russia’s communist revolution. He largely aligned with Hegel 
and Marx’s criticism of the political economists’ view of civil society. Hegel and 
Marx conceived of civil society as equivalent to political society and highlighted its 
inequalities rather than its harmony (Fine, 1997). Gramsci embraced Hegel’s accent 
on the importance of intermediary bodies in mediating between civil society and the 
state (Taylor, 1995; Whitehead, 1997)41 and Marx’s idea that civil society existed in 
relation to the state. Yet, he disagreed with Hegel’s view of the state as the realm that 
                                                 
40
 See Locke, (1986) {1690}. 
41
 See Hegel, 1967 {1821}. 
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could supersede inequalities in civil society, and with Marx’s expectations that a 
revolution would inevitably emerge from the development of the economic structure 
and would thus put an end to those inequalities. According to Marx, the state was the 
source of the formal equality embedded in rights that gave existence to a “civil” 
society and prevented the disadvantaged classes from being aware of their objective 
position in the economic sphere (Marx and Engels, 1982 [1932]: 69). Similarly, 
Gramsci stressed that civil society was the arena in which the state constructs, via a 
variety of institutions, the hegemony that sustains state power. However, he argued 
that for the revolution to arise it was crucial that a political organisation generated a 
counter-hegemony in that same arena in order to confront the state (Kumar, 1993). 
Hence, Gramsci regarded the state and civil society as intertwined realms that could 
support or oppose each other, depending on the situation of domination – if a counter-
hegemony challenging state power emerged in civil society, opposition prevailed. 
 
Between the 1930s and the 1980s debates about the concept of civil society dwindled 
as social studies turned its attention to the state and the individual. However, the 
pluralist critique of utilitarianism brought into social studies a central issue that had 
been debated in previous theories of civil society – intermediary organisations. After 
the 1920s, social studies increasingly viewed the state as the main promoter of change 
and progress. The state-led post-Second World War reconstruction reinforced this 
view, but it also witnessed an increasing focus on individuals in explaining social 
phenomena. Individualist approaches faced challenges from several theories. 
Utilitarianism, the most influential individualist approach of the post-war years, 
conceived of the social sphere as an aggregation of rational and self-interested 
individuals. Pluralism was a group theory that criticised individualism, not by 
suggesting a focus on the state, as class-based group theories did in those years,42 but 
by stressing the importance of interest groups in decision-making processes (eg Dahl, 
1961: 64). These groups resembled the intermediary social organisations that had 
appeared in previous debates on civil society. Yet the critique of individualism was 
limited, since interest groups were seen as coalitions of individuals with shared 
interests or attitudes (Polsby, 1963: 115; Truman, 1962: 33, both in Wenman, 2003: 
58; Goodin and Klingemann, 1996: 11). 
                                                 
42
 For instance, Althusser’s structuralist Marxism. His article on state apparatuses is key in this respect (Althusser, 1971). 
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These long-standing theories informed the three perspectives that emerged with the 
revival of the study of civil society. 
 
The neo-conservative perspective that emerged in the 1990s draws on a libertarian 
reading of Locke and the Enlightenment. It takes up their arguments about the 
harmony between natural and commercial society (Nozick, 1988: 107-110) and 
incorporates the individualist approach to social studies that spread after the mid-20th 
century. It regards civil society as separate from the state and as composed of an 
aggregation of individuals. In the public-private divide, civil society falls into the 
latter and, if civil society can generate a civic culture, this should pursue the aim of 
restraining the excesses of unorganised mass politics. In this, the perspective 
resembles Tocqueville’s disapproval of civil society’s direct involvement in politics. 
This perspective underlay the early neoliberal approaches to civil society that 
accompanied macroeconomic adjustment. 
 
The neo-pluralist perspective also draws on the Enlightenment tradition and sees state 
and civil society as two separate spheres. It takes the pluralist idea of the importance 
of interest groups in shaping government decisions. However, in response to the 
criticism that not all interest groups have the same possibilities of influencing 
government decisions because some have more resources than others, neo-pluralists 
suggest that the sources of plurality lie not in the organisation of labour but in 
community life. This emphasises Tocqueville’s concern with the civic culture that 
associational life can engender, and stretches the focus on interest groups to include 
value-oriented organisations. Social organisations are still viewed as a way of 
protecting individuals from state excesses but they are not merely aggregations of 
individual interests. Moreover, plural groups are conceived of not as separate to but 
as constitutive of the state itself (Dunleavy and O’Leary, 1987). The debates on social 
capital, begun with Putnam’s work (1993) and included in the MDBs’ views of civil 
society by the mid-1990s, reflect this perspective. 
 
The neo-Gramscian perspective continues along the lines of Gramsci’s adoption of 
Hegel and Marx, and criticises individualist approaches to social studies without fully 
endorsing pluralist or class-based views. It envisages civil society as intertwined with 
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the state and political society and, as in Gramsci’s writings, civil society is, at the 
same time, the space of domination and the space of potential emancipation. 
However, as neo-Gramscians focus on rejecting the existing power structures, they 
tend to see civil society as the space of freedom and the state as the space of coercion. 
In some theories, the elimination of the state and the political sphere is a utopian 
horizon, as in the case of the civil society theories that emerged in the first countries 
emancipated from Soviet domination (Havel, 1985). Some neo-Gramscian views 
retain a class component, but more often, these views combine with pluralist views of 
liberal democracy (Jelin and Hergsherber, 1996). Other neo-Gramscian views 
incorporated an identity dimension that removed references to class (Álvarez, et. al., 
1998). This perspective predominated among grass-roots activists and students of 
social movements in Latin America. 
 
 
b. Civil society and poverty reduction in this thesis 
 
A study of the politically constructed meaning of civil society in a given social 
reality, as in this thesis, requires an understanding of civil society that avoids a-priori 
definitions. Following the neo-Gramscian perspective, civil society is seen here as an 
arena in which the struggles for hegemony take place. As Gramsci put it, consent is 
manufactured mainly in civil society, where institutions and organic intellectuals 
contribute to its manufacture or to the expansion of a counter-hegemonic strategy that 
can be led by inorganic intellectuals or a vanguard party (Gramsci, 1998 [1971]: 12, 
13, 15, 204). At the same time, in line with the ontological position taken in this 
thesis, what civil society is in a particular social setting is defined through struggles 
for hegemony that are not necessarily tied to class interests. Civil society is, then, 
both a discourse defined by hegemonic struggles and the very arena in which these 
struggles for the definition of discourses occur (Munck, 2002: 357). Hence, defining 
what civil society is is a fundamental hegemonic operation that sets the boundaries of 
the arena in which hegemonic and counter-hegemonic projects engage in political 
struggles. Therefore, the focus on civil society is particularly crucial in the analysis of 
the struggles between neoliberalism and populism. With the multiplication of 
definitions and theories that followed the revival of interest in studying civil society, 
civil society as a signifier lost its fixed attachment to a particular content and emerged 
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as a floating signifier (Munck, 2002: 358, 359). Different discourses or political 
projects tried to fix that empty signifier to chains of equivalence and nodal points in 
order to articulate a discourse on it and hegemonise it. This thesis looks at such 
attempts made by neoliberalism and populism in the field of poverty reduction 
policies in Argentina of the 1990s. 
 
Civil society as a discourse is contingent on the broader discourse in which it is 
inserted, in this case the poverty reduction policy area. Looking at the discourse on 
civil society within this particular policy field entails taking into account the 
characteristics of the prevalent approaches to poverty in the periods under study. 
Therefore, poverty reduction is broadly understood here as policies intended to 
benefit the worse-off sectors of the population, and the thesis situates the struggles to 
define the discourse on civil society within different approaches to poverty in the 
history of Argentina (chapter 3) and in the 1990s in particular (chapters 5, 6, 7). In 
that decade, the most salient debate on the definition of poverty was on structural 
versus income-based definitions. Structural poverty was measured using the 
necesidades básicas insatisfechas (NBI – unsatisfied basic needs)43 method, and 
income poverty was determined by measures of poverty lines constructed on the basis 
of general consumption power44 or the possibility of accessing a basic food and goods 
basket.45 To define its universe of analysis, the thesis takes as poverty reduction 
policies those that the SDS – the state agency created specifically to address poverty – 
considered to be part of its remit (SIEMPRO, 1998, 2001). 
 
 
2.3. Conclusion 
 
                                                 
43
 The NBI method was applied for the first time in Argentina in 1984 by the Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censo (INDEC 
– National Institute of Statistics and Census) for the first governmental study on poverty. Using census data from 1980, the 
method analyses households looking at five indicators: overcrowding (more than three persons per room); housing (inapproprite 
types such as families in rented rooms or dangerous buildings); sanitary conditions (lack of toilets); school attendance (children 
aged 6-12 years who do not attend school); and sustainability capacities (more than four persons per family member with a stable 
job, and low educational level of the head of the household). If one of these indicators is present, the inhabitants of the household 
are considered to have NBI (INDEC, 1984; Feres and Mancero, 2001). 
44
 The poverty line divides the population into those who live on less than US$1 a day (US$2 for Latin America) – considered 
“poor” – and those who do not. This calculation is based on what the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) was in the USA in 1985 
(World Bank, 1993; Ravallion, 1998). 
45
 These measurements are based on household survey data, which in Argentina comes from the Encuesta Permanente de 
Hogares (EPH - Permanent Household Survey). The calculations set a minimum comsumption basket and if a household’s 
income cannot purchase the basket, that household is in a situation of poverty (Altimir, 1979; 1994; 2001; ECLAC, issues since 
1994). 
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This chapter has specified what neo-liberalism and populism mean in this thesis. 
Taken as political projects with three components – logical, normative and contingent 
– it has been argued that they are opposing and antagonistic projects but that their 
combination is possible. Neo-liberalism focuses on the economic aspects of the 
liberal doctrine and leaves the political aspects of the project available for other 
political projects to re-articulate. However, it should be considered that, in the history 
of Argentina, liberalism and populism have been constructed as opposing political 
projects, which has laid the ground for a persistent antagonism. Chapter 3 deals with 
this historical construction. 
 
The second section considered the theoretical developments that were articulated in 
three perspectives on the civil society of the 1990s – neo-conservative, neo-pluralist 
and neo-Gramscian. The section specified that the understanding of civil society used 
in this thesis draws on the neo-Gramscian perspective, and is applied to the ontology 
behind the deconstructive discursive institutionalism that guides the thesis’ analyses. 
As such, civil society is seen as the arena in which hegemonic struggles take place 
and as a discourse that defines the boundaries of that arena and, thus, the possible 
struggles for hegemony. Poverty reduction, in turn, is the discourse into which the 
discourse on civil society is inserted. Therefore, this analysis of civil society requires 
to take into account the variations in approaches to poverty reduction during the 
decade. 
 
Chapters 3 and 4 provide further details about the contingent components of populism 
and neoliberalism respectively, their specific approaches to poverty and their 
discourse on civil society. Chapter 3 looks at the historical moulding of Argentinean 
populism, while chapter 4 focuses on the neoliberal project as formulated by the 
MDBs, considered here as key promoters of this political project. 
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Chapter 3 
 
The Argentinean Populist Political Project and its Discourse on Civil 
Society in Poverty Reduction Policy 
 
 
 
This chapter looks at how the discourse on civil society in poverty reduction policies 
emerged and changed by observing the characteristics of social organisations dealing 
with poverty – organisations that the 1990s discourse regarded as the core civil 
society actors. It shows that the Peronist populist appeal articulated diffuse 
understandings of civil society, which until the late 1930s had been scattered among 
social organisations dealing with poverty, and that by the 1980s the discourse’s main 
features reflected the continued predominance of populism but had also incorporated 
elements from the liberal political project. 
 
The first section of this chapter presents an account of the diffuse discourse on civil 
society and of the hegemonic struggles between populism and liberalism in Argentina 
up until the late 1930s. The second section focuses on the emergence of the Peronist 
populist project and its success in becoming hegemonic (1943-1955), when the 
populist discourse on civil society was first articulated. The third section looks at the 
years of the political proscription of Peronism (1955-1973), when the populist 
discourse acquired new features and consolidated. The fourth section examines the 
period of the military dictatorship (1976-1983) and the democratic government of 
Alfonsín (1983-1989), when the domestic discourse on civil society incorporated 
liberal elements but remained predominantly populist. Nevertheless, the conclusion 
highlights that the incorporation of liberal elements opened up possibilities for the 
liberal project to hegemonise the populist discourse on civil society. 
 
 
3.1. The liberal-conservative hegemony 
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a. Hegemonic struggles between liberalism and populism 
 
Liberalism and populism have struggled for hegemony since the country’s early days. 
In the first decades of the 19th century, an elite group in the River Plate area 
embraced the ideals of the Enlightenment and were concerned with the rule of law 
and modernisation. Their liberalism clashed with the provincial caudillos’46 populism, 
which regarded caudillos’ decisions as above the law and advocated Catholic values 
as the core organisers of social life, as had been the case during more than four 
centuries of Hispanic domination in Argentina (Romero, J. L. 2001: 73-100). After 
independence the battles between Federals and Unitarians reflected the antagonism 
between the elites’ and the caudillos’ projects but in the mid-19th century liberalism 
became hegemonic. Liberalism appeared in the 1853 Constitution and expanded with 
the unification of the country in 1861. Yet, the struggles between liberalism and 
populism soon re-emerged in the opposition between civilisation and barbarism that 
dominated political ideology in the late 19th century (Svampa, 1994) and elements of 
the caudillos’ populism started to grow within liberalism. The result was an 
increasingly conservative liberal hegemony in which governments combined a liberal 
non-interventionist state with a persistent hierarchical view of social organisation, 
based on the Catholic conception of divine order, and by-passed institutions by using 
the widespread practice of electoral fraud (Lobato, 2000: 168). 
 
In the 20th century the struggles between liberalism and populism continued and 
resulted in different articulations combining these political projects. The Hipólito 
Yrigoyen presidencies (1916-1921 and 1928-1930) represented an attempt to develop 
a political project that focused on the people, by giving priority to obtaining popular 
support in the framework of a liberal democracy without questioning the liberal agro-
export economic model (Svampa, 1994: 141, 155). In the 1930s, after a coup d’état, a 
fraudulent democracy was established, which involved ignoring liberal political 
institutions, and, against a background of international financial crisis, the 
governments adopted ISI strategies to complement the agro-export-based system, 
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 Local social and political leaders 
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which, in contrast to the liberal premises, entailed a significant increase in state 
intervention in the economy. Yet, while the 1930s were far from being politically and 
economically liberal, populism was present in those years only in the contingent 
forms of by-passing democratic institutions and granting a central role to the state. Its 
more fundamental logico-normative characteristic– its focus on the sovereignty of the 
people – was absent.  
 
It was not until the emergence of Peronism in the 1940s that populism became 
hegemonic. Peronism revived the struggle between liberalism and populism, since it 
was based on the construction of the antagonism between the masses and the 
oligarchy. It signified a new articulation of the populist project and its political 
triumph thus represented the success of a populist appeal in Argentina. 
 
 
b. A diffuse discourse on civil society 
 
At the turn of the century in Argentina, the state’s non-interventionist stance, coupled 
with increasing social demands triggered by industrialisation and population growth, 
was fertile ground for the emergence of social organisations attempting to supplement 
insufficient state action to address poverty-related problems. The practices and views 
of these organisations produced a diffuse discourse on civil society – a collection of 
similar characteristics across different organisations that nevertheless was not 
articulated as a coherent discourse. These characteristics involved a mixture of 
opposing the state and maintaining and seeking its support; weakly institutionalised 
internal mechanisms of representation of members along with strong leadership; a 
focus on addressing corporatist social demands; the importance of Catholic views in 
guiding organisations’ policies and practices; and the discretionary use of charity. 
These characteristics could be observed in the main organisations dealing with 
poverty before the 1940s. 
 
Until the turn of the century, the Sociedad de Beneficencia de la Capital (SBC – 
Capital City Beneficence Society) and Mutual Aid Organisations (MAOs) were the 
most central organisations dealing with poverty-related issues. Created in 1823, the 
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SBC was administratively independent from the state but the latter set its objectives 
and responsibilities, was a key source of funding and, gradually, incorporated the SBC 
into its structure until its closure in 1947 (Thompson, 1995; Plotkin, (2003) [1993]: 
139; Passanante, 1987: 11-3). Also, in the SBC the hierarchical view of society 
inherited from the Catholicism of the colonial years, continued to motivate social 
action, and the use of charity – in the sense of the rich giving discretionally to the 
poor – abounded (Moreno, 2000: 116). MAOs, which flourished in the late 19th 
century and were a key form of organisation until the 1910s,47 exemplify the case of 
organisations that emerged independently from the state but which addressed poverty-
related problems for their members, who had common national or regional origins. 
Also, despite proclaiming that they were governed by democratic rules, elections were 
rarely held in MAOs and usually a few members or one person held power 
indefinitely (Devoto and Fernández, 1990: 141-143).  
 
By the turn of the century, Trade Unions (TUs) were emerging as a central form of 
organisation dealing with poverty-related issues. They sought to address poverty by 
fighting for better working conditions and salaries, and, similarly to MAOs, by 
providing social services such as health and accident insurance for their members. 
Regarding their relationship with the state, they emerged as “resistance societies” 
(Falcón, 1986; Falcón, 1990: 342-351) and most union leaders favoured direct 
confrontation with employers over demanding changes at state level (Falcón, 1990: 
357). The bases, however, tended to favour less combative strategies (Bravo, 2000: 
42; Rocchi, 2000: 172).  
 
The Catholic organisations such as the Círculos de Obreros (COs – Workers’ Circles) 
and Acción Católica (AC – Catholic Action) were evidence of the persistent presence 
of Catholicism and the Church in dealing with social issues in the country and the 
intertwined relationship between social organisations and the state. The COs, founded 
in Argentina in 1890,48 aimed to provide an alternative to the combative political 
positions spreading among unions, and advocated legislation as the means to 
improving workers’ welfare (Sábato, 2002: 148). However, they shared with the 
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 By the turn of the century MAOs were the most widespread form of organisation, reaching a peak in 1914 with 1,202 
associations and 7,885,237 members (Passanante, 1987: 63, 75; Sábato, 2002: 141). 
48
 Father Grote founded COs in Argentina, inspired by German social Catholicism and the Papal Encyclical Rerum Novarum 
(1891), which defined the Church’s position on social issues (Passanante, 1987: 50-1). 
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dominant elites a preoccupation with maintaining the established order and, after the 
COs were integrated into the Church structure in the 1910s,49 they became strike-
breakers (Di Stéfano and Zanatta, 2000: 388). The AC, created in 1931, favoured 
charity-inspired social action over political action (Di Stéfano and Zanatta, 2000: 377) 
and, although it was autonomous from the state, it represented the triumph of the 
Church hierarchy’s views on social action and was therefore also aligned with the 
decreasingly liberal governing elites’ views, who increasingly held the “myth of the 
Catholic nation”. The myth consisted of the belief that the Church and its doctrine 
were the nucleus of Argentinean nationality and views such as liberalism were 
“transplants” from foreign bodies (Di Stéfano and Zanatta, 2000: 425). 
 
In the inter-war years, Neighbourhood Associations (NAs), such as sociedades de 
fomento (neighbourhood development boards), bibliotecas populares (local non-state 
libraries) and sports and recreational clubs, blossomed. They supplemented the state 
by providing services and activities for improving community life that the state was 
failing to offer (González, 1990: 91-128; Gutiérrez and Romero, 1995: 69-105; 
Romero, 1995: 181, 182; Romero, 2002: 176). However, they did not seek to replace 
the state but sought its intervention to respond to neighbourhood demands (González 
Leandri, 2001: 220). Additionally, the legitimacy of NAs’ governing bodies depended 
more on their effectiveness in bringing improvements to the neighbourhood than on 
respect for rules of governance (González Leandri, 2001: 224; Romero, 1995: 176, 
177) and, in turn, most decisions depended on leaders’ negotiations with the state. In 
those negotiations the leaders’ ability to deal with local punteros (community political 
leaders), municipal legislators and civil servants and, sometimes, their ability to hold a 
public post while running a NA were crucial, which indicated blurred boundaries 
between NAs and the political sphere (González Leandri, 2001: 229). 
 
Cooperatives appeared in Argentina in the early 1900s and presented different 
characteristics and approaches to poverty (Passanante, 1987: 86). The most significant 
urban cooperative was the Hogar Obrero (Workers’ Home), founded in 1905 and in 
the 1910s the Ligas Agrarias (Agrarian Leagues) started rural cooperativism. This 
entailed the use of an alternative economic system without directly challenging the 
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 In 1912, Msg. D’Andrea replaced Father Grote and the COs were renamed Catholic Workers’ Circles, in line with the 
Church’s attempt to integrate into its structure this and the multiplicity of other Catholic organisations that had flourished since 
the turn of the century (Di Stéfano and Zanatta, 2000: 356, 371). 
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status quo, and discretionary interventions were excluded. They addressed poverty 
through building affordable housing, providing financial help, and developing a 
strategy to buy and sell goods at low prices. However, since cooperativism’s 
underlying socialism emphasised cooperatives’ instrumental aspects over political 
objectives, the impact of these novel approaches was limited (Passanante, 1987: 86, 
90, 95). Rural cooperatives, furthermore, were initially confrontational, as they had 
come about as a result of a protest – the 1912 Grito de Alcorta50 – but they soon 
developed a close relationship with the Ministry of Agriculture (Passanante, 1987: 
108). 
 
 
3.2. Peronism and the emergence of the populist hegemony 
 
 
a. The Peronist populist appeal and its approach to social issues 
 
A military government took power in 1943 and Juan Domingo Perón was named 
Secretary of State for Labour.51 From this position, he promoted the formation of 
unions and intervened in labour-capital conflicts in favour of the former (Godio, 2000: 
818-821). Opposition from business sectors and within the military led to Perón’s 
removal from office and his imprisonment. Masses of people invaded Buenos Aires’ 
central Plaza de Mayo on 17 October 1945 demanding his liberation, and Perón was 
elected President with the support of unions, the Church and parts of the military. 
Once in power he continued with the ISI model of economic development begun in 
the 1930s, and state interventionism expanded (Tedesco, 1999: 13).  
 
The state played a central role in the Peronist political project. State interventionism 
was a key contingent element of the project but did not define its populist character, 
which resulted from its discursive logic. The populist character of the Peronist appeal 
was evident in its key to success – its ability to capture the diffuse views of the 
popular sectors and re-signify them in a foundational discourse centred on its leader 
                                                 
50
 After the conflict between tenants and landowners in Alcorta, Santa Fe province, numerous ligas and the Federación Agraria 
Argentina (FAA – Argentinean Agrarian Federation), which brought together rural cooperatives, emerged (Sábato, 2002: 153). 
51
 On the relationship between Perón and the military see Potash, 1969. 
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(James, 1990: 20, Sigal and Verón, 1986: 56, 57). Capturing these views entailed the 
construction of a political identity by dividing the political space into “the people” and 
an oppressive “other”. Peronism generated an antagonistic “other” – the elites 
associated with liberalism, foreign ideas and the oligarchy – that opposed “the people” 
– chiefly urban workers – and gave the latter political existence by dissolving their 
differences and highlighting their commonalities (Laclau, 1977b; 2005a: 111, 112; 
Svampa, 1994: 228-9). The Peronist appeal reflected and shaped the demands of that 
newly constituted popular identity, whereas the liberal project was depicted as 
unresponsive to people’s demands. Yet, this appeal included not only anti-liberal 
claims but also elements of political discourses that were not popular among the 
general population, such as elitist nationalism, which was supported by sectors of the 
elite and the military (Devoto, 2002; Altamirano, 2002: 215; James, 1990: 33), and 
clerical Catholicism (Caimari, 1995; 2002: 446, 450, 452; Laclau, 1977b: 190). 
Peronism even incorporated key elements of the liberal political project, such as 
democracy, but redefined it as “mass democracy”.52 This appropriation of non-
popular and liberal notions allowed the new political project to anchor itself in 
existing discursive frameworks and moderated the anti-status quo tendencies of the 
populist appeal. 
 
The Peronist project’s approach to social issues was guided by a notion of social 
justice that reflected the centrality of “the people” and the state in this project. The 
underlying aim of social justice was to reduce the divisions between workers and 
capitalists and integrate the former into society by addressing their demands and 
making them part of the Peronist “people”. This aim was pursued through a model of 
social policy that combined state centralisation and attempts to provide universal 
social services with the work of social organisations, mainly state-controlled TUs and 
the Fundación Eva Perón (FEP – Eva Perón Foundation). Including social 
organisations in this system was complementary to the populist project because it 
reinforced antagonism with a central organisational form of liberalism – political 
parties (Sigal and Verón, 1986: 63). 
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 For more on the Peronist discourse see Sigal and Verón, 1986: especially 37-39, 54; James, 1990: 24, 33-38; Svampa, 1994: 
231 and Ciria, 1983: 21, 22. 
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b. The articulation of the populist discourse on civil society 
 
In line with its ability to capture the diffuse views of the popular sectors and re-signify 
them in a new discourse, Peronism articulated in a coherent discourse the 
characteristics of the organisations dealing with poverty-related issues that had 
remained scattered up until the late 1930s. 
 
The diffuse views on civil society that existed before the 1940s were articulated by 
Perón’s governments around the notion of “comunidad organizada” (“organised 
community”)53 and the populist discourse on civil society in poverty reduction 
emerged. The concept of “comunidad organizada” was a nodal point that connected 
the characteristics of the newly emerging discourse on civil society with the populist 
Peronist project. The “comunidad organizada” implied a form of corporatism in 
which organisations emerged according to areas of activity rather than political 
preferences or individual interests. Their conflicts were to be dealt with by 
organisations’ representatives, under the supervision of the state, and would foster 
unity between different social groups, helping to constitute the Peronist “people”. 
Also, the notion of “comunidad organizada” condensed the pre-Perón organisations’ 
mix of oppositional and dependent stances regarding the state. It framed the 
oppositional stance in a rejection of pre-established forms of social and political 
organisation and underpinned the organisations’ search for state support by 
institutionalising links between the state and social organisations. This notion 
constituted a way of resolving an intrinsic tension of successful populist projects, 
which stems from the need to somehow institutionalise these projects’ fundamentally 
anti-status quo character. In turn, by anchoring the discourse in existing conceptions 
of civil society, social organisations were more likely to adopt the Peronist discourse 
and its project, which led to their “Peronisation”. Perón himself embodied the 
organisations’ preference for strong leadership over institutionalised rules, and 
Peronism became a worldview of reference for organisations. Thus, social 
                                                 
53
 The concept had been present in Peronism since its beginnings but Perón announced this officially in 1952. Following the 
announcement, the CGE (Confederación General Económica – General Economic Confederation), the CGP (Confederación 
General de Profesionales – General Confederation of Professionals), the CGU (Confederación General Universitaria – General 
Confederation of University Students) and the UES (Unión de Estudiantes Secundarios – Secondary Students’ Union) emerged 
and the already existing CGT (Confederación General del Trabajo – Trade Unions Confederation) became key in the 
“comunidad organizada” (Torre, 2002: 58; Altamirano, 2002: 219). 
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organisations followed the Peronist approach to poverty, addressing it in a 
discretionary way in accordance with Peronist perspectives, which in themselves 
remained linked to Catholicism. In summary, the features of the populist discourse on 
civil society as articulated by Peronism were: 
 
1. Social organisations’ oppositional stances were incorporated into the anti-status quo 
character of the Peronist political project. 
 
2. Social organisations were both state and politically controlled. 
 
3. Social organisation was viewed from a corporatist perspective. 
 
4. Social organisations were “Peronised” and Catholic values continued to guide 
social action. 
 
5. Discretionary intervention to deal with poverty persisted. 
 
 
During the Peronist governments, the FEP54 and TUs were central actors in the 
delivery of social services. The populist discourse emerged clearly in these 
organisations. The FEP’s boundaries with the state and the Peronist party were 
difficult to delineate. The FEP was expected to supplement the state system of social 
action. While the unions dealt with the needs of workers, the FEP was responsible for 
helping the poorest and those excluded from the labour market (Plotkin, 2003 [1993]: 
137). Additionally, the FEP had the political aim of expanding the Peronist project to 
those not in the labour market – women, children and the unemployed – and of 
counterbalancing the government’s dependence on union support. The FEP’s 
relationship with the state remains unclear as there are no records of state funding, but 
the FEP operated from the Ministry of Labour’s offices, which shows that it was 
integrated into the state apparatus. The links between the FEP and the party could be 
seen in the FEP’s operational scheme. The células mínimas (minimum cells) – FEP 
community workers – were members of the women’s branch of the party and 
                                                 
54
 The description of the FEP draws on: Ferioli, 1990; Isuani and Tenti, 1989: 17, 18; Plotkin, 2003 [1993]: 137, 140, 141, 144-
145, 148-150; Navarro Gerassi, 2000: 332, 333; Romero, 2002: 226, 230; Passanante, 1987: 129-131; Guy, 2000: 334-337; and 
Ciria, 1983: 306. 
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eventually these células operated from the unidades básicas (basic units) – the party’s 
local branches. In accordance with these strong links with the state and the Peronist 
party, the FEP’s services were delivered discretionally in response to disparate 
demands and the political needs of the party and its leader. The unions were aligned 
with the Peronist “comunidad organizada” through the Ley de Asociaciones 
Profesionales (Law of Professional Associations), which simultaneously made the 
state a key promoter of unionisation and the unions strongly dependent on the state.55 
This law made the state the guarantor of unions’ benefits, since it decided how to 
distribute them and had the power to grant or withdraw the unions’ legal status. 
Unions announced their “Peronist” political position at the 1950 Congress of the 
Confederación General del Trabajo (CGT – Trade Unions Confederation) (Ciria, 
1983: 27, 28), reinforcing the populist project’s view of inextricability between the 
social and political spheres. 
 
Many social organisations dealing with poverty adopted the Peronist populist 
discourse and became “Peronised”. Since the Peronist discourse on social organisation 
resembled NAs’ and cooperatives’ own views and practices, these organisations 
continued operating as they had up until the 1930s and easily adopted the Peronist 
discourse as their own. Some grass-roots organisations such as NAs were sidelined as 
Peronist party local institutions – such as unidades básicas – proliferated and 
undertook similar activities. Yet, most of these associations collaborated with local 
party institutions (Romero, 2002: 232). Urban cooperatives, particularly housing ones, 
did well with Perón’s disbursement of large amounts of money to provide workers 
with affordable housing (Ballent, 1999: 22). In addition to these material benefits, 
Peronism provided a political discourse for the space that the socialists’ apolitical 
cooperativism had left vacant. Crucially, the initial Peronist alliance with the Church 
facilitated Peronism’s permeation of Catholic members of social organisations. 
Moreover, the Peronist attempt to create a “Peronist Christianism”, seeking to empty 
Catholic symbols and fill them with Peronist content, upset the Church but implicitly 
suggested questioning the Church’s materialism, which appealed to some lay people 
who opposed the views of the Church hierarchy and had long been involved in social 
organisations dealing with poverty (Caimari, 2002: 466). 
                                                 
55
 This 1945 law established that the state promoted and had to authorise the organisation of one union per economic sector, not 
per trade or factory, and that the unions’ main role was to represent the sector in negotiations – controlled by the state – with 
capitalists. The Minister of Labour had to supervise union federations (James, 1990: 23). 
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3.3. The proscription of Peronism and the consolidation of the populist 
hegemony 
 
 
a. Expansion of the Peronist identity 
  
Perón governed for two consecutive periods from 1946 until 1955 when the military-
led Revolución Libertadora overthrew him and Peronism was proscribed. Perón went 
into exile, and a succession of failed strategies to eradicate Peronism from 
Argentinean political life followed (Smulovitz, 1991). The Revolución governments56 
tried to eradicate Peronist influences from state and society (Tedesco 1999: 6) and the 
elected governments of Rogelio Frondizi (1958-1962) and Arturo Illia (1963-1966) 
attempted a controlled reintegration of Peronism into the political system. Frondizi 
attempted “Peronism without Perón” but the lack of support from Perón, refusals to 
grant Peronism legal political status and elections being declared null and void 
(Smulovitz, 1991: 121; McGuire, 1997: 145-150) hampered the initiative. Juan Carlos 
Onganía’s dictatorship (1966-1969) aimed to reinstate “order” in a political sphere 
perceived as corrupt and threatened by revolutionary ideas in the wake of the Cuban 
revolution (De Riz, 2000: 33-40). It tried to de-politicise the popular sectors 
(O’Donnell, 1988: 31) and weaken the main structures of Peronism – unions – 
through the economic marginalisation of workers (Corradi, 1985: 90). Nevertheless, 
the Peronist identity proved difficult to erode and Perón’s control of the movement 
from abroad made that erosion more difficult. 
 
The political proscription of Peronism was an attempt to re-establish a liberal project, 
but it resulted in the expansion of the Peronist identity. The intention during the 
proscription was to de-politicise society, re-establishing the separation between the 
private and the public, and to dissolve collective forms of representation, eventually 
returning to a system of individual representation – political parties. Yet, state 
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 The Presidents of this Revolution were Eduardo Lonardi (September-November 1955) and Pedro Aramburu (1955-1958). 
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intervention remained significant. Frondizi’s structuralist-based desarrollismo57 
(developmentalism) favoured state-planned industrialisation and, although Illia 
focused on state deficit reduction and Onganía introduced market-oriented reforms 
(Corradi, 1985: 90), they kept the ISI model. More importantly, the failure of these 
governments to address popular demands through democratic institutions, along with 
the spread of revolutionary ideas, led to the deepening of Peronism’s anti-status quo 
and anti-liberal stances (Laclau, 1977b: 190, 191). The political exclusion of 
Peronism resulted in the higher visibility of its political antagonist – liberalism – 
thereby contributing to overcoming internal differences within Peronism and enabling 
the Peronist identity to expand (Barros and Castagnola, 2000: 31). 
 
Yet, the limits of this expansion of chains of equivalences became apparent as soon as 
Peron’s return was imminent. The 1969 Cordobazo, a mass insurrection against the 
dictatorship, precipitated the end of Onganía’s regime and marked the transition 
towards the return of Perón. When Alejandro Lanusse was appointed President by the 
military he announced the return to democracy, and the existence of opposing streams 
within Peronism started to become apparent. These sectors were the left-wing youth 
movement and its armed wing, Montoneros,58 with which Perón entered into direct 
confrontation once his return appeared likely, and the unions, themselves immersed in 
internal struggles. The Peronist candidate, Héctor Cámpora, won the 1973 elections. 
He allowed the return of Perón, resigned, and held new elections. Perón won, but 
internal disputes within his movement worsened and he was unable to control the 
unions.  
 
When Perón died, in July 1974, his wife took office and the paramilitary Alianza 
Argentina Anti-Comunista – Triple A (Argentinean Anti-Communist Alliance), 
formed by the Minister for Social Welfare engaged in “ideological cleansing” directed 
at left-wing groups. In the face of continued political chaos and persistent economic 
crisis, the government sought military intervention, which led to the 1976 coup 
(Tedesco, 1999: 10, 11, 19, 20). 
 
                                                 
57
 Desarrollismo was based on economic structuralism’s assumption that the deterioration of the terms of trade that affected non-
industrialised countries hindered Latin American development, and it followed the recommendation to modify the economic 
structures that sustained those economies based on the production of raw materials for export. (On developmentalism and these 
premises see Nosiglia, 1983: 14-16, 59; on structuralism, see chapter 2, note 13.) 
58
 For a historical account of Montoneros see Gillespie, 1982. For an ethnographic approach, see Anguita and Caparrós, 1997. 
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b. A changing approach to social issues 
 
During the Peronist proscription, concerns with defining and addressing poverty 
increased and the emerging notion of “marginality” deeply shaped the approach to 
poverty. Initially used to refer to shantytown dwellers, the meaning of marginality 
later expanded to take in anyone with the characteristics of these dwellers, whether 
they lived in shantytowns or not, or those unemployed or on low pay (Ward, 2004: 
184-5). Revolutionary perspectives held that tackling poverty required the subversion 
of the established system. Accordingly, scholars re-signified “marginal” in Marxist 
terms as “marginal mass” (Nun, 2001: 24). Thus, marginal became the term used to 
refer to the poor from a variety of perspectives.  
 
Community promotion and NBI indicators emerged as two central tools for dealing 
with poverty, defined in “marginality” terms. By the late 1970s NBI indicators had 
become the main method for measuring poverty. Developed by the Economic Council 
for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), the NBI method was aligned with this 
institution’s structuralist views and was linked to the notion of marginal because it 
considered general living conditions and not income or consumption power (chapter 
2). Community promotion, in turn, involved state or social actors’ endeavours to 
promote the formation of community organisations to tackle poverty-related problems 
and would aid the marginal’s social re-integration (Nun, 2001: 19-22). 
 
 
c. New features of the populist discourse on civil society 
 
During the proscription of Peronism, the discourse on civil society incorporated new 
elements without losing its populist character. 
 
Community promotion replaced the notion of “comunidad organizada” in condensing 
anti-status quo claims – now also coming from revolutionary ideas – and the 
organisations’ continued strategy of dealing with social demands by seeking state 
action. The fact that community promotion drew on both on a revision of structuralist 
ideas and on revolutionary positions facilitated the emergence of this verbal bridge. 
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Programmes promoting community organisation, run by the state and social 
organisations, aimed at counterbalancing the structuralist focus on redefining the 
economy but maintained the idea that the state had to deal with social action. They 
also sought to challenge revolutionary insurgencies; the state agency for promoción 
comunitaria (community promotion) at the Ministry of Social Welfare increasingly 
sought to demobilise left-wing activism at the community level (Abel and Lewis, 
2002: 21, 40; Cardarelli and Rosenfeld, 1998: 29, 52, 53). At the same time, based on 
the Marxist notion of “marginal mass”, grass-roots actors re-signified the meaning of 
community promotion to make it an instrument of projects with revolutionary aims 
framed in participatory methodologies. Popular education movements59  became one 
of the most salient examples of this re-articulation (Cardarelli and Rosenfeld, 1998: 
46, 47).  
 
In the context of prioritising community promotion in dealing with poverty, the 
characteristics of the discourse on civil society changed with respect to the discourse 
articulated during the Peronist governments. 
 
1. Social organisations’ oppositional stances that had been incorporated into the anti-
status quo character of the Peronist political project became more confrontational as 
the anti-status quo stance of Peronism radicalised in the context of political exclusion 
and the spread of revolutionary ideas. 
 
2. While during Perón’s government social organisation was both state and politically 
controlled, during the Peronist proscription organisations temporarily supplemented 
the state until the structuralist economic programme bore fruit and, although using 
more confrontational methods, organisations continued to seek state concessions as a 
strategy for solving groups’ demands. This showed the continuation of the populist 
rejection of a strict separation between the private and public spheres. 
 
3. Peronist corporatism regarded social organisation as not only in a close relationship 
with the state, but as emerging from areas of activity rather than from individual 
interests. During the Peronist proscription the confrontational strategies adopted to 
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 Popular education consisted of an approach to education that took into account the specific culture and everyday experiences of 
the students and had the ultimate aim of exposing the situation of oppression to which these experiences related. The approach is 
based on the writings of Paulo Freire (1970). 
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deal with the state led to the distancing of leaders from the bases and the 
bureaucratisation of organisations. Yet, in the context of a “community promotion” 
approach to poverty and revolutionary ideas, participatory democratic practices and 
non-hierarchical forms of internal organisation became more widespread. This 
bottom-up self-organisation contradicted corporatist views but not only did unions 
remain central to the Peronist project but also, in a context in which revolutionary 
means to accessing power were prioritised, participatory governing mechanisms 
remained in line with populism, rejecting the liberal conception of the individual right 
to self-government and the notions of representative institutions linked to it. 
Furthermore, a focus on self-organisation reflected a core characteristic of populism – 
its dislike of established forms of organisation. 
 
4. During Peron’s governments social organisations were “Peronised” and the alliance 
of Peronism with the Church and the attempts at Peronist Christianism contributed to 
the endurance of the Catholic values behind social action. During the Peronist 
proscription there was an increasing professionalisation of social organisations 
dealing with poverty, and their members. Yet, revolutionary ideas permeated the 
Peronist political identity of organisations and their work continued to be guided by 
Catholic worldviews, especially in the 1960s when the II Vatican Council paved the 
way for adapting these values to different scenarios, allowing them to be combined 
with elements of revolutionary ideals. Therefore, the separation between political and 
technical objectives remained blurred in these organisations. 
 
5. Discretionary intervention to deal with poverty persisted. Despite attempts to 
centralise social action during Peron’s government and to define the characteristics of 
poverty during the years of Peronist proscription, social organisations continued to 
use selective and discretionary interventions, which reflected the populist appeal’s 
need to retain its direct links with the people. 
 
These changes showing the developments in the populist discourse during the Peronist 
proscription appeared in the key organisations dealing with poverty. 
 
The attempt begun in 1955 to dismantle Peronism included the closing down of the 
FEP and the intervention of unions. The latter’s immediate response was the 
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formation of a movement of workers’ “resistance”, which employed armed violence 
(James, 1990: 112-117). After Frondizi’s attempt at “Peronism without Perón”, the 
Law of Professional Associations was restored with the aim of increasing further the 
dependence of unions on state concessions and therefore empowering a weak state. 
Unions started to engage in dialogue with the government but adopted a 
confrontational strategy of “golpear y negociar” (hit and negotiate) consisting of a 
“hit” of mobilisation, to demonstrate union control of the masses, followed by 
negotiations with the government, independently from the bases. This strategy 
separated the bases from their leaders as union structures became more 
bureaucratised. However, the bases’ recent memory of resistance and the increase of 
revolutionary movements around the world facilitated the reorganisation of workers’ 
bases. In Córdoba, foreign companies promoted the formation of company unions, 
which became the seedbed for the sindicatos clasistas60 (class-unions) or grass-roots 
unionism. They introduced several mechanisms for combating union bureaucratisation 
and allowing wider worker participation, including the elimination of barriers for new 
candidates in internal elections. After the Cordobazo, sindicalismo clasista arrived in 
the country’s largest industrial centre, Greater Buenos Aires. Union bureaucracies lost 
control of their bases and the Juventud Trabajadora Peronista (JTP – Working 
Peronist Youth), linked to Montoneros, penetrated many unions (Romero, 2002: 252, 
253). 
 
There was a resurgence of NAs in the 1960s triggered by community promotion 
initiatives and the increase in shantytowns that resulted from the internal migration 
that followed the implementation of ISI strategies (Romero, L.A. 2001: 157, 158). 
Unlike the inter-war NAs, these NAs’ focus was on fighting for tenure rights, because 
these shantytowns emerged as settlements on unused lands. Also, self-organisation 
was more common than demanding state action, and professionals increasingly 
provided services to these organisations. However, links with the public sphere 
developed through these organisations’ connections with political organisations. 
Many community workers became political militants and the Movimiento Villero 
Peronista (Peronist Movement of the Shantytowns), linked to the Juventud Peronista 
(JP – Peronist Youth), and Montoneros, permeated many associations (Romero, 2002: 
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 The name sought to reflect that the leaders of these organisations were usually communists. 
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270-271). Their influence, together with changes in grass-roots Catholic organisations 
and the community promotion approach’s emphasis on self-organisation, contributed 
to the spread of participatory governing mechanisms, such as assemblies, and non-
hierarchical organisational schemes. 
 
Many cooperatives got involved in the dynamics of capitalism, losing the 
associational and solidarity principles behind their creation, but some remained 
committed to providing social services. In the rural areas they became Rural Leagues, 
with the first one emerging in Chaco province in 1971. Their governing mechanisms 
were widely participatory and were based on a non-hierarchical structure of grass-
roots nucleus and delegates. They provided credit for small farmers, and demanded 
that the state provide protection for the sale of their products and reduce taxes. Their 
political action consisted of petitions and strikes (Romero, 2002: 267). Soon the 
leagues gained a large Catholic membership as the Church dissolved the Movimiento 
Rural de la Acción Católica (MRAC – Catholic Action’s Rural Movement) and the 
leagues absorbed many of its members (Romero, 2002: 266, 267). In 1972 political 
activists became involved in the leagues but, by 1974, economic difficulties had made 
internal differences unsustainable, leading to a demobilisation which was then slowed 
right down by the repression that followed the 1976 coup (Archetti, 1989: 454, 460). 
 
The 1963 II Vatican Council’s focus on temporal matters facilitated both the spread of 
an already growing concern with the poor among Latin American Catholic 
organisations and the mixing of Catholic and revolutionary views (Levine, 1992: 33). 
The Council’s principles were echoed in the Medellín (1968) and Puebla (1979) 
Bishops Congresses,61 the emergence of Liberation Theology62 and the formation of 
the Movement of Third World Priests (see Martin, 1992). At a more local level, in 
Argentina, they paved the way for the Curas Villeros (Shantytown Priests) movement 
(Vernazza, 1989), the spread of Comunidades Eclesiales de Base (CEBs – 
Ecclesiastical Base Communities) and the increasing political involvement of AC 
branches. In this post-Counciliar context, both community participation in 
organisations and professional advice from those involved in social work were sought, 
                                                 
61
 The Medellin documents proposed many liturgical, structural and pastoral innovations, and at Puebla the bishops declared their 
“preferencial option for the poor” in the midst of the division between conservative and progressive sectors within the Church 
that had emerged after Medellin (Levine, 1992: 36). 
62
 Gutiérrez (1974) is considered the foundational document of the movement. Analysis of the movement can be found in Dodson 
(1979); and Levine (1992: 31-53). 
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in order to understand and solve the problems faced by the poor (Levine, 1992: 35). 
Catholic organisations’ commitment to political and revolutionary action manifested 
in the participation of the Juventud Obrera Católica (JOC – Catholic Workers’ 
Youth) and the Juventud Universitaria Católica (JUC – Catholic University Students’ 
Youth) in the 1969 Cordobazo and in several other insurrections of the period 
(Giménez Beliveau, 2004: 5). 
 
 
3.4. The return of liberalism 
 
 
a. Erosion and persistence of populism 
 
By the late 1980s, populism was still hegemonic but had started to lose ground as the 
liberal project was re-emerging. The military dictatorship of 1976-1982 undertook a 
partial liberalisation of the economy. The UCR government focused on consolidating 
liberal democracy and, while avoiding endorsing economic liberalism, it took a few 
steps in that direction. However, although the re-emergence of liberalism eroded the 
populist hegemony it did not bring an end to it. 
 
In March 1976, the armed forces seized power and tried to advance economic 
liberalism. Alongside the kidnapping, torture and killing of thousands of people,63 
including union workers and left-wing militants, the dictatorship, except for General 
Viola’s brief government (March-December 1981), attempted to liberalise the 
economy, and neoliberalism made its first inroads in the country. The regime made 
liberalism appealing to the military, who until then preferred developmentalism to 
liberalism, by associating developmentalism with Peronism through highlighting that 
the focus on industrialisation made them both dependent on the power of the unions 
(Cavarozzi, 1992b: 61-63). Liberal economic measures, such as opening up the 
economy and state retraction from the economic sphere, would force unions and 
businesses to accept international prices rather than collective agreements, thus 
eroding the unions’ importance (Canitrot, 1980: 7). 
                                                 
63
 The official number of “disappeared” people was 8,961 (CONADEP, 1984) but human rights organisations maintain it was 
more than 30,000. 
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However, the ISI model, which had become a central contingent element of the 
populist project, was not abandoned. The dictatorship envisaged a strong state – as 
opposed to a weak one dominated by corporations (Cavarozzi, 1992b: 63, 64) – that 
was central in achieving the regime’s goals by, for instance, regulating labour and 
facilitating credit for capitalists. Moreover, state economic activity expanded 
(Marshall, 1988: 48) and economic protectionism continued (Palermo and Novaro, 
1996: 54-56; Canitrot, 1980: 43 in Cavarozzi, 1992b: 67). The failure of its economic 
policies, internal disputes and domestic and international pressure regarding human 
rights abuses contributed to the eventual end of the dictatorship. The defeat in the 
Malvinas/Falklands War led to negotiations with political elites for a return to 
democratic rule (Tedesco, 1999: 47, 50). 
 
Alfonsín, the UCR candidate, was elected President in 1983. His government focused 
on consolidating liberal democracy, which was reflected in its investigation of human 
rights abuses and the reduction of both military and union power. Indeed, democracy 
was conceived of as the panacea to all the country’s problems, as a famous phrase of 
Alfonsín’s put it: “Con la democracia se come, se cura y se educa” – “With 
democracy it is possible to eat, to heal and to educate”.64 Additionally, the first victory 
for a non-Peronist in a full democratic election since 1945, when Peronism gained its 
first electoral success, and an ongoing process of democratisation of the Peronist party 
indicated an increase in pluralism (Novaro, 1994: 60-3). 
 
Yet, the advances of liberalism were counterbalanced by an attempt to construct a 
new hegemonic project – the Tercer Movimiento Histórico (Third Historical 
Movement) – inspired by the UCR’s success in the 1983 and 1985 elections (Morales 
Solá, 2006: 8; Novaro, 1994: 58). Additionally, the government gave in to corporatist 
pressures, which managed to colonise public policy areas, and addressed social 
demands predominantly in accordance with the preferences of party bosses or 
“caudillos” (Acuña, 1994: 35; Novaro, 1994: 63, 74). 
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 UCR Presidential Rally, Oct-Nov 1983 
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Successive economic crises led to increasing pressures on the Alfonsín government to 
implement economic liberalism. The government attempted to control fiscal 
expenditure and introduced privatisation plans, but the association of economic 
liberalism with the tragic experience of the dictatorship (Palermo and Novaro, 1996: 
58, 59) contributed to Alfonsín’s reluctance to adopt it. The government started 
implementing neo-Keynesian economics to stimulate demand through increases in 
real wages (Canitrot, 1991: 131). However, in return for continued financing, 
international creditors demanded liberal reforms and assumed that if Argentina signed 
an agreement with the IMF that would be the best indication of the country’s 
commitment to such reforms (Tedesco, 1999: 91; Acuña, 1994: 33). In order to please 
creditors and obtain IMF support, the Plan Austral of 1985 committed to paying off 
the debt and focused on tackling fiscal deficit, and in 1988 the Plan Primavera 
(Spring Plan) included privatisation objectives. However, these Plans were not liberal 
– the Plan Austral involved state control of prices and wages (Tedesco, 1999: 103-
108) and the Primavera focused on price freezes and accompanied a de facto 
cessation of interest payments on debt. The former failed mainly because of the 
government’s difficult relationship with unions, whose role was crucial in managing 
price and wage controls (Tedesco, 1999: 105-106, 109; Acuña, 1994: 33), and the 
latter failed to meet fiscal goals. In June 1989, following a sharp rise in the value of 
the dollar, hyperinflation hit the country and Menem, who had won the presidential 
elections in May, took power earlier than scheduled (Acuña, 1994: 32-37). 
 
 
b. State withdrawal and food aid 
 
Liberalism also started to appear in the approaches taken by these governments in 
addressing poverty. The dictatorship focused on withdrawing state action from social 
areas and thus implemented measures in which the most distinctive features of what 
later became the neoliberal approach to social reform – privatisation, decentralisation 
and targeting – emerged. Alfonsín’s government continued with a budget for the 
social sectors similar to that of the dictatorship, but its main action on tackling poverty 
was chiefly in line with the populist project. 
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During the dictatorship, decentralisation and privatisation of social services resulted in 
concentrating the provision of state social services in the poorest sectors, thus 
producing a form of targeting. The national state transferred the management of 
hospitals and primary schools to provincial governments and the role of obras 
sociales65 and private healthcare providers increased (Isuani and Tenti, 1989: 20). 
Private organisations, including social organisations, had to supplement state delivery 
of social services. Yet, the dictatorship’s repression led to the closing down of 
institutional channels for social demands, including social organisations (Jelin, 1997: 
79). Furthermore, community promotion had ceased to be a government objective 
(Cardarelli and Rosenfeld, 1998: 54), and that hindered the emergence of social 
organisations as important actors in the delivery of social services. 
 
Alfonsín’s government did not increase social expenditure, but it was concerned with 
poverty, which it addressed with food aid and an approach that continued along the 
lines established during the populist hegemony. Public expenditure in education 
remained constant between 1981 and 1990, and was no different to the amount spent 
in the years of the dictatorship, and public expenditure decreased in healthcare, where 
private sector participation increased (Lloyd Sherlock, 1997: 28, 29). However, the 
government undertook the first official study on poverty (INDEC, 1984) and 
developed a significant programme aimed at alleviating poverty, the Programa 
Alimentario Nacional (PAN – National Food Programme). The PAN, approved in 
1984, consisted of the distribution of food boxes that covered 30% of a family’s 
monthly nutritional needs (Golbert, 1992: 44), based on a view of poverty as being a 
lack of access to nutrition, ie the inability to access the basic basket of food that 
covered the nutritional needs of an individual or household.  
 
The PAN promoted the formation and strengthening of community farms, 
neighbourhood associations and mothers’ associations, involved local community 
workers in selecting beneficiaries and delivering the boxes, and organised training and 
workshops for the wider community. However, state and party institutions, rather than 
social organisations, were the programme’s main actors. The state purchased the food 
and employed all the community workers involved in the programme. Local political 
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leaders contributed to the programme in different ways, such as providing storage for 
the boxes. Additionally, most of the organisations involved were UCR committees or 
organisations linked to the party (Moreno, 2002: 319, 320). Thus, programme 
distribution was not detached from party politics. Indeed, PAN distribution was not 
based on the INDEC 1984 study data on poverty, and recipients could access the food 
boxes just by signing under oath that they were poor (Midre, 1992: 362).  
 
Therefore, the PAN, which became a trademark of Alfonsín’s administration (Midre, 
1992: 360), included central elements of the populist project. The centrality of the 
state and of community promotion reflected key contingent elements of the populist 
project that had been incorporated during Perón’s government and the 1960s 
respectively. The blurred separation between the private and public spheres, and the 
preference for addressing the people through weakly institutionalised channels, 
corresponded to the normative and logical components of this project. 
 
 
c. Renewal of the populist discourse on civil society 
 
With the advances of liberal features over the populist hegemony, the populist 
discourse on civil society among organisations dealing with poverty incorporated 
several features linked to the liberal project. However, the discourse remained 
predominantly populist. The support for liberal democracy and the deepening of 
processes begun in the 1960s – the significant increase in voluntary organisations and 
the technification of organisations’ approaches to poverty – resulted in the 
incorporation of features tied to liberal normative views – the importance of 
individuals and a preference for institutionalised methods in addressing social 
demands. Yet, a view of inextricability between the private and public realms, the 
preference for community over individuals, and the prevalence of the political over 
institutional logic continued to distinguish the country’s discourse on civil society and 
revealed the persistence of its populist character. The following provides a summary 
of the key modifications the discourse on civil society went through in these years. 
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The first two modifications related to the relationship between the private and public 
spheres. First, although organisations’ anti-status quo stance increased during the 
dictatorship years, channelling it through opposition to the military regime made it 
supportive of democratic institutions (eg: Jelin, 1994; Jelin and Herschberg, 1996; 
Pearce, 1997; Roberts, 1998; Oxhorn, 1994). Struggles for the defence of individual 
human rights were coupled with demands for a return to a representative democratic 
government, reducing attachment to the notion of mass democracy envisaged by 
Perón. Second, during the dictatorship, organisations consolidated their role of 
temporarily supplementing the state in dealing with poverty, in the expectation that 
the state would eventually take over. When democracy returned, the UCR government 
supported this supplementary role, because of fiscal constraints and a decision to 
promote community participation. Additionally, the organisations’ anti-status quo 
stance weakened and this made it easier for social organisations to accept state funds 
and guidance. 
 
The next three changes related to the populist project’s preference for community 
over individuals. One change was that while liberal democracy was increasingly 
endorsed as a system of government that preserved individual freedom, organisations 
continued to prefer participatory internal governing mechanisms and non-hierarchical 
structures that allowed direct contact between members and leaders. At the same time, 
strong leadership prevailed and distance between bases and leaders was common. The 
second change was the increase in the number of organisations during both the 
dictatorship and the democratic government (Luna, 1997: 3; Moreno, 2002: 317), 
including the emergence of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and new social 
movements, which co-existed alongside “old” organisations such as unions 
(Roxborough, 1997). This change suggested that organisations were increasingly 
being set up according to individuals’ free will and interests. Nevertheless, 
corporatism remained strong, as was apparent in the continued leverage of workers’ 
corporations rather than individuals in defining state action. This was accompanied by 
poverty-focused organisations’ growing dependence on state funds. Finally, 
organisations became increasingly technical, partly as a result of the growth, in both 
number and recognition, of specialists who could negotiate with the state in the 
organisations’ name, which in turn reinforced the distance between leaders and bases, 
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and partly because the advice that accompanied the international funds that abounded 
in the country in the 1980s was that organisations should technify (Forni, 1992: 520-
2; Chambers 1987). 
 
In relation to the logical component of populism, although the technification of 
organisations seemed to bring about political neutrality, organisations retained their 
political identities and, following a historical trend, member participation usually 
went beyond the organisations themselves and included some form of involvement in 
the political sphere. Thus, the growth in the number of social organisations did not 
necessarily reflect an increased role for individual will in forming organisations – 
corporatism remained strong and political allegiances and Catholicism continued to be 
crucial in defining organisations’ preferences. Similarly, although organisations 
became more technical they did not stop addressing poverty in a discretionary way, 
with little attachment to institutionalised methods and resorting to the state and to 
party politics. 
 
The new characteristics of the discourse appeared in both old and new poverty-
focused organisations. The unions, a pillar of Peronism, began to support the liberal 
ideas of democracy and individual human rights. During the dictatorship’s first years, 
union members “disappeared”, unions were taken over by the state, and strikes were 
banned (Godio, 2000: 1104). However, unions continued to dominate the provision of 
healthcare services and, on this basis, retained political power and remained a key 
actor in dealing with poverty-related issues. They divided into a pro-dialogue sector, 
which formed the CGT Azopardo in 1982, and a confrontational sector, which in 1980 
created the CGT Brasil.66 The latter obtained crucial support from the Pastoral Social 
(Social Pastoral) of the Catholic Church, which, concerned with human rights abuses, 
joined forces with it. During a mass following a general strike in July 1981, 10,000 
people chanted songs demanding a return to democracy (Godio, 2000: 1121; Moreno, 
2002: 287-8). 
 
Four days before the Falklands/Malvinas War started, the CGT Brasil organised a 
general strike in which human rights organisations and the multipartidaria (multi-
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 Azopardo and Brasil are the streets where the headquarters of the two CGTs were based. 
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party coalition)67 participated. Later, the unions resisted Alfonsín’s attempts to 
democratise the union movement, arguing that it was a state-control strategy (Godio, 
2000: 1158), and they organised 13 general strikes during his governments. In 1987, 
when the forthcoming Peronist party internal elections engaged the unions in internal 
party struggles, their confrontation with the government started to decrease (Tedesco, 
1999: 133). Therefore, their support for the liberal democracy that grew under the 
dictatorship was overshadowed by their determination to use non-representative 
mechanisms to impose their views on a democratically elected government. Yet, as 
the unions were such central actors in the populist hegemony, their assimilation of 
liberal democratic views was especially significant. 
 
New and existing organisations started to include a focus on poverty. Above all, the 
Church organisation Caritas and organisations that grew out of neighbourhood and 
rural organisations were becoming specialised in poverty. Some human rights 
organisations focused on searching for people’s relatives disappeared since 1976, 
providing legal aid and denouncing human rights violations (Brysk, 1994), and they 
included actions to fight poverty, which was considered a violation of basic human 
rights (eg SERPAJ – Servicio, Paz y Justicia [Service, Peace and Justice]). During the 
democratic government, new social movements flourished. Mainly the expression of 
minority groups, they dealt with poverty through awareness-raising campaigns on 
issues such as the environment and HIV/AIDS (Moreno, 2002: 327, 328). In 
particular, Caritas and newly emerging NGOs became the main organisations dealing 
with poverty in these years. In spite of increasing religious diversification in the 1980s 
(Mallimaci, 1996), Caritas – created in 1956 to counter the increasing diversification 
of the AC and for years focused on collecting money to distribute among the needy – 
grew significantly in that decade (Mallimaci, 1996 and 2000: 119). During Alfonsín’s 
government, Caritas became key in delivering state social programmes because of the 
extension of the network of parishes that hosted Caritas Parroquiales (Parish Caritas) 
(Díaz Muñoz, 2002). In collaboration with programmes such as the PAN and other 
nutritional programmes, Caritas Parroquiales identified recipients of aid and 
distributed goods and services (Moreno, 2002: 319, 320). In turn, NAs and rural 
organisations underwent important transformations. During the dictatorship, NAs’ 
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main activities revolved around responding to repressive measures such as forced 
slum clearance (Romero, 2002: 269) and to state cutbacks in services and 
infrastructure for shantytowns. The organisations focused on services rather than on 
infrastructure (Cavarozzi and Palermo, 1995: 37) running, for instance, health centres 
and “madres cuidadoras” (childminder) schemes (Moreno, 2002: 300, 301). In urban 
areas, some old NAs and some new organisations became NGOs specialised in 
poverty-related issues, known as development NGOs (DNGOs) and usually referred 
to as “habitat organisations”. In rural areas, DNGOs built on the experiences of earlier 
rural organisations linked to the MRAC and the Rural Leagues. 
 
The characteristics of these emerging NGOs reflected those of the populist discourse 
on civil society of the time. The growth of social organisations, especially during the 
dictatorship’s reluctance to support community organisation, seemed to signal an 
increase in individuals’ will to organise independently from state support. Yet, many 
organisations became brokers of state resources once democracy returned and 
community promotion strategies were resumed. In programmes such as PAN, many 
NGOs and community organisations became mere vehicles of state action rather than 
channels for their social bases’ demands. As one study showed, neighbourhood 
associations, for example, “began to reflect whatever the state chose to offer” 
(Cavarozzi and Palermo, 1995: 37). The organisations’ closeness to the state was 
crystallised in the late 1980s with the creation of the Mesa de Concertación de 
Políticas Sociales (Social Policies Dialogue Board), formed by several social 
organisations linked to government programmes (González Velazco, 2002: 365). 
 
These NGOs continued to prefer non-hierarchical forms of organisation and 
participatory governing mechanisms and, as professional organisations, they emerged 
as intermediaries between donors and their membership and the wider community. 
However, studies have shown that the increasingly technical profile of NGOs and 
their distance from the recipients of their services resulted in the prevalence of single-
list systems, a lack of elections, and sometimes the appointment of outsiders to 
leadership positions, based on their wealth or contacts (Sirvent, 1999). A lack of 
information given to the membership about decision-making and members’ disinterest 
in politics reflected the distance between leaders and the bases (Sirvent, 1999: 225). 
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Moreover, in the case of rural organisations, their central offices were usually in 
Buenos Aires (Moreno, 2002: 330, 331).  
 
The transformation of organisations into technical NGOs appeared to accompany their 
de-politicisation, which was reinforced by the fear of political participation, still 
lingering after the dictatorship (Sirvent, 1999: 223-228). However, there was an 
increasing use of organisations as platforms for the leaders’ political activities. The 
roles of the political puntero (ward boss) and the community leader overlapped, as did 
those of NGO staff and state civil servants. Nor did technification mean an end to the 
discretionary nature of addressing of poverty. DNGOs usually gave advice and 
training to grass-roots organisations of their choice and excluded those of different 
party colours (Cavarozzi and Palermo, 1995: 40, 42-3). 
 
 
3.5. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has shown the historical moulding and developments of the Argentinean 
discourse on civil society concerning social organisations involved in poverty 
reduction actions. The populist discourse emerged from the Peronist populist project’s 
articulation of diffuse views and practices among social organisations dealing with 
poverty. When Perón was in exile, the populist character of the discourse was 
consolidated. By the 1980s the discourse was still predominantly populist, despite 
having incorporated some features linked to the liberal political project: the 
boundaries between the social sphere and the political sphere, which included the state 
and political forces, remained blurred; internally, organisations preferred non-
hierarchical structures and participatory governing mechanisms to representative 
mechanisms of government, but with strong leaders, usually detached from the bases, 
continuing to guide them; both Catholicism and political identities continued to be 
central in defining actions taken by social organisations; and discretionary modes of 
dealing with poverty persisted. 
 
However, the advance of liberalism – the increasing support for liberal democracy, 
the growth of voluntary organisations, and the increasing technification and 
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institutionalisation of actions for tackling poverty – emerged as an avenue through 
which the neoliberalism that arrived in the 1990s could colonise this populist 
discourse. The next chapter analyses the neoliberal discourse on civil society and 
explores whether that discourse was prepared to colonise populism, or whether it 
presented opportunities for populism to regain a hegemonic position. 
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Chapter 4 
 
The MDBs’ neoliberal political project and discourse on civil society 
 
 
 
This chapter describes the WB and IDB discourse on civil society in the poverty 
reduction field. It shows that throughout the 1990s both MDBs’ discourse was 
neoliberal, despite modifications in the late 1990s and differences in their strategies. It 
was neoliberal because it was part of an approach to poverty consistent with the core 
of the neoliberal political project – market liberalisation – and because it 
operationalised the normative and logical components of this project. 
 
The distinctive features of the discourse operationalised the components of the 
neoliberal political project. First, civil society was seen to be mainly comprised of 
social organisations, and these were expected to permanently supplement the state’s 
poverty reduction policies. Second, civil society was located in the private sphere, 
alongside the market and separated from the political sphere – including the state. 
Third, social organisations were viewed as emerging from individuals’ will and 
interests and, fourth while this would lead to a preference for internal democratic 
mechanisms because they could preserve individual freedom, the willingness to 
undertake voluntary work emerged as a more important organisational characteristic. 
Fifth, participation in organisations was expected to be restricted to specific poverty 
reduction projects without involving influencing policy-making. Sixth, technical 
organisations were the central civil society actors and, seventh, organisations’ poverty 
reduction actions were expected to use standardised technical methods. Finally, 
efficiency objectives were the overarching justification for all these features. The first 
five features reflected the normative component of neoliberalism and aimed to redraw 
the dividing line between the private and public spheres and prioritise the individual 
over the community. Stressing efficiency and the technical profile of social 
organisations, rather than the political objectives behind the inclusion of civil society 
in poverty reduction actions, revealed a preference for the logic of difference in 
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responding to social demands. Efficiency justifications, however, appeared to be 
masking the political character of the discourse. 
 
The MDBs’ discourse on civil society evolved alongside the formation of the 
Washington consensus (mid-1980s to mid-1990s) and its modifications in the post-
Washington consensus years (mid-1990s to 2001). The first section of this chapter 
describes the MDBs’ approaches to development before the 1990s, during the 
Washington consensus years and in the post-Washington consensus years. The second 
and third sections explain, respectively, the MDBs’ approach to poverty and their 
discourse on civil society in the 1990s. The third section shows that, as with the 
modifications in the MDBs’ agenda and approach to poverty, the changes in the 
discourse on civil society in the second half of the 1990s reflected the articulation of a 
more elaborate neoliberal project in which the political character of neoliberalism 
became more visible. 
 
The conclusion suggests that, seemingly paradoxically, the neoliberal struggles for 
hegemony generated opportunities to challenge the neoliberal project. The 
Argentinean populist discourse on civil society and the MDBs’ neoliberal one are 
strikingly different. Yet, the MDBs’ focus on efficiency was a fundamental avenue 
that opened up the possibility for non-neoliberal projects, such as the populist one, to 
colonise neoliberalism. Changes to the MDBs’ discourse on civil society after the 
mid-1990s and historical and institutional differences between the WB and the IDB 
constituted further opportunities for the advancement of the Argentinean populist 
discourse. 
 
 
4.1. The MDBs’ adoption of neoliberalism and its deepening 
 
The WB and the IDB at first differed significantly in their approaches to poverty and 
their relationships with borrowing countries. By the late 1980s, however, they had 
converged in the adoption of neoliberalism. Neoliberalism continued to guide the 
MDBs’ perspectives throughout the 1990s, despite undergoing important changes 
after the mid-1990s. 
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a. Differences in the early WB and IDB 
 
The differences in the WB and IDB conditions of emergence significantly affected the 
relationships they established with their borrowing countries – the IDB was more 
sympathetic to country-members’ views and the WB was more independent from 
these countries in making strategic decisions. The WB was founded in 194468 in 
Bretton Woods,69 USA following an initiative by the triumphant forces to help in the 
post-Second World War reconstruction. The IDB70 was created in 1959 in the midst 
of the Cold War and the post-Cuban revolution. The Brazilian President Juscelino 
Kubitschek drove the initiative forward,71 following up on a turn-of-the-century plan 
to create a regional agency (Tussie, 1997: 20-1). Thus, while creditors founded the 
WB, the IDB was an initiative of the borrowing countries themselves (Culpeper, 
1997: 12). These different origins led to the construction of a “special relationship” 
between the IDB and the region’s countries (Nelson, 2000: 76). 
 
The ideas that informed the setting-up of both Banks and their most central 
institutions reflected and reinforced their different relationships with the countries of 
the region. The WB originally drew on John Maynard Keynes’ ideas but the less 
interventionist US plans of Harry Dexter White prevailed in the final arrangements 
(Bird, 2001: 824). The IDB, in contrast, was informed by the highly interventionist 
version of Keynesianism that was at its heyday in the region when the IDB was 
created – structuralism (chapter 3). A key institutional mechanism that is related to 
these different relationships between the Banks and the regional countries is their 
voting systems. While both systems are based on shareholding rights, the 26 Latin 
American and Caribbean members collectively control 50.02% of the IDB’s shares,72 
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 The World Bank Group consists of five institutions: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), 
founded in 1944 and usually referred to as “the World Bank”; the International Finance Corporation (IFC, est. 1956); the 
International Development Association (IDA, est. 1960); the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID, 
est. 1966); and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA, operational since 1988) (Shihata, 1991: 8). 
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 The WB was created alongside the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Trade Organization. Only one 
element of the latter survived, the General Trade Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which after its 8th Round in Uruguay, 
became the World Trade Organisation (WTO) (Hoekman and Kostecki, 1995:  part 1). 
70
 The IDB Group consists of the Inter-American Investment Corporation (IIC), operational since 1989, and the Multilateral 
Investment Fund (MIF), created in 1992. 
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 See http://www.iadb.org/aboutus/I/history.cfm?language=English 
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 The USA is the single largest shareholder in the IDB, with approximately 30% of the voting power, followed by Japan with 
5%. Other lending members combined have 15% (BICUSA, http://www.bicusa.org/en/Institution.Structure.4.aspx, downloaded 
17-10-2006). 
 98 
whereas in the WB these countries’ voting power diminishes, as countries from all 
over the world also have a share.73 Furthermore, the IDB’s “Charter” or “Agreement 
Establishing the IDB”74 states that periodic Replenishment Meetings, at least once a 
decade, are the forum where member countries redefine the amount of capital they 
contribute to the Bank and agree on its investment priorities. In contrast, the WB’s 
governing rules, stated in its “Articles of Agreement”,75 are difficult to modify and 
strictly forbid the Bank to get involved in borrower countries’ political affairs 
(Shihata, 1991: 53, 60-79, 82-84), which limits the possibility of country 
governments’ preferences being included in WB strategies. 
 
Both MDBs pursued development and agreed that this was equal to economic growth. 
However, up until the 1980s they used different strategies to achieve development, 
and therefore their approaches to poverty differed. While in the WB a “trickle down” 
approach prevailed, the IDB implemented “direct actions” in the social areas from the 
start. 
 
In the first years of the WB, lending for the modernisation of physical infrastructure 
was key to generating economic growth. Growth would have “trickle down” effects 
benefiting the entire population of the borrowing countries (Gilbert and Vines, 2000: 
18) and would lead to poverty reduction. In the 1960s doubts about the “trickle down” 
approach emerged among economists who argued that growth not only required but 
also produced inequality and therefore undermined any poverty reduction that growth 
could generate (Kuznet, 1955 in Kanbur and Vines, 2000: 89). The WB did not 
engage with these criticisms until the 1970s76 when, under the presidency of 
McNamara, poverty alleviation became an explicit goal. After 1973, a portfolio of 
projects specifically targeted at the poor was developed (Kanbur and Vines, 2000: 96, 
97; Kapur, et al. 1997: 263, 329). Yet, the preference of some sectors of the Bank’s 
operational staff for less interventionist approaches (Mosley, et al., 1995 in Gilbert 
and Vine, 2000: 22), the rise of neo-conservative governments in developed countries 
with influential positions on the WB board, and the reluctance of privileged groups in 
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 The USA, despite having fewer shares in the WB than in the IDB (30% versus 17%), is the WB’s largest shareholder (Tussie, 
1997), followed far behind by Japan with 6% of votes cast (Wade, 2001: 1). 
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 http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=781584 
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 http://tinyurl.com/29dslr 
76
 The International Development Agency (IDA), created in the 1960s to provide loans at non-commercial rates to less developed 
countries, was a step towards the emergence of a specific focus on poverty. Yet, it focused on poor countries and not on the 
poorest sectors of borrowing countries (Culpeper, 1997: 8-9; Mosley, 1997: 1953). 
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borrowing countries to adopt pro-poor policies (Bresser Pereyra and Nakano, 1998: 
34), thwarted this attempt to change the WB approach to poverty. Moreover, the oil 
crisis of the early 1970s precipitated the liberalisation of the international economy 
and international private credit for middle-income countries became increasingly 
available, making IFI loans unnecessary and limiting these institutions’ influence in 
borrowing countries. 
 
The IDB strategies for achieving development were based on the structuralist77 
emphasis on the need for a structural re-organisation of internal economies and the 
promotion of industrial production for internal markets in the framework of regional 
integration. Although the IDB, like the WB, held that development stemmed from 
investing in infrastructure and the productive sectors, it considered the equalisation of 
labour productivity, led by technology innovation, to be the key to poverty reduction 
(Rodríguez, 1980). The IDB’s more interventionist approach, and its responsiveness 
to regional governments’ concerns about social stability in the aftermath of the Cuban 
Revolution, contributed to the prompt implementation of direct actions to address 
social problems. Therefore, the IDB’s initial loan portfolios concentrated on 
infrastructure development and the productive sectors, as did those of the WB, but 
also included social projects such as water sanitation, urban development and housing 
(Culpeper, 1997: 88, Tussie, 1997: 21). In the 1960s, the IDB’s role in the region was 
minor because of accelerated regional growth, which by the late 1960s had reached an 
annual rate of 7%, and in the 1970s this marginal role continued due to the availability 
of private credit (Scheman, 1997: 86, 88). In the social sectors, however, the IDB 
introduced a new type of social project in the mid-1970s that was aimed at involving 
the poor in productive activities – micro-enterprise  (Lustig and Deutsch, 1998: 19; 
Culpeper, 1997: 98). In 1978, moreover, the 5th replenishment conclusions 
established the “low-income goal”, according to which at least 50% of overall lending 
should be directed at low-income people (Culpeper, 1997: 89). Yet, adopting the low-
income goal did not entail shifting the focus away from the infrastructure and 
productive sectors. 
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 On structuralism, see notes 13 in chapters 2 and 3. 
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b. The Washington consensus years (mid-1980s – mid-1990s): MDBs’ convergence – 
market liberalisation and “conditionality” 
 
The MDBs’ adoption of market liberalisation as the key to development marked the 
convergence of these Banks’ approaches to development and their focus on 
macroeconomic reform. The ascendancy of neo-conservative governments in the 
developed world and, particularly for the IDB, the failure of Latin American countries 
to tame inflation, contributed to the MDBs’ adoption of market reform as a strategy 
for development. By the late 1980s, both Banks were supporting market liberalisation 
reforms of the “Washington consensus” type (chapter 2). The MDBs shifted from 
understanding development as the result of investment in infrastructure and the 
productive sectors to emphasising the importance of free and open markets in 
achieving growth. Differences remained among Latin American economists about the 
appropriateness of focusing on market reform – evident in the 7th IDB replenishment 
meetings in 1987 (Culpeper, 1997: 92) – and IDB loans continued to focus on the 
productive and infrastructure sectors. Yet, the IDB agreement with the WB on the 
importance of macroeconomic reforms such as achieving fiscal balance appeared in 
the growing number of loans the IDB approved to help countries’ market-oriented 
reforms (Meller, 1989: 70). This convergence was fostered by the increasing 
collaboration between the two Banks after 1987, facilitated until 1992 by the USA’s 
requirement that IDB staff work under the supervision and training of the WB 
(Tussie, 1997: 66, 135-6). 
 
An increasing use of “conditionality” accompanied the emphasis on the importance of 
free and open markets for economic growth. At the same time as the post-debt crisis 
scenario aided the MDBs’ consolidation as policy diffusers, because they were among 
the few sources of funds available for the region, the Banks actively encouraged 
market liberalisation through new lending mechanisms with attached “conditions” that 
required policy changes aimed at market liberalisation. The WB added “adjustment 
lending” schemes to its original project-based lending, or “investment lending” (IL).78 
These were Structural Adjustment Loans (SALs) in 1980 and Sectoral Adjustment 
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 The main IL instruments are Specific Investment Loans (SILs), focused on economic, social and institutional infrastructure, 
and Sector Investment & Maintenance Loans (SIMs), aimed at aligning policy sectors’ expenditure, policies and performance 
with countries’ development priorities. 
 101 
Loans (SecALs) in 1984.79 The IDB promoted structural reform through Policy-Based 
Loans (PBL). 
 
The adoption of market liberalisation is indicative of the MDBs’ adoption of 
neoliberalism because market liberalisation entails an operationalisation of the 
neoliberal political project. First, by stressing the importance of market mechanisms 
and re-sizing the state, market liberalisation attempts to redraw the dividing line 
between the private and public spheres – the normative component of the neoliberal 
project. Second, market liberalisation involves a preference for responses to social 
demands based on the economic rationality that derives from the functioning of free 
markets, which reveals the use of the distinctive logic of discursive construction of 
neoliberalism – difference. Finally, market liberalisation was crucial for 
neoliberalism’s hegemonic struggles. The emphasis on the rationality of markets 
helped to make neoliberal views appear neutral, and thus contributed to 
neoliberalism’s hegemonic expansion across a wide political spectrum. 
 
 
c. The Post-Washington Consensus years (mid-1990s – 2001): institutional reform 
and “post-conditionality” 
 
By the mid-1990s, institutional reform had stepped into the limelight on the MDBs’ 
neoliberal agenda, marking the transition from the Washington consensus to the post-
Washington consensus (Burki and Perry, 1998; Stiglitz, 1998a, b). The latter’s 
advocates stressed that not only markets but institutions mattered in achieving 
development. However, market liberalisation continued to be the core of the 
neoliberal project. Furthermore, instead of a significant change in the MDBs’ agenda, 
the new consensus reflected the enhancement of the neoliberal project’s strategy of 
hegemonic articulation. 
 
The MDBs’ views on institutional reform were similar. Interest in institutional reform 
appeared for the first time in the creation of loans for public sector reform at the 
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 SALs support reforms to promote growth, efficient use of resources and sustainable balance of payments, focusing on major 
and crosscutting economic issues. SecALs support policy and institutional change in specific sectors (World Bank, 2000e). 
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beginning of the 1990s80 and in the mid-1990s the MDBs’ views on the subject 
appeared in strategic documents.81 The IDB recommends greater transparency and 
accountability of governments, modernisation of physical infrastructure and systems 
of policy formulation and implementation, professionalisation of human resources, 
and the improvement of decentralisation processes (IDB, 1996a: iii-iv). The WB 
developed its strategy in terms of “good governance”. The main features of the 
strategy are accountability, transparency and access to information, a consolidated 
rule of law, and adequate public management, with decentralisation as a crosscutting 
issue and civil service reform as at its core (World Bank, 1992; esp. 23-27; 48, 49; 
World Bank, 1994a: xvi, 1-3; World Bank, 1997: 7-13). 
 
The incorporation of institutional reform expanded the neoliberal agenda’s scope from 
the macroeconomic sphere to the politico-institutional realm. Nevertheless, while 
institutional reform strategies recognise that there is more to successful development 
than reliance on market forces (Philip, 1999: 242), they suggest that the reforms 
should be oriented towards market liberalisation. The WB sees “good governance … 
[as] an essential complement to sound economic policies.” (World Bank, 1992)82 and, 
similarly, the IDB states that institutional reform “... involves achieving new forms of 
organisation and political and social management that work with the new 
development strategy” (IDB, 1996a: i). Indeed, as one of the pioneers of the post-
Washington consensus ideas explained, institutional reform is the distinctive feature 
of the post-Washington consensus but it does not replace the Washington consensus 
central tenets – macroeconomic stability and liberalisation. Rather, it builds on these 
tenets and stresses factors that the Washington consensus neglected – financial sector 
reform, governments’ role as a complement to the private sector, and improving state 
efficiency (Stiglitz, 1998b: 1, 7). Thus, institutional reform continued to 
operationalise the neoliberal project. The focus on checks and balances mechanisms 
favours individual pluralist representation over the formation of popular identities. 
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 The first WB loans for “Public Sector Management” were made in 1989; the first IDB loans for “Public Sector Reform and 
Modernization of the State” were made in 1990 (Annex I, figures 1 and 2). 
81
 The WB strategy for institutional reform includes its 1992 good governance strategy, and this strategy’s evaluation in 1994 and 
update in 2000. The update included and detailed further the views presented in the World Development Report 1997 on the role 
of the state in development (World Bank, 1992; World Bank, 1994a; World Bank, 1997; World Bank 2000a). The IDB key 
strategic document for institutional reform was the “Frame of Reference for the Bank Action in Programs for Modernization of 
the State and Strengthening of Civil Society” (IDB, 1996a). 
82
 See also http://www.worldbank.com/html/extdr/backgrd/ibrd/role.htm 
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Similarly, calls for the consolidation of the rule of law emphasise the institutional 
logic of discursive formation. 
 
The expansion to the politico-institutional realm involved realigning interests and 
unveiling power struggles that had crystallised in institutions (Leftwich, 1993; 
Casaburi and Tussie, 2000a). These political implications meant that the MDBs 
increasingly used dialogue to complement “conditionality” in making governments 
adopt institutional reform83 (Nelson, 1992; Kahler, 1992: 126). The IDB framed this 
dialogue in its “special relationship” with the borrowing countries and the WB 
developed an “ownership” strategy to improve its connection with borrowing 
countries. The IDB institutional reform strategy took into account the specificities of 
each country (IDB, 1996a: iii-v) and, drawing on the regional governments’ decisions 
contained in the 8th replenishment report, explicitly addressed the political aspects of 
such reform. For instance, in response to the governments’ preferences the strategy 
focused on reinforcing democracy in the region. The WB, forbidden by its Articles of 
Agreement to interfere with borrowing countries’ politics, presented its strategy in 
managerial and administrative terms that masked the political character of the reforms 
(Philip, 1999: 234-236; van Cranenburgh, 1998; Bryld, 2000: 701). Moreover, the 
WB strategy seemed to assume that its recipe was easily universalisable and it 
therefore neglected the reality of each country (Philip, 1999: 426; Martinussen, 1998). 
However, in 1996 the WB started to develop an “ownership” strategy, which sought 
to improve the Bank’s relationship with borrowing countries and focused on dialogue, 
persuasion, training and delegation of control to country offices to achieve 
government compliance with its recommendations. In 1999 “ownership” became a 
formal strategy, when the WB announced the Comprehensive Development 
Framework (CDF) (Wolfensohn, 1999). 
 
Relying on dialogue rather than conditionality to advance institutional reform seemed 
to present the possibility for political projects other than neoliberalism to advance 
their views. By acknowledging the political character of institutional reform, the IDB 
acknowledged the openness of discourses and therefore the possibility of debate. The 
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 Conditionality became more widespread but reflected the growing importance of institutional reform. SALs increased in the 
1990s – in the 1980s they totalled $27 billion across 191 operations and in the 1990s they reached $72 billion across 346 
operations. Yet, conditions on Fiscal and Trade Reform went from 47.6% in 1980-84 to 14.1% in 1999 and conditions on Public 
Sector Reform and the Social Sectors – fewer than 15% of the conditions between 1980 and 1984 – totalled 51.6% in 1999 
(World Bank, 2001). 
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WB’s ownership strategy, similarly, seemed to favour the widening of the WB 
approaches by incorporating countries’ views. However, the promotion of institutional 
reform involved an operation of hegemonic articulation, which actually sought to 
expand the neoliberal hegemony. The use of technical language to highlight that 
rationality and efficiency that guided economic reform was repeated in institutional 
reforms (Hildyard and Wilks, 1998) and contributed to “suturing” (chapter 1) the 
discourse on these reforms and to closing the door to alternative political projects. 
Additionally, the WB’s repositioning as a “knowledge Bank”84 limited the ownership 
strategy (Pender, 2001: 397; Cammack, 2004: 196, 198), since it implied that the 
Bank possessed a “monopoly of ‘development knowledge’” (Cammack, 2004: 190). 
The WB regarded itself as a “unique reservoir of development experience …, [which] 
position[s] us” – said the WB president when presenting the idea of the knowledge 
Bank – “to play a leading role in this new global knowledge partnership” 
(Wolfensohn, 1996). Hence, ownership “… means commitment to carry out policies 
identified as sound by the Bank as the sole authoritative provider of development 
knowledge” (Cammack, 2004: 202). 
 
 
4.2. The MDBs’ neoliberal approach to poverty reduction 
 
Both MDBs’ approaches to poverty reduction, into which their discourse on civil 
society was inserted, were neoliberal throughout the 1990s. They were formed in the 
Washington consensus years, when their core characteristics – targeting, 
decentralisation and participation – emerged. The modifications introduced in the 
second half of the 1990s refined rather than altered this neoliberal approach. 
 
 
a. Targeting, decentralisation and participation 
 
Following the convergence on the importance of market liberalisation for 
development, by the early 1990s the WB and the IDB had both adopted a neoliberal 
approach to poverty. The distinctive features of the neoliberal approach to social 
                                                 
84
 First formulated in 1996, this notion was first documented in a “strategic compact” approved in 1997 (Laporte, 2004). 
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issues in the 1990s were targeting, decentralisation and privatisation (Garland, 2000: 
6; Díaz Muñoz, 2004: 14; Vilas, 1997: 934; Sheahan, 1998; Lustig, 1995; Cortés and 
Marshall, 1999: 199). In the area of poverty reduction targeting was central, 
decentralisation crosscut the approach, and, increasingly through the 1990s, 
privatisation took the form of participation. 
 
The approach was neoliberal because its main features contributed to market 
liberalisation and operationalised the normative and logical components of 
neoliberalism. Targeting, decentralisation and participation attempted to redraw the 
dividing line between the public and private spheres by saving state resources and 
expanding the market. The implementation of these three features put into practice the 
logic of difference by preferring individualised and institutionalised or technical 
responses to social demands. Yet, in turn, these technical responses activated the 
political character of neoliberalism because their apparent neutrality helped 
neoliberalism’s hegemonic struggles. Civil society participation in poverty reduction 
policies played a crucial role in the formation of political identities supportive of 
neoliberalism, and hence the next section explores this political character in more 
depth. 
 
In the heyday of the Washington consensus (1988-1994), poverty reduction gained 
ground in the MDBs’ goals and the neoliberal approach took shape. During the early 
Washington consensus years (1985-1988), the focus on macroeconomic reform led 
the MDBs to practically neglect poverty issues. Although the World Development 
Report of 1980 (WDR1980) (World Bank, 1980) established poverty reduction as a 
WB priority, the WB resumed a “trickle down” approach to poverty. Yet, since 
market reform rather than investment in infrastructure would trigger the trickle down 
effect, the approach was elsewhere labelled “trickle-down-plus” (Kanbur and Vines, 
2000: 91). IDB loans continued to concentrate on the infrastructure and productive 
sectors (IDB, various). As with the WB, the IDB’s development strategies of the 
1980s introduced a focus on human capital factors – health and education – but a 
growing focus on market reform resulted in the marginalisation of poverty-related 
concerns (Kanbur and Vines, 2000: 97-100, Culpeper, 1997: 90, 92-3). In 1982, the 
IDB achieved the low-income goal established in 1978 for the first time, but failed to 
do so again until the end of the decade. The 7th replenishment (1987) debates focused 
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on adjustment, and poverty and social issues were not discussed (Culpeper: 1997: 89). 
By the late 1980s, however, growing evidence of increases in poverty85 and criticism 
by Northern NGOs contributed to poverty’s return to centre stage in both Banks. The 
MDBs’ project portfolios showed soaring investment in the social sectors and fewer 
loans for the productive sectors (Annex I, figures 1 and 2). The projects funded 
through this investment shaped the neoliberal approach to poverty, alongside the 
MDBs’ strategic documents. 
 
In the Washington consensus years, the MDBs’ poverty reduction strategies focused 
on targeting, which was explicitly linked to neoliberalism’s focus on free markets and 
state reduction. The WB’s WDR1990 emphasised the need to improve economic 
management, open up the economy and stimulate labour-intensive growth. Targeting 
the poorer sectors in the delivery of health and education services and making social 
safety nets available to them would contribute to achieving those aims (World Bank, 
1990: 7). Targeting was functional to the neoliberal objective of keeping fiscal 
accounts balanced. It promised to achieve social goals with less strain on the budget 
(Sheahan, 1998: 186) and contributed to enhancing markets by helping those unable 
to enter the labour market to do so (Toye and Jackson, 1996: 56). The 8th 
replenishment (1994) renewed the IDB’s attention to poverty and the focus was 
placed – as in the WB – on employment creation and targeted investments in health 
and education. Accordingly, the “low income goal” was revived and a new category 
of “targeted” projects, in which at least 50% of beneficiaries are poor, was created 
(IDB, 1994: 21; Morley, 1997: 19). The low-income target was applied not just in 
employment projects, which led to focusing on basic education, primary health, poor 
neighbourhood improvements and micro-enterprise (IDB, 1994: 20, 21). In both 
Banks, targeting became the defining variable of a poverty reduction intervention. A 
WB Operational Directive (OD)86 on poverty reduction, following up on the WDR 
recommendations, established that projects could qualify as poverty reduction actions 
if they contained a specific mechanism for targeting the poor (Toye and Jackson, 
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 In the region, income per capita fell by 11% and those living on less than US$2 a day increased from 26.5% of the population 
in 1980 to 31% in 1989 (Morley, 1995a, chapter 1). 
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 OD 4.15, December 1991. Operational directives are statements of procedures to follow in accordance with the Bank’s 
objectives. They can be compulsory, or reccomendations of good practices. See: http://tinyurl.com/4ul864. This OD became 
compulsory when it became an operational policy in July 2004. See: http://tinyurl.com/4cnxoa. 
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1996: 57).87 Similarly, the IDB established that a poverty reduction oriented project 
should be either geographically targeted at poor areas or include a significant majority 
of poor people as beneficiaries (IDB, 1994: 21). 
 
Decentralisation and participation were less prominent elements of the MDBs’ 
strategies for poverty reduction in this period, but were key practices of the MDBs’ 
most salient interventions in the area – social safety nets (SSNs) and social investment 
funds (SIFs).88 SSNs, originally emergency and temporary interventions to deal with 
the effects of adjustment and stabilisation on the most vulnerable sectors of the 
borrowing countries’ populations (Lustig and Deutsch, 1998: 10), evolved during the 
1990s into a form of social protection against the impact of natural or economic 
shocks on the poor (Morley, 1997: 12; Lustig, 2001: 1). They could be implemented 
through a variety of social actions, including cash transfers, income-generation 
programmes and infrastructure work (Husain, 1997: v). SIFs initially operated as 
short-term SSNs to soften the impact of structural adjustment policies on the poor,89 
providing temporary employment in infrastructure projects to that target population 
(Warren, 2003; Deutsch, et al., 1998: 1, 3). Thus, like SSNs, SIFs were targeted 
interventions. What was specific about SIFs was their decentralised character and 
their emphasis on community and private sector involvement in providing public 
services, avoiding the governments’ bureaucratic channels.90  
 
 
b. Refinement of the neoliberal approach 
 
In the post-Washington consensus years, while the MDBs’ approaches to 
development and poverty changed, the scope of change was limited because market 
liberalisation continued unchallenged. The changes reflected more an enhancement of 
the neoliberal strategy of hegemonic articulation than a deviation from the normative 
and logical components of neoliberalism. 
                                                 
87
 Complementary to OD 4.15 was the WB policy paper “Assistance Strategies to Reduce Poverty” (1991), which recommended 
Poverty Assessments for checking governments’ commitment with poverty reduction objectives and for evaluating their 
achievements (Toye and Jackson, 1996). 
88
 The first SIF that gained international recognition and support was implemented in Bolivia in 1986 (Graham, 1992). Deutsch et 
al., 1998: 1, 25 provide more details on SIFs in the region. 
89
 See http://tinyurl.com/53amzf 
90
 For more details about WB SIFs see Glaessner, et.al. (1994). On IDB SIFs see Goodman (1997). 
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First of all, there was a reappraisal of the strategies’ focus on human capital. In the 
WB, the focus on institutional reform, the Mexico Tequila crisis and the appointment 
of a new WB president in 1995 – Wolfensohn – facilitated the incorporation of 
economic theories and economists critical of the “trickle-down-plus” approach91 
(Pender, 2001: 403, 404). GDP92 growth started to be valued not as a goal in itself but 
because it contributed to improving human welfare indicators such as nutrition, 
education and health (Kanbur and Squire, 1999: 1, 2). The IDB, drawing on evidence 
that the poor benefit less from growth (Londoño and Székely, 1997), stressed that for 
growth to have an effect on poverty reduction the state needed to guarantee equality in 
the distribution of the benefits of growth, an approach known as “growth with equity” 
(Teitel, 1992). 
 
Nevertheless, the focus on human capital was based on studies that suggested that 
such factors help the functioning of free markets (Kanbur and Vines, 2000: 103). The 
pillars of the WDR2000 poverty reduction strategy reflect the continued importance 
of market freedom as a normative horizon. The first pillar, opportunity, suggests that 
making markets work for the poor will help them to increase their skills and thus 
reduce inequalities in asset distribution (World Bank, 2000c: 9). The second, 
empowerment, means enhancing poor people’s capacity to influence state institutions 
and to hold them accountable for ensuring the rule of law (World Bank, 2000c: 38-9). 
The poor would thus help to guarantee that the state worked efficiently and 
predictably, facilitating the functioning of free markets. The third pillar, security, 
recommends ensuring the availability of social protection for the poorest and those 
most vulnerable to crises, so that risks can be taken in the market (Cammack, 2004: 
205) and so that the conflicts that market reforms might bring about can be cushioned 
(World Bank, 2000c: 169). The IDB poverty reduction strategy focused on the same 
central points as the WB strategy: enhancing the poor’s access to market 
opportunities; building human capital by upgrading poor people’s skills; changing the 
distribution of assets, including land reform; and providing social protection and 
safety nets for the unemployable and for vulnerable populations, ie those particularly 
at risk at times of economic or natural crises, such as women and young people 
                                                 
91
 This includes the appointment of Joseph Stiglitz as chief economist in 1997. 
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 Gross Domestic Product 
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(Lustig and Deutsch, 1998: 16-28, 20, 24, 25; Morley, 1997: 4, 8, 12). These 
similarities show that, although the IDB holds that the state has an important role in 
guaranteeing equity, it also envisages it as enabling markets to work for the poor. 
 
Second, the meaning of targeting broadened and targeted interventions became 
permanent features of social action. Not only low-income sectors but also vulnerable 
populations become targets of poverty reduction actions. An IDB task manager for 
poverty reduction programmes in Argentina explained that, in selecting target 
populations, whether they were “... unemployed or not was not so important, what 
mattered was that they were weak…” (Traverso, 2003). At the same time, by 1997 
SSNs had become income maintenance programmes that protected the poorest in 
economic or natural crises (Lustig and Deutsch, 1998: ii; World Bank, 1997: v). Also, 
both MDBs started to envisage targeted interventions not just as temporary emergency 
interventions, but as SSNs that should be permanently available as insurance and 
social protection mechanisms (Lustig and Deutsch, 1998: ii; World Bank, 2001: 169; 
World Bank, 1997: 2; World Bank, 2000c: 170). Thus, targeted programmes stopped 
being compensatory social policies intended to correct a temporary situation until the 
state resumed social security provision (Bresser Pereyra and Nakano, 1998: 35) and 
became consolidated as a permanent strategy for coping with poverty. This 
consolidation reinforced the neoliberal aim of re-drawing the dividing line between 
the state and society, by making the reduction of state intervention in social action 
permanent. 
 
Third, the emphasis on participation and decentralisation increased. This change drew 
on lessons learned from SIFs – in which participation and decentralisation were 
central – and from the introduction of institutional reform in the MDBs’ agenda. SIFs 
seemed to become less important during the 1990s. Yet, what happened was that the 
SIF model of channelling funds – providing funds to community groups or other local 
actors for small-scale initiatives, avoiding government bureaucracies – became the 
backbone of most of the MDBs’ poverty reduction projects, even if they were not 
strictly social funds. Observers within the IDB remarked: “…funds have effectively 
become the primary means by which many governments … undertake actions in poor 
communities” (Deutsch, et al., 1998: 1). Simultaneously, SIFs changed. Community 
development aims gradually replaced employment creation objectives. Also, while the 
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focus on infrastructure development remained, participation objectives were stressed 
(Warren, 2003; Deutsch, et al., 1998: 3; Lustig, et al., 1999: 5). Participation, echoing 
the MDBs’ growing concern with institutional reform, referred increasingly to both 
social organisations and local governments. The proliferation of the SIF management 
model, the focus on participation and the inclusion of local governments reinforced 
the decentralisation and participation features of the neoliberal approach to poverty. 
These changes also embodied new efforts to redraw the dividing line between the 
private and the public. Focusing on participation, moreover, reflected the Banks’ aim 
of enhancing dialogue and achieving ownership of their recommendations, key in the 
process of constructing political identities to support the neoliberal political project.  
 
Innovation clearly occurred in these years, yet the core pillars of the approach to 
poverty remained the same. US power placed a tough limit on the possibilities of the 
post-Washington consensus ideas generating deep changes in the MDBs’ approach to 
poverty. Epitomic of US power were the events that led to the resignation of the 
original lead author of the WDR2000, Ravi Kanbur, who attempted to move the 
centre of attention in the WB’s poverty strategy from growth to empowerment. The 
US Treasury insisted on highlighting economic growth and free markets as the route 
out of poverty. Kanbur refused to change the WDR and eventually resigned. The 
WDR was modified and, as shown above, opportunity and market freedom occupy 
central stage (see Wade, 2001; BWP, 2000; Denny, 2000). Alongside US power, the 
persistence of a ‘market-liberalisation’ mindset among operational sectors of the WB 
(Kanbur and Vines, 2000: 100), staff habituation to established practices and the 
continuation of approved projects also played a role in limiting change. Continuing 
with the disbursement of loans for projects approved in the early 1990s and the 
influence of the WB, contributed to the IDB retaining a market freedom-based 
strategy for poverty reduction. 
 
Most crucially, what limited the scope of change in the neoliberal approach to poverty 
was that the post-Washington consensus itself, the framework within which 
innovation in the poverty approach occurred, did not challenge the normative 
component of neoliberalism, retaining market freedom as the ultimate objective. The 
post-Washington consensus and its poverty reduction strategy might not have 
included a straightforward rejection of interventionism or a commitment to the idea 
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that free markets work perfectly (Cammack, 2004: 209), but it continued to ultimately 
defend the freedom of the individual over and above the community. It also continued 
to attempt to re-establish the divide between the private and public spheres in order to 
facilitate freedom in the former, as that would ensure a thriving economy. 
Furthermore, the post-Washington consensus approach to poverty embodied a better 
designed and more ambitious societal transformation project, in which the generation 
of political identities that could contribute to hegemonising neoliberalism became 
more important. The discourse on civil society, therefore, became crucial because this 
discourse defines the arena in which hegemony is constructed. 
 
 
4.3. The MDBs’ neoliberal discourse on civil society 
 
Throughout the 1990s, the MDBs’ increasing concern with civil society was apparent 
in the growing number of projects with some form of civil society involvement, the 
Banks’ internal structure, and the launching of key publications on participation. For 
instance, according to the WB, while between 1973 and 1990 the percentage of WB-
funded projects including civil society participation remained below 20%, since 1994 
the percentage has hovered around 50% (World Bank, 2000b: 5). In the late 1980s, the 
IDB Small Projects Programme and internal sectors of the WB, mainly the Africa 
Desk, were focusing on community participation issues (Sollis, 1992: 164-5; Stiles, 
1998: 202). The WDR1990 and the OD 4.15 (note 19) incorporated participation 
issues into the WB’s poverty reduction strategies (Shihata, 1991: 39). The WB 
established the Civil Society Unit (initially “NGO Unit”) in 1992 (Clark, 2002) and 
the IDB established the State, Governability and Civil Society Division within the 
Sustainable Development Department in 1996 (Castagnino, 2003). By 1996, both 
Banks had published their participatory strategies (World Bank, 1994a; 1996; IDB, 
1996b). 
 
Throughout these years, the MDBs’ discourse on civil society in poverty reduction 
was neoliberal because it was part of a neoliberal approach to poverty and because, in 
itself, it operationalised the neoliberal political project. The main characteristics of the 
discourse emerged during the Washington consensus years, and during the post-
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Washington consensus years key innovations were introduced. However, the 
innovations did not challenge the features of the neoliberal discourse that had 
emerged in the early 1990s. Rather, these changes were in accordance with the 
deepening of the political character of neoliberalism that was taking place alongside 
the rise of institutional reform in those years. Historical and institutional differences 
between the WB and the IDB shaped their strategies on civil society. Yet both Banks 
recommended and implemented similar actions for incorporating civil society into 
their poverty reduction actions, resulting in their discourse on civil society acquiring 
similar characteristics in practice. 
 
 
a. The Washington Consensus years: key features emerge 
 
In these years the main characteristics of the MDBs’ discourse on civil society 
emerged. 
 
First, social organisations were seen as the main civil society actors. They were 
expected to supplement the state in poverty reduction policies and this 
supplementation was expected to become permanent. Building on the experience of 
social funds, social organisations’ main role in MDB poverty reduction actions was 
the administration and implementation of MDB-funded state social programmes. At 
the same time as targeting crystallised as a permanent feature of the neoliberal 
approach to poverty, reflecting the definition of new boundaries between the state and 
society where the former intervened less in the latter, the aim of making civil society 
organisations permanent supplements of the state in poverty reduction policies 
appeared in the WB’s main participatory strategy. The strategy stated that 
participation “…support[s] and prepare[s] poor people to own and manage assets and 
activities in a sustainable manner” in order to eventually withdraw non-community 
originated social interventions (World Bank, 1996: 4). Contrastingly, the IDB stressed 
that working with civil society in poverty reduction projects helped to improve 
citizens’ relationship with the state (IDB, 1996b: section 1, 5), reflecting the IDB’s 
historical focus on the role of the state in development. Yet, since the mechanisms of 
civil society participation that the IDB suggested, as shown below, are similar to those 
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of the WB, in practice social organisations also tended to supplement state withdrawal 
from the social areas. 
 
Second, civil society was located in the private sphere, alongside the market and 
separated from the political sphere, which included political organisations and the 
state. Civil society organisations were seen as emerging independently from the state 
and were conceived of as located in the private realm as a third sector vis-à-vis the 
market. This means that the MDBs regarded these organisations as a counterpart to 
the market at the non-economic level, ie the non-profit sector of the private sphere 
(Anheier and Seibel, 1990). 
 
Third, social organisations were viewed as emerging from free individuals’ will and 
interests and, fourth, while it could be concluded from this that internal democratic 
mechanisms were preferred, the will to work voluntarily, ie on an unpaid basis, was 
more valued as a characteristic of organisations. The MDBs conceived of civil society 
as voluntary social organisations emerging from free individuals’ decision to organise 
for a particular purpose. While the MDBs’ strategies did not state a preference for any 
particular form of internal organisation, it can be assumed that these organisations 
were expected to be democratically organised, as this could preserve individual 
freedom. But what was clearer was that voluntary organisation meant both 
organisations emerging from free individuals’ decisions (voluntary=chosen) and self-
funded organisations (voluntary=unpaid or not for profit). This reflected the 
contextualisation of the notion of individual will in the framework of a political 
project that prioritised economic over political aspects and thus conceived of civil 
society as a third sector alongside the market, as the MDBs’ definitions of civil 
society showed: 
 
“… people organized into productive units by their own initiative to seek 
satisfaction for their collective needs. Implicit in this definition is the 
understanding that civil society organizations are beyond the context of the 
production of goods and services determined by political mandate (governments) 
or equity mandate (business).” (IDB, 1996b) 
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“… the arena in which people come together to pursue the interests they hold in 
common – not for profit or the exercise of political power, but because they care 
enough about something to take collective action.” (World Bank, 2000d: 3) 
 
 
Fifth, participation in organisations was expected to be restricted to specific poverty 
reduction projects, without involving influencing policy-making. Analysts93 and MDB 
staff noted this. The first head of the WB NGO/Civil Society Unit commented in an 
interview that the Bank 
 
“… saw NGOs as potential cheap sub-contractors to help [in project 
implementation] ... so... [the WB believed] there was nothing fundamentally 
wrong with the projects but ... [the problem] was just how they were 
implemented. So no need to involve NGOs at the design stage, no need to change 
the projects at all…” (Clark, 2002) 
 
This limited participation resulted from the characteristics of the MDBs’ work and 
their recommendations regarding participation. The MDBs worked with civil society 
through operational collaboration and policy dialogue. The former involved funding 
organisations indirectly – through Bank-funded national state programmes – and 
directly – through small grants. The latter included indirect MDB-civil society 
contacts within project loans and direct contacts established through consultations and 
disclosure of information procedures. Operational collaboration in the form of indirect 
funding94 and policy dialogue activities in the form of consultations within MDB 
projects prevailed because most of the MDBs’ work in borrowing countries consisted 
of project loans to governments. Participation thus comprised consultations at the 
project design, administration of funds and implementation of sub-projects stages, to 
help to adjust a preconceived idea of a project to the specificities of each case. Re-
enforcing this restricted participation, the MDBs’ strategies recommended stakeholder 
participation – participation by those affected by a given project, including 
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 See Nelson, 1995 and Casaburi, et al., 2000; Tussie and Tuozzo, 2001: 116 for Argentina 
94
 This was noted in both MDBs’ documents (eg World Bank, 1998b) and interviews. For instance John Clark, from the WB, said 
“Maybe a few million goes as grants to NGOs… [but]  most of the money goes through the governments.” (Clark, 2002). Mariel 
Sabra, from the IDB explained: “There were donations to civil society through small projects or specific joint Bank-NGO 
projects beyond the Bank’s loans portfolio [but] the bulk of Bank resources go to loans.” (Sabra, 2002) 
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community members or beneficiaries, non-governmental organisations, private 
enterprises, government officials and Bank staff (World Bank, 1996: 125-127; IDB, 
1996b: section 4; Schwartz and Deruyttere, 1996: 10). Since social organisations 
participated as stakeholders, their participation was restricted to specific projects. 
 
Sixth, the MDBs preferred technical organisations and, seventh, these organisations 
were expected to implement standardised technical methods to address poverty. As 
analysts have indicated, the MDBs tend to equate civil society with NGOs (Casaburi, 
et al., 2000: 219-20; Rabotnikof, et al., 2000: 40; Rabotnikof, 1999: 10, 13). Banks 
documents and practices point in that direction. Although the MDBs include in their 
definitions of civil society grass-roots organisations, informal groups, church groups, 
research institutions and professional associations, NGO is the overarching term that 
refers to civil society organisations in general (World Bank, 1996: 158). Equating 
NGOs with civil society is less evident in the IDB’s strategies, which include NGOs 
as one type of civil society organisations alongside grass-roots and other organisations 
(IDB, 1996b: section 1, 5). However, since organisations in poor communities usually 
lack the funds and skills to participate, intermediary NGOs are, in practice, crucial for 
both Banks (World Bank, 1996: 153-158; Stiles 1998: 210). Furthermore, technically 
skilled organisations had the skills to address poverty with standardised methods that 
would not be based on political preferences. Crucially, preferring technically skilled 
organisations meant excluding politically oriented organisations that performed social 
actions in the communities – including trade unions or political parties – from the 
MDBs’ working definition of civil society. 
 
Finally, efficiency objectives were the overarching justification for involving civil 
society in MDB projects and they underpinned the discourse’s features. Both MDBs 
advocated participation because of its efficiency in terms of contributing to project 
sustainability by guaranteeing an adequate use of resources, and by achieving project 
objectives that expert-based (or non-participatory) projects could not achieve (World 
Bank 1996: 4; IDB, 1996b: section 1, 3). In terms of the discourse features, NGOs are 
embraced because their closeness to and expertise in working with local communities 
guarantees efficiency, rather than because participation in itself is considered crucial 
for development (Nelson, 1995). Similarly, stakeholder administration and 
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implementation of projects is recommended because it is cost-effective compared to 
the results of public sector provision of social services (Sollis, 1992: 163). 
 
The first five of these features reflected the normative component of neoliberalism, 
which aimed to redraw the dividing line between the private and public spheres and 
prioritised the individual over the community. At the same time, limited to project-
level participation, civil society organisations operate in isolation from one another. 
Therefore civil society involvement in poverty reduction actions fostered social 
fragmentation rather than identity formation, which reflected a preference for dealing 
with social demands individually and thus operationalised the logic of discursive 
formation characteristic of neoliberalism – difference. Stressing efficiency and the 
technical profile of social organisations, also revealed a preference for the logic of 
difference in responding to social demands. Efficiency justifications underpin all the 
features that operationalise the logic of difference. Yet, the alleged political neutrality 
of efficiency objectives helped to make this neoliberal discourse appealing to 
supporters of varied political positions, because it involved the implementation of the 
logic of equivalence. 
 
Efficiency objectives activated the logic of equivalence present in neoliberalism – as 
in all political projects – firstly by creating social antagonisms. The logic of 
equivalence builds on the articulation of different demands as equivalent in terms of 
being equally non-satisfied by the established institutional system. Highlighting the 
efficiency underpinning the MDBs’ discourse on civil society involved stressing the 
inefficiency of competing discourses. Second, efficiency justifications attempted to 
generate new chains of equivalence by connecting the demands other discourses were 
failing to address within the boundaries of the discourse that emerges from the 
creation of an antagonist (chapter 1; Laclau, 2005b: 35-37). Just as the “end of 
history” arguments supported the neoliberal preference for market reform (chapter 2), 
efficiency objectives made the MDBs’ recommendations on civil society seem 
detached from particular political perspectives, and therefore enabled the discourse to 
gain support from different political positions. Accordingly, generating the 
commitment of beneficiaries, a central objective in the MDBs’ participatory 
strategies, not only helped project sustainability but also conferred on the project the 
strength to resist social and governmental opposition (Rabotnikof, 1999: 11). 
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Similarly, while the MDBs stressed that civil society participation made projects more 
efficient because it facilitated a process of social learning that could enable social 
change (IDB, 1996b: section I; World Bank, 1996: 5), since civil society participation 
is project-based, dialogue occurs within a predefined framework – the MDBs’ 
projects. Thus, this social learning leads mainly to the expansion of the MDBs’ views. 
 
 
b. Post-Washington consensus years: innovation and continuity 
 
In the mid-1990s, the introduction of institutional reform, criticism of MDBs’ 
approaches to participation, and the arrival of Wolfensohn and the development of 
ownership strategies in the WB, led both Banks to put civil society in the limelight 
and four interrelated innovations emerged in the MDBs’ discourse on civil society. 
 
First, the social capital perspective emerged in both Banks. The WB adopted the 
notion as early as 1994 (Seragelding and Steer, 1994: 34) and introduced social 
capital as a key area of WB concern with the launch of the Social Capital Initiative95 
in 1996 and the WDR97 (World Bank, 1997: 114). The IDB had sponsored studies, 
publications and seminars on social capital since 1998 (PNUD/BID, 1998; Kliksberg, 
2000a; Kliksberg and Tommassini, 2000) and in 2001 launched the Interamerican 
Initiative of Social Capital Development and Ethics (IDB, 2001). Despite differences 
in the MDBs’ rhetoric, they agreed on the positive effects of social capital on 
development and on the need to intervene to help social capital emerge or strengthen. 
The WB understands social capital both as organisations and as rules – formal or 
informal – that facilitate social organisation (World Bank, 1997: 77). This Bank 
stresses that institutions can play a key role in their formationthe formation of social 
capital? (Banco Mundial, 1997: 130; World Bank, 2000a: 130) and that a type of 
social capital, which the WB calls “linking”, is crucial for development because it 
concerns liaising with decision-making institutions (World Bank, 2000c: 128). The 
IDB stresses the cultural cohesion that social capital produces and, like the WB, it 
associates social capital with organisations and rules and holds that social capital is a 
complement to economic development (Kliksberg, 2000a and b). Both MDBs, thus, 
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 See http://go.worldbank.org/XSV70MA600, downloaded 02-09-2008. 
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advocate the implementation of policies to mobilise social capital (Kliksberg, 2000a: 
25, 26; World Bank, 2000c: 10, 130) but see social capital and institutional aspects as 
affecting each other. This “synergic” view, in which state and society engage in an 
embedded relationship (Evans, 1996; Evans (ed.) 1997; Portes and Landolt, 2000),96 
suggests a reconsideration of the private-public divide that the Washington consensus 
aimed to establish (Edwards, 2001: 3). 
 
Second, the use of the term civil society increased, and its definition broadened as the 
variety of organisations considered part of civil society grew. The focus on social 
capital building meant that the MDBs started to include organisations that were not 
project stakeholders in participatory policies. As such, trade unions, political 
movements and local state organisations started to be included in MDB definitions of 
civil society. Since the IDB’s first writings on participation already included a variety 
of actors as part of civil society, this change concerned the WB more. The WDR1997 
held that NGOs were a portion of civil society (Banco Mundial, 1997: 132) alongside 
“labor organisations, … foundations, and the private sector.” Although in 1998 the 
WB was still referring to civil society as NGOs (World Bank 1998a), NGO was 
starting to mean also non-profit economic-related civil society organisations such as 
trade unions, professional associations and grass-roots organisations (Banco Mundial, 
1997: 129). Soon after, the term civil society started to appear in WB documents.97 In 
2001, the NGO Unit was renamed the NGO and Civil Society Unit, after the 
definition of civil society was broadened to become: 
 
“…the space among family, market and the state; [consisting of] research and 
policy design organizations, labor unions, the media, NGOs, grass roots 
associations, community based organizations, religious groups and many 
others…” (World Bank, 2000d: 1) 
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 Although the Banks adopt a social-based understanding of social capital, most famously developed by Putnam (1993), their 
views reflect an institutional approach (Rothstein and Stoll, 2002). The academic debate on social capital in these years can be 
summarised in three views. One focused on individuals’ skills, such as trust and tolerance, which membership of social 
organisations can foster (Putnam, 1993). Another emphasised the generation of structural rules from these memberships, which 
can have both positive and negative effects (Portes, 1995, Coleman, 1990). The third, the institutionalist perspective, stressed the 
importance of institutions in fostering social capital (Levi, 1996; Fox, 1996). For more on the social capital debate see Putzel, 
1997; Harriss and De Renzio, 1997; Harriss, 2002; Fine, 2001 and the “bowling alone debate” triggered by Putnam’s article on 
civic engagement in the USA (Putnam, 1995b and American Prospect issues 25 and 26, 1996). 
97
 For example, a 1998 report on NGO involvement in WB projects (World Bank, 1998b). 
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Therefore, civil society was starting to be located not exclusively in the private realm 
but also at the intersection between the latter, the public sphere and the state. 
 
Third, the conceptualisation of the relationship between state and civil society 
changed following the rise of institutional reform objectives, the introduction of the 
social capital perspective and the redefinitions of civil society. First, local 
governments increasingly became partners in participatory projects, and started to 
manage funds, hire NGOs and contribute to the identification and selection of sub-
projects (Warren, 2003). Second, the MDBs bestowed a new role on civil society – 
keeping the state accountable and advocating policy change. The notion of 
empowerment connected this new role for civil society with the Banks’ institutional 
reform agenda, in which accountability was key. The WDR2000 stated that 
empowering poor people entailed “[r]eforming public administrations and other 
agencies… to increase their accountability and responsiveness to poor people…” 
(World Bank 2000c: 9). Thus, empowering means strengthening participation in 
political processes and local decision-making in order to improve governance (World 
Bank, 2000c: 110). In the IDB’s institutional reform strategy, civil society’s 
participation was not limited to the check and balance of state institutions, it included 
improving the relationship between civil society and the state (IDB, 1996a: iv, v). Yet, 
in its poverty strategies the IDB refers to empowerment in the same way as the WB 
does, implying also an emphasis on accountability and check and balance issues 
(Morley, 1997: 15). 
 
Fourth, direct links between domestic civil societies and the MDBs increased. The 
relationship between civil society and the MDBs changed from being mainly 
mediated by nation states to becoming increasingly direct. This change built on the 
relationship that Northern NGOs had been developing with the WB and, to a lesser 
extent, with the IDB, since the 1980s through advocacy campaigns,98 which started to 
shape what was later known as global civil society (Edwards and Gaventa, 2001; 
Scholte, 2000; Anheier, et al. 2001; Taylor, 2002, among others). The change was 
evident in the MDBs’ attempts to consult civil society about their strategies and, to 
some extent, in increases in direct funding for civil society. The WB started to consult 
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 These campaigns included environmental issues concerning Bank-financed projects, the impact of structural adjustment and 
the abolition of the Banks. 
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with civil society in the Adjustment Lending99 participatory reviews and the 
participatory Country Strategy Programmes (CAS), which set out the Bank’s priority 
lending areas and budget in each country.100 Other examples are the participatory 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP),101 the WB’s Thematic and Sector 
Strategies,102 the creation of the Inspection Panel103 and the expansion of the NGO-
World Bank Liaison Committee.104 Correspondingly, the NGO Unit, which until the 
late 1990s focused on mainstreaming work with civil society among WB staff and 
promoting network formation among stakeholders, turned its attention to international 
advocacy networks and focused on keeping civil society organisations informed about 
opportunities for interaction with the WB (Garrison, 2003; World Bank, 2000c).105 
Because of the IDB’s closer relationship with the region’s states, IDB Country Papers 
(CPs) and other strategic papers continued to be prepared with national governments 
only, assuming that, if governments were democratic, they represented their civil 
societies. Although in 1994 the IDB launched the Independent Investigation 
Mechanism, akin to the WB’s Inspection Panel (IDB, 2004b: 3), governments rather 
than civil society organisations used it (Nelson, 2000: 91). Nevertheless, the IDB, 
following the WB, set up an informal NGO working group to guide civil society-IDB 
direct interaction – the Interdepartmental Group on Participation and Civil Society 
(GIPSC) (Nelson, 2000: 81), and in 2000 it started exploring a strategy for citizenship 
participation in the design of strategic papers106 (IDB, 2000a; 2000b; 2004a; Perfit, 
2003). Regarding funding, while in the 1990s the IDB reduced direct funding for civil 
society organisations and favoured indirect funding (Sabra, 2002; IDB, various), the 
WB’s Small Grants Programme, launched in 1983 to fund civil society organisations 
(Bosoer, 2002), gained importance in the late 1990s after its management was 
decentralised to country offices. 
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 Launched in July 1997, only seven countries participated in these reviews (Hearn, 1999: 19). 
100
 The first participatory CAS in Latin America were in 1996 in Colombia and Peru. In Argentina, the first experience of CAS 
was in 1998 (Tussie and Tuozzo, 2001: 109-110). 
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 They are prepared between a low-income country, the IMF and the WB. They set out the plans to foster growth and reduce 
poverty within the framework of a three-year economic adjustment programme. 
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 These establish the Bank’s objectives in areas such as the environment; urban transport; rural development; participation; anti-
corruption; health, nutrition and population; mining; telecommunications and information technology; and urban and local 
government. See http://www.World Bank.org/whatwedo/strategies.htm 
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 The Inspection Panel was created in 1994 to monitor the application of WB policies and directives, and to recommend to the 
Board appropriate compensation if violations occurred. 
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 In 1981 the WB established the NGO-World Bank Liaison Committee to examine collaboration with NGOs (Hudock, 1999: 
49-50, Chiriboga, 2001: 77). Since this was more in response to Northern NGOs’ demands than to those of borrowing country 
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became a “working group”. In Latin America, the NGO network “Latin American Association of Popular Organisations” 
(ALOP) led the way in this (Chiriboga, 2001: 77; Hudock, 1999: 49-50). 
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 See also http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/overview.htm, downloaded 25-07-01. 
106
 This strategy was approved in 2004 (IDB, 2004a). 
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Although these post-Washington consensus innovations modified the MDBs’ 
discourse on civil society, the key characteristics of the discourse as shaped in the 
early 1990s remained central. 
 
The discourse stayed focused on organisations that were seen mainly as voluntary and 
independent from the state, and which were expected to supplement the latter. First, 
by 2001 the WB’s social development website was describing NGOs as private and 
non-profit organisations that were independent from government and in which 
voluntarism was key.107 Similarly, the IDB “Initiative on Social Capital” (IDB, 2001) 
described civil society as principally composed of voluntary and private actors, and 
social capital as aimed at strengthening voluntary work (Yamada, 2001: 10). Second, 
while the incorporation of state actors in participatory processes suggested the 
emergence of a more blurred private-public divide, not only were organisations still 
expected to supplement the state but also to keep it accountable, which redrew the 
divide and reinforced the preference for defending the private sphere from state 
interference. This appears in the WDR1997, which, despite stressing the importance 
of the state in development, depicts civil society organisations as supplementing state 
failures in providing services and pressuring the state to improve its services (Banco 
Mundial, 1997: 132). Additionally, increasing direct consultation with civil society 
contrasted with the state strengthening objectives behind institutional reform, because 
direct consultation entailed bypassing the state. Above all, although overlaps between 
the private and public spheres were acknowledged, civil society and the market were 
still seen as operating on the basis of the same rationalities, where individual freedom 
was central (Casaburi and Tussie, 2000a: 32; Casaburi, et al., 2000: 216). 
 
Civil society participation continued to predominantly occur in relation to the MDBs’ 
project loans, despite the increase in direct consultation and disclosure (Malena, 2000: 
19-34; Tussie and Tuozzo, 2001: 114). Indeed the proportion of projects with civil 
society participation was close to 50% of the WB project portfolio in the second half 
of the 1990s, whereas it had never exceeded 40% before 1994. In the social assistance 
sector this trend was more marked and between 1995 and 1999 these projects 
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 Printout from the WB Social Development website, NGOs and Civil Society section. Downloaded 06-07-2001. 
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accounted for between 55% and 88% of the sector’s projects (World Bank 2000b).108 
Direct funding for civil society remained small. For instance, the amount approved for 
each project within the Small Grants Programme was less than US$5,000 and no more 
than ten organisations per country per annum received this (Larrecochea, 2000). 
Additionally, a study showed that the introduction of the notion of social capital did 
not produce changes in the type of participation promoted in WB poverty reduction 
projects (Fox, 1997: 971). Furthermore, while social capital building was to be 
pursued through a variety of actions, for example research diffusion and reforming 
legal systems,109 the strategy most actively recommended regarded the level of social 
policies and, therefore, of project loans (Kliksberg, 2000b: 49). 
 
The Banks continued to prefer working with technical organisations and, therefore, 
other organisations with a well-established presence in Latin America – such as trade 
unions – usually remained excluded from MDB poverty reduction activities (Tussie 
and Tuozzo, 2001: 112). The key WB policy dealing with civil society participation, 
the Good Practice (GP) 14.70, was revised in 2000 but NGOs were seen as 
synonymous with civil society (Note 3 of GP 14.70, February 2000). In the field, 
since efficiency remained the core justification for participation and social capital 
building, the Banks continued to work with specialist organisations to guarantee 
project sustainability (Rabotnikof, et. al., 2000: 54), and NGOs continued to be 
selected according to their ties to local communities and their technical skills, because 
these guaranteed project efficiency (Malena, 1997: 1). Establishing direct links with 
civil society organisations beyond the projects did not signify a waning focus on 
technical organisations involved in MDB projects. Rather, as the WB experience in 
consulting about its CAS in Argentina showed, the organisations that had created 
links with the Banks through operational collaboration were those that engaged in 
direct relationships with the Banks (Van Loc, 2002; Martina, 2002). 
 
Efficiency objectives continued to be the justification for including civil society in 
MDB activities and for the introduction of the social capital perspective. These 
objectives were still a central argument for mainstreaming civil society participation 
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 These data refer to project proposals approved, and are not based on post-implementation evaluations of the actual inclusion 
of civil society in the projects. 
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 For instance, the WB promoted the creation of a legal framework to regulate NGOs (Tuozzo, 2004: 109), and the IDB 
sponsored a publication on fostering the creation and work of civil society organisations through regulation (Oliveira, 1997). 
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particularly in the WB, where economic and legal sectors were used to dealing with 
macro-economic interventions and resisted civil society involvement in projects 
(Ibrahim, 1998). Similarly, both MDBs justified the focus on social capital building 
by saying that it would make their social projects more efficient (World Bank, 2000c: 
10, 130; Kliksberg, 2000b: 46). As the WB put it, “… the density of social networks 
and institutions and the nature of interpersonal interactions that underlie them, 
significantly affect the efficiency and sustainability of development programmes”.110  
 
As the main features of the discourse on civil society remained important, these 
innovations, rather than representing the ebbing of the neoliberal character of the 
discourse, complemented the refinement of the neoliberal political project that was 
underway in these years. First, the changes accompanied the MDBs’ institutional 
reform and helped the generation of support for the normative views on which they 
were based. For instance, the inclusion of local state institutions in participatory 
processes deepened neoliberalism’s decentralisation objectives (Harriss and De 
Renzio, 1997: 930-1). Also, building social capital would result in empowering local 
communities, which thus could help to correct a key problem of decentralisation 
processes – the rising power of local elites (World Bank, 2000c: 9). Second, the 
discourse continued to promote participation, with the underlying objective of making 
the state work in favour of markets (Cammack, 2004: 204). Checks and balances 
mechanisms would compel the state to deliver services efficiently – a principle 
considered to rule the markets – and restrict the scope of state intervention to allow 
the private sphere to operate freely. 
 
In a reflection of the deepening of the political character of neoliberalism, during the 
post-Washington consensus years it was not only efficiency that masked the political 
positions implicit in the neoliberal discourse on civil society. Also the exclusion of 
certain groups from the interaction between civil society and the state had moulded 
civil society in accordance with neoliberal normative views since the first MDB 
projects that included civil society. During the post-Washington consensus years, this 
moulding by exclusion appeared more relaxed on paper, where civil society actors 
linked to the previously hegemonic project were considered, but not in practice. 
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Furthermore, the increase in direct relationships between the MDBs and civil society 
in those years also embodied universalisation aims, since they were additional 
dialogue mechanisms aimed at making borrowing countries adopt MDB 
recommendations. If governments lacked the expertise or were unwilling to adopt 
these recommendations, civil society could emerge as an ally of the Banks and 
support their initiatives. Not surprisingly, analyses of the WB CAS consultations with 
civil society suggest that they appeared to be more a case of “including civil society in 
order to add legitimacy to the strategy which remains fundamentally intact” (Hearn, 
1999: 13).111 
 
 
4.4. Conclusion 
 
This section compares the neoliberal and populist discourse on civil society and 
explores the opportunities that non-neoliberal discourses, such as the populist one, 
may have found to conquer the increasingly refined MDB neoliberal discourse on 
civil society in the poverty reduction area. 
 
Comparing the domestic and historically shaped populist discourse on civil society in 
the poverty reduction area, as described in chapter 3, with the MDBs’ discourse, 
striking differences appear at first glance. First, while in the MDBs’ discourse 
organisations are expected to take over state tasks, in the populist discourse 
supplementing the state is a provisional solution. Second, the location of civil society 
in the private realm, in the MDBs’ discourse, alongside the market and separated from 
the state, contrasts with the search for state funds and guidance in the case of the 
Argentinean populist discourse. Third, the view of organisations as emerging from 
free individuals will and interests, which presupposed that, fourth, democratic internal 
mechanisms would prevail, although it emphasised the voluntary – unpaid – character 
of organisations’ activities, differed from two other features of the populist discourse. 
One, in the Argentinean populist discourse political preferences significantly affected 
the formation of organisations. Two, despite the increasing endorsement of liberal 
democracy as a political system, organisations tended to prefer participatory 
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mechanisms and non-hierarchical forms of organisation that could preserve direct 
contact between members and leaders who, at the same time, were markedly strong 
and autonomous from the bases. Fifth, instead of limiting civil society participation to 
specific projects, the populist discourse conceived of participation in social 
organisations as involving participation in the political sphere, in relation to both the 
state and specific political projects. Sixth, the neoliberal preference for technical 
NGOs differs from the populist discourse in which political identities, and Catholic 
views, were crucial in defining organisations’ actions, despite poverty-focused 
organisations in the country having gone through technification processes. Seventh, 
while the MDBs expected social organisations to address poverty using standardised 
technical methods, in the populist discourse organisations usually tackled poverty in 
accordance with their political positions and without following fixed institutional 
patterns. Above all, while efficiency appeared to be the main justification of the 
underlying features of the neoliberal discourse and masked the political objectives that 
guided the definition of these features, in the populist discourse the objective of 
constituting political identities in order to become hegemonic is overtly the core of the 
discourse and cross-cut all its features. 
 
Despite being so strikingly different from the Argentinean populist discourse on civil 
society that had been hegemonic until the late 1980s in the country, the MDBs’ 
neoliberal discourse on civil society gained hegemony during the 1990s but contained 
opportunities for non-neoliberal discourses to colonise that hegemony. The main 
opportunities lay in the MDBs’ focus on technical and efficiency issues that affected 
their rhetoric on participation, the changes in the discourses after the mid-1990s, and 
the differences in IDB and WB strategies. 
 
Focus on efficiency and technical matters. Neoliberalism’s emphasis on the 
economic aspects of liberalism using technical and managerial language to refer to 
political matters, left the political space available for other discourses. This was a key 
interstice that allowed the entrance of populism. In addition, a paradoxical 
consequence of focusing on efficiency was that the MDBs appeared to be paying lip 
service to the implementation of civil society participation. Indeed, civil society 
participation was recommended but not compulsory, except for projects related to the 
environment, and those involving population resettlements and dealing with 
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indigenous populations, in which the main focus was on consultation.112 Participatory 
strategies were for guidance only and the WB’s key policy on civil society 
involvement was the Good Practice 14.70, which is only advisory in character. 
Moreover, throughout the 1990s there was no specific budget earmarked for the 
promotion of civil society participation (Etchegaray, 2002; Clark, 2002), which was 
thus highly dependent on task managers – MDBs’ staff responsible for the design and 
implementation of Banks projects in the countries – and state programme officers. 
Task managers are evaluated in terms of the efficient use of resources rather than the 
level of participation reached in the projects they manage (Mori, 2003). In the IDB, 
both task managers and civil society specialists admitted that they rarely worked 
together to infuse projects with the Bank’s views of civil society participation 
(Traverso, 2003 and Perfit, 2003). As a result, participation could be sacrificed for the 
sake of cost-saving or fulfilling other more tangible results such as infrastructure, or 
irrelevant participatory exercises could be organised to “tick the box” of community 
participation in evaluation processes (Anigstein, 2002; Daniels, 2003, Levine, 2003). 
However, lack of real attention, coupled with an available rhetoric on civil society and 
participation, presented an opportunity for other discourses to colonise the neoliberal 
discourse.  
 
Changes in the discourse after the mid-1990s. The recognition that political 
objectives underpin a discourse impairs the core universalisation strategy of a 
discourse such as neoliberalism, which is based on a proclamation of political 
neutrality. Further weakening the neoliberal struggles for its universalisation, this 
recognition involves opening up to discussion neoliberalism’s normative component. 
The aim of generating synergies between civil society and state institutions, which 
underpinned the MDBs’ notion of social capital, involved the presupposition of the 
interconnected nature of civil society and the political sphere. The notion of 
ownership, being an important tool for hegemonic construction, especially if framed 
in the “knowledge Bank” ideas, involved an acknowledgment of the political 
implications of the neoliberal project and the importance of universalising neoliberal 
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particular views. Furthermore, as the neoliberal strategies of hegemonic struggles 
were enhanced with the post-Washington consensus, the political character of the 
discourse became more evident. This openness of the discourse was protected by 
insisting on efficiency objectives and retaining the scope for interaction between civil 
society and the state, framed within specific projects. However, as the political aspects 
of new notions such as social capital, ownership, and the intention to include non-
technical organisations in the definition of civil society were not articulated by the 
MDBs’ discourse, they constituted avenues through which non-neoliberal projects 
could permeate the neoliberal discourse. 
 
Differences between the IDB and the WB. Despite the general agreement between 
the MDBs’ discourses on civil society, variations in the MDBs’ corporate cultures and 
institutional characteristics were reflected in differences in their strategies regarding 
civil society, and could be taken as opportunities to resignify their neoliberal 
discourse. For instance, the IDB’s declared intention to link civil society 
strengthening with the construction of democracy was an opportunity for discourses 
that were more focused on political matters than neoliberalism was to colonise the 
neoliberal discourse on civil society. Also, while the WB notion of ownership 
provided an opportunity for countries to advance their views, the notion was framed 
in the knowledge Bank perspective. This perspective assumed that the WB position 
was the correct one regarding development and related matters such as poverty 
reduction and civil society participation. In contrast, the IDB’s decisions were more in 
tune with the region’s governments and this represented an opportunity for a greater 
margin in the negotiation of approaches. The MDBs, furthermore, are not monolithic. 
There are groups and individuals with different ideas and interests, with different 
backgrounds and positions in the institutions, more markedly in the WB than in the 
IDB where there is a “culture of control” that aims to ensure that rules are obeyed 
(Culpeper, 1997: 50). Interviewees both at state and Bank level stressed that ideas 
from MDBs’ official documents were adopted in different ways at the operational 
level and were adapted for the Latin American environment in particular (Etchegaray, 
2002; Díaz Muñoz, 2002; Senderowitz, 2003). 
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Whether and how these opportunities were re-signified by neoliberalism or populism 
in struggling with each other to hegemonise the discourse on civil society, needs to be 
explored on an empirical base, which is the objective of the following chapters. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Neoliberalism meets Peronism: the formation of the neopopulist 
discourse (1990-1994) 
 
 
 
This chapter focuses on Carlos Menem’s first government. It analyses the political 
struggles underpinning the formation of the neopopulist discourse on civil society in 
the poverty reduction policy area and explains the discourse’s main characteristics. In 
other words, the chapter maps the factors that moulded this discourse and traces the 
key discursive operations embedded in it. 
 
In those years, the national state’s discourse on civil society in the poverty reduction 
policy area was, at first, a disjointed neopopulist discourse (1990-1992) and, later, the 
neopopulist discourse emerged (1993-1994). In the former, neoliberalism and 
Argentinean populism co-existed in parallel. In the latter, elements of these political 
projects and their discourses on civil society were combined in a non-conflictive way 
under the hegemony of neoliberalism. However, populism figured more in the 
discourse on civil society than in the approach to poverty in which it was inserted. 
 
The discourse was neopopulist because it articulated elements of neoliberalism and 
Argentinean populism and also because it was inserted in a neopopulist approach to 
poverty. The key elements of the neopopulist approach to poverty were a focus on 
coordination and targeting based on NBI indicators, a definition of poverty as integral, 
centred on self-esteem and “the neediest”, and an emphasis on social organisation. 
This third element concerned the government’s discourse on civil society in this 
policy area, which articulated elements of the neoliberal and populist project around 
the notions of social organisation, state promotion and solidarity. The notion of 
solidarity was key in allowing populism to have greater importance in this discourse 
than in the government’s approach to poverty. 
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Undertaking the genealogical step of the analytical model proposed in this thesis, the 
chapter maps the events and actors that influenced the formation of this discourse. 
The government’s endorsement of neoliberalism, aided by the existence of a critical 
juncture or discoursive dislocation, such as the hyperinflationary crisis, was combined 
with a populist logic of discursive formation, which became more visible in the 
second part of this period. The combination of neoliberalism with the populist logic 
defined the conditions of possibility for the formation of the approach to poverty and 
the discourse on civil society within it.  
 
The pressure of non-partisan opposition – UNICEF, the Catholic Church and social 
protesters – was crucial in making the government incorporate poverty into its agenda. 
Nevertheless, the government’s neoliberalism led to the persistence of a non-
interventionist stance towards poverty, which made poverty reduction’s institutional 
dynamics and its policy makers’ crucial in shaping the approach to poverty and its 
discourse on civil society. This persistent non-interventionist stance also made it 
necessary to resort to MDB funds, which reinforced neoliberalism in this policy area. 
However, neoliberalism’s stress on the logic of difference, or institutional and 
technical responses to social demands, created spaces for other political projects to 
permeate the neoliberal framework, since the contents of the logic of equivalence that 
neoliberalism was implementing as a political project were left unarticulated. 
Populism advanced through those spaces, helped by the resilient populism within the 
government’s neoliberal orientation, and policy makers in this area could advance 
their political views. Additionally, the ongoing redefinitions of the MDBs’ approach 
to poverty since the early 1990s, which involved a shift of focus in their discourse on 
civil society from individuals to organisations, facilitated the entry of political 
projects that, like populism, favoured the community over the individual. 
 
The first section looks at the mix of neoliberalism and populism at the government 
level. The second section focuses on the government’s approach to poverty. The third 
section presents the main discursive articulations behind the neopopulist discourse on 
civil society. The conclusion explains how the hegemonic struggles between 
neoliberalism and populism were reflected in the discourse on civil society in poverty 
reduction.  
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5.1. Menem’s first presidency: neoliberalisation and populism 
 
President Menem’s endorsement of neoliberalism was combined with the use of the 
populist logic, which became more visible in the second half of his first government. 
Menem’s adoption of neoliberal economic reforms involved the emergence of 
neoliberalism as the normative horizon guiding the government’s actions. However, 
since the beginning of this government, the populist logic had prevailed both in the 
bypassing of established institutions and in the way in which political and social 
actors were addressed. From 1992 onwards populism regained strength, especially 
when the deepening of the neoliberal reform required the re-alignment of traditional 
Peronist political identities and Menem embarked on a reform of the National 
Constitution that would enable him to run for re-election. 
 
In the first two years of Menem’s first presidency, neoliberal reform was the 
government’s core objective and the Convertibility Plan of 1991 embodied the 
government’s embracement of neoliberalism by-enlarge. After winning presidential 
elections with 47% of the popular vote in May 1989, Menem took power amidst 
social instability and a monthly inflation rate of around 200%.113 He tackled inflation 
with adjustment. He adopted a programme of economic reform centred on the 
reduction of fiscal imbalances via the reorganisation of the state – mainly through 
privatisation114 and state reduction – and the liberalisation of markets – including the 
liberalisation of salaries and consumer prices, the reduction of subsidies, and 
measures to open up the country to international trade. A new hyperinflationary crisis 
in March 1990115 and a new rise in inflation in September led to deepening 
adjustment,116 but inflation had led to low liquidity and recession which resulted in a 
decline in tax revenues and the impossibility of complying with the fiscal deficit 
targets agreed with the IMF. The government appointed Domingo Cavallo as Minister 
of Economy in March 1991. He soon announced the “Convertibility Plan”, the most 
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 Unless otherwise stated, the data and ideas presented in this paragraph and the following one are from Acuña, 1994, especially 
37-8, 41-3, 46-8. 
114
 This included the privatisation of telecommunications (ENTEL), airlines (Aerolineas Argentinas), utilities – water (OSN), 
electricity (SEGBA), gas (Gas del Estado), oil and gas (YPF and its related companies) – and military-linked enterprises, such as 
Fabricaciones Militares. 
115
 This crisis followed a similar pattern to the hyperinflationary episodes under Alfonsín’s rule. The monthly increase in 
consumer prices reached a high of 95.5% in the first trimester of 1990 (Acuña, 1994: 41). 
116
 This included reforming state structures, state worker redundancies, and an increase in the number of items liable to value-
added tax (Acuña, 1994: 38, 42). 
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visible element of which was the establishment of a fixed exchange rate of $1=US$1 
but which was essentially a programme of neoliberal reforms aligned with the 
neoliberal project.117 In order to redraw the boundaries between the state and the 
market and to achieve fiscal balance, the Plan called for the acceleration of the 
privatisation process, further reducing state jobs and functions, and improving tax 
collection. It also included plans for market liberalisation through trade liberalisation 
and the flexibilisation of the labour market.118 The Plan helped the government reach 
an agreement with the IMF in June 1991 (Crespo, 1991) that allowed the country to 
enter the Brady Plan to negotiate the external debt and regain access to international 
financial markets. 
 
However, price stability, achieved in the framework of neoliberal reforms, and 
populist strategies to construct power interacted in synergy during Menem’s first 
government. In many cases, institutions were bypassed because this was seen as 
necessary for advancing neoliberal reform. For instance, the increase in the number of 
members of the Supreme Court enabled the appointment of judges supportive of 
Menem’s rule and helped avoid objections to reforms based on the Constitution 
(Acuña, 1994: 42-3). Similarly, the government made extended use of executive 
decrees – laws sanctioned by the President without the intervention of Congress. 
Between July 1989 and August 1994 Menem issued 336 decretos de necesidad y 
urgencia (need and urgency decrees), while only 25 such decrees had been passed 
between 1853 and July 1989 (Ferreira Rubio and Goretti, 1998: 33). This expanded 
use of decrees served to enact rapid neoliberal reform in critical areas such as 
privatisation, deregulation and the reform of the labour market (Ferreira Rubio and 
Goretti, 1996: 443). 
 
The bypassing and manipulation of institutions debilitated already divided political 
and social actors, such as parties and unions, through which opposition to Menem’s 
neoliberalism could be channelled. An internal opposition emerged among the 
deputies of the Partido Justicialista (PJ – Justicialist, or “Peronist”, Party) in the 
Congress – the Grupo de los 8, a group of eight Peronist deputies who objected to 
                                                 
117
 For the complete text of the convertibility law see La Nación 28-03-1991. 
118
 Labour flexibilisation objectives were included in parts of the Convertibility Plan, for instance, lowering labour costs such as 
compensation for lay-offs and accidents, and reform of the unions’ main source of funding – the obras sociales – which would 
decrease their bargaining power (Acuña, 1994: 48). 
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Menem’s neoliberalism. The main opposition party, the UCR, divided into supporters 
of ex-president Alfonsín, against neoliberalism, and supporters of Angeloz, in favour 
of it. Menem’s bypassing of the parties’ arena of debate – Congress – and of his own 
party institutions further weakened these parties and their attempts to resist neoliberal 
reform. After Menem took office, the CGT divided into the Menemist CGT San 
Martín and the oppositional CGT Azopardo. Yet Menem retained the support of the 
bulk of the unions by manipulating this division and generating union competition 
over state resources, which Menem used to punish opponents and reward supporters 
(Murillo, 2001: 150). 
 
Unlike populism in the past, which main support came from organised labour, support 
for this government’s neoliberal reforms came from non-organised individuals 
(Weyland, 1996). The importance of the populist logic was reflected in how political 
support was acquired. Individuals’ support was not mainly sought through the 
implementation of the logic of difference – through differential and fixed responses to 
individual demands – but through leaders with whom people could identify, and who 
could reflect and mould the people’s identity. Thus, recruiting celebrities who 
generated support due to their popularity reinforced the support Menem had from 
independent individuals, as shown in the positive image ratings he obtained in the 
opinion polls. Ramón “Palito” Ortega, a former singer, and Carlos Reutemann, a 
former Formula One racer, are two cases in point (Novaro, 1994: 14). 
 
Following the launch of the Convertibility Plan, the neoliberal hegemony peaked for 
two years, after which limitations started to appear. In 1992 inflation decreased, 
reaching 1970 levels with consumer prices increasing by only 17.5%, and GDP grew 
by 9% (Acuña, 1994: 48). The success of the Plan generated important political 
support for the government’s plans and helped suture the neoliberal discourse. Price 
stability facilitated both the implementation of many of the Plan’s neoliberal reforms 
in areas beyond the macroeconomic sphere, and the 1993 electoral victories. Yet, the 
exchange rate parity resulted in an overvalued peso after the inflation that followed 
the Plan and the foreign currency reserves and capital inflows sustaining the parity 
had diminished by late 1992, once the largest privatisations had been completed. 
Moreover, the country’s growth rate slowed down – from 8.2% GDP growth in 1993 
to 5.8% in 1994 (Annex I, figure 13) – and unemployment, badly affected by state 
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bureaucracy cuts, the suspension of subsidies, and rationalisations in newly privatised 
companies, soared from around 6% up until 1992 to 9.9% in 1993 and 10.7% in 1994 
(Annex I, figure 6). 
 
At the same time as the neoliberal Convertibility Plan’s success was contributing to 
the expansion of neoliberalism, the limitations that started to emerge in 1992 
facilitated the advancement of alternative discourses. The use of the populist logic 
gained visibility, and normative and contingent elements of Argentinean populism re-
emerged. The success of the Convertibility Plan and the political victories it brought 
about strengthened Menem’s intention to run for re-election. Yet, the Constitution 
forbade re-election and thus its reform appeared necessary. In turn, continuity with 
neoliberal reforms beyond the macroeconomic level required negotiations not only 
with policy makers, but with conflicting social interests. The populist logic was 
paramount in reaching agreement on the Constitutional reform and in the negotiations 
of policy reform with new actors. 
 
Many commentators stress the consensual character of the Constitutional reform 
(Novaro, 2001). However, both conceiving the reform mainly as a means for Menem 
to achieve presidential re-election and the way in which the reform was agreed 
demonstrated the prevalence of a populist logic and project. In order to reduce internal 
party opposition, Menem bypassed the party and instead established talks about the 
reform with Peronist provincial governors. These discussions were framed in 
negotiations on the redistribution of fiscal resources between the nation and the 
provinces in the framework of the Pacto Federal (Federal Pact) (Eaton and 
Dickovick, 2004: 97). To deal with the main opposition party, Menem devised the 
Pacto de Olivos (Olivos’ Pact). The Pacto gave the reform a consensual framework 
and allowed the opposition to include proposals for the reform that embodied attempts 
to counterbalance the concentration of power in the presidency and to make the 
reform go beyond re-election objectives – for instance, the creation of a Cabinet Chief 
and of the Consejo de la Magistratura (Magistrates Council). However, the populist 
logic stood out in the strategies that paved the way to the agreement of the Pacto de 
Olivos. Menem attempted to manipulate parliamentary rules regarding the number of 
votes needed for Constitutional reform and used pressure and threats to bring about a 
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popular referendum, preferring plebiscitarian means, thus linking the leader directly 
with the people and bypassing representative institutions (Novaro, 2001, 64). 
 
The expansion of neoliberal reform beyond the macroeconomic realm could have led 
to an increase in institutionalised dialogue between the government and the people 
(Bambaci, 1999: 125). Yet, while the government indeed negotiated more with 
Congress after 1993 (Panizza, 2000b; Llanos, 2002), this was after the PJ obtained a 
majority in both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. Moreover, in the 
negotiations between the unions and the government to advance labour reform 
populism gained territory. In early 1992, with the exception of the teachers’ and state 
workers’ unions which formed the CTA to oppose the government, the CGT reunited, 
mainly to block government attempts to liberalise the labour market. However, this 
was only a shift from subordination to cooperation, “effectively restraining” the 
government’s neoliberal plans but still supporting the government (Murillo, 2001: 
151).119 This collaboration resulted from the CGT’s difficulty in opposing individuals 
– including workers themselves – satisfied with economic stability and from unions’ 
partisan loyalty (Murillo, 2001: 167), which showed that historical populism was still 
effective. Furthermore, the validity of the populist logic of bypassing institutions was 
present in Menem’s strategy of obtaining union support by threatening to issue 
executive decrees to reform labour legislation – especially to reform the obras 
sociales, the main source of union funding. However, labour reform was minimal in 
these years, as the unions managed to shape government plans according to their 
preferences – moulded during the hegemony of Argentinean populism – showing the 
endurance of not only the logic but also the contingent aspects of populism. 
 
Therefore, two periods can be identified in the government’s position towards the 
hegemonic struggles between neoliberalism and populism. First, the government 
focused on neoliberalism, and second, from 1992 onwards, although neoliberal reform 
continued to organise the government’s views, populism expanded. While before 
1992 the populist logic was mostly at the service of advancing neoliberal reform, 
starting in that year this logic spread and other elements of the populist project re-
emerged. 
                                                 
119
 For details on the unions-government relationship during these years, see Murillo 2001: 134-150, 168. 
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5.2. Poverty: from non-interventionism to incorporation 
 
In its first years this government was non-interventionist concerning poverty, which 
precluded debate about poverty-related problems and allowed for a disjointed 
coexistence of elements of both the neoliberal and populist projects. Once inflation 
was under control, social expenditure in the country decreased to levels below those 
of 1985 (Annex I, figure 3). Yet, in the few poverty reduction policies implemented, 
state-centred programmes coexisted with others that privileged individuals’ initiatives, 
and policies attempting to reduce state expenses shared with other policies the 
objective of constructing political support through a discretionary distribution of 
resources. Three sets of policies illustrate this disjointed approach to poverty: social 
emergency policies that followed hyperinflation; decentralisation measures; and the 
Programa Federal Solidario (PROSOL – Federal Programme of Solidarity). 
 
In 1993 poverty started to become part of the government’s agenda and the 
neopopulist approach to poverty emerged. The approach combined populist and 
neoliberal views in a non-conflictive way within a neoliberal framework. First, 
coordination and targeting were based on NBI indicators; the former were central in 
the neoliberal approach to poverty and the latter were part of the structural conception 
of poverty developed in the years of populist hegemony. Second, poverty was 
understood as integral – defined by not just economic but multiple factors – focusing 
on self-esteem and referring to the poor as “the neediest”. The notion of integral 
poverty and a focus on self-esteem reinforced the neoliberal focus on coordination 
and attempted to prevent poverty reduction policy from appearing as interfering with 
the functioning of the economy. Meanwhile, dealing with self-esteem factors required 
strategies that exceeded the neoliberal focus on managerial matters and defining the 
poor as “the neediest” facilitated the connection between the targeting of the poor and 
the populist historical and logical concern with the marginal and the underdog. The 
articulation of this approach appeared in the Plan Social 1995 (Social Plan 1995). 
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Institutional factors and policy makers in the poverty reduction policy area were 
crucial in shaping the neopopulist discourse. Non-partisan opposition from UNICEF, 
the Catholic Church and social protesters meant that the government incorporated 
poverty reduction into its agenda, by creating an ad hoc area in the cabinet, the SDS. 
The government nevertheless retained a non-interventionist stance towards poverty. 
This twofold response led to the emergence of four institutional characteristics of the 
poverty reduction area. First, the MDBs emerged as an important actor because 
national funds for poverty action were insufficient. Second, informal channels and, 
third, policy makers were crucial in defining the outcome of decisions due to the lack 
of government commitment to this policy area. Fourth, in the context of the increasing 
centrality of populist objectives at the general government level, policy makers could 
bring in not only their technical profile but also their experience within the populist 
discourse of Peronism. The design of the PROMIN programme and the formation of 
the SDS reflected these dynamics. 
 
 
a. A disjointed approach to poverty (1990-1992) 
 
Like the MDBs’ trickle-down-plus approach to poverty at that time, and in line with 
Washington Consensus neoliberalism, the Argentinean government saw poverty as 
either an unavoidable element of all societies or as a result of inadequate 
macroeconomic policies. Therefore, there was no need for the state to intervene 
directly, since macroeconomic neoliberal reforms would produce economic growth, 
ultimately overcoming any remaining poverty. In addition, avoiding poverty issues 
could save state funds and would mean not intervening in the private sphere, 
contributing to the neoliberal project’s aims of re-drawing the boundaries between the 
private and public spheres. 
 
This non-interventionism with regard to poverty precluded debate about poverty-
related problems and allowed a disjointed co-existence of elements of the neoliberal 
and populist projects, as can be observed in social emergency programmes that 
followed hyperinflation, decentralisation measures, and PROSOL. 
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The social emergency programmes aimed at dealing with the consequences of 
hyperinflation were PAN and the Bonos Solidarios (Solidarity Bonds). Both regarded 
poverty as an emergency and, therefore, as temporary. Yet, PAN was in line with 
populism and Bonos with neoliberalism. PAN was state-centred and contained 
elements of community organisation, whereas Bonos distributed money to individual 
beneficiaries who were free to decide how to spend it. However, the populist logic 
was present in both. The programmes shared an understanding of poverty as a lack of 
access to a basic basket of food that covered the nutritional needs of an individual or 
household, and a vague definition of who the poor were that paved the way for the 
discretionary distribution of resources, despite official data on poverty being available 
since 1984.120 Indeed, local party leaders distributed PAN food boxes and the PJ and 
the divided CGT distributed the Bonos (Midre, 1992: 370) as the government tried to 
foster competition between the CGTs and sectors of the PJ to keep them under 
control. 
 
Decentralisation measures cross-cut the early 1990s’ poverty reduction policies in 
Argentina. Yet, decentralisation did not entail innovation in poverty reduction 
thinking, and its focus on managerial matters allowed for the infiltration of populism, 
making decentralisation a crucial instrument in building political alliances beyond 
political party structures. Of the three distinguishing features of the neoliberal 
approach to social issues in the 1990s – decentralisation, privatisation and targeting – 
in the early 1990s in Argentina decentralisation measures were implemented in all 
social sectors,121 privatisation occurred more in the areas of social security, health and 
education;122 and targeting emerged only after poverty was incorporated into the 
government’s agenda. Decentralisation affected the programmes that were then 
considered as focused on poverty reduction – nutritional programmes. In 1991 two of 
these programmes were decentralised to the provinces – the Programa de Políticas 
Sociales Comunitarias (PROSOCO – Programme of Social Policies for 
Communities), which incorporated the resources of Bonos and PAN, and the 
Programa Social Nutricional (PROSONU – Social Nutritional Programme) 
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 The first study on poverty in Argentina was published in INDEC (1984). 
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 See Repetto et al., 2001a and b on the decentralisation of schools and hospitals, Ansolabehere (2003) for the cases of housing 
and nutritional programmes, and Repetto et al. (2001c) for nutritional programmes. 
122
 In those years the government promoted the creation of private educational establishments, transformed the public pensions 
system into a private bank-run system of retirement insurance (Lloyd Sherlock, 2000; Alonso, 2000; Alonso and Repetto, 2004) 
and attempted to privatise the union-run health services as a package of labour flexibilisation measures (Bambaci, 1999; Murillo, 
2001). 
 139 
(Ansolabehere, 2003, 629; Vinocur and Halperin, 2004: 28). Decentralisation 
consisted of transferring programmes’ managerial responsibilities and funds through 
the provinces’ co-participation in national taxes revenues and reflected efforts to re-
size the national state. It did not entail new approaches to poverty. It continued an 
initiative started by Alfonsín (Makón, 2002) and decentralised resources were 
expected to be used for the purposes established by the original programmes. 
Although there was no oversight of this (Ansolabehere, 2004, 629) and the national 
state did not train provincial staff to run the programmes (Repetto and Alonso, 2004, 
28), the policies remained untouched. Furthermore, without oversight or training on 
the functioning of the programme, the national government could use decentralisation 
as an instrument to transfer resources in order to build political alliances beyond 
political parties’ structures. 
 
PROSOL, created in 1992, was an attempt to introduce a new approach to poverty. 
Yet, the programme could not be implemented due to the lack of government 
commitment to addressing poverty. PROSOL regarded poverty as an integral 
phenomenon produced by multiple causes and thus did not focus on any one aspect of 
it, such as nutrition. It proposed a combination of targeted assistance and actions to 
strengthen government agencies and training for social leaders. Although all these 
elements later became part of the neopopulist approach to poverty, since poverty 
reduction was not a government priority and programme managers constantly 
changed, PROSOL implementation was difficult and its attempt to redefine the 
approach to poverty proved ineffectual (Repetto, 2001: 187-189). 
 
 
b. Opposition, incorporation and subsequent articulation of the neopopulist approach 
to poverty (1993-1994) 
 
By 1991, structural poverty had decreased from 22.3% of households living with 
NBI123 in 1980 to 16.5%. However, official studies showed that structural poverty had 
increased compared with mid-1980s data and in the early 1990s income poverty 
remained high compared with historical levels (Powers, 1995: 95). Unemployment 
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 See chapter 2. 
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rose from 6.3% in 1990 to 9.9% in 1993 and 10.7% in 1994 and in 1994 the 
population living below the poverty line – those who cannot afford a basic basket of 
goods – reached an unprecedented high of 19% (Annex I, figures 4, 5, 6). 
 
Despite these data showing poverty increases, the government only took account of 
them when concerns were voiced by three non-partisan opposition actors: the 
Argentinean office of United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the Catholic 
Church and social protesters. Parties and unions that claimed that these worsening 
indicators were the consequence of adjustment were not heard, since they were weak, 
bypassed and manipulated. In contrast, the voices of UNICEF, the Catholic Church 
and rioters were heard because they were well-positioned actors in the international 
scenario or because they could influence private investment. Although the 
government had a generally good relationship with the Catholic Church, internal 
sectors had been criticising the government because of the social costs of adjustment 
since the beginning of the decade, and in 1992 the Church hierarchies joined in with 
this criticism and even the Pope reprimanded the government (Powers, 1995: 110). At 
the same time, a group of social scientists based in the local branch of UNICEF had, 
in a number of publications since the early 1990s, been outlining the consequences of 
adjustment for poverty in the country. They highlighted that the character of poverty 
was changing, becoming more linked to lack of income than to lack of basic 
infrastructure (eg Beccaria and Minujin, 1991; Beccaria and Vinocur, 1991; Minujin 
(ed.), 1992). They also made a number of public declarations in the media criticising 
the lack of government social policies and child and maternal health policies (La 
Nación, 7-02-1991 and 1-04-1991). Social protests and riots involved criticism of the 
government’s treatment of social issues. They started with state employees, 
pensioners and teachers, who were particularly affected by the unemployment, 
modification of the pension system and reduction of teachers’ wages that privatisation 
and state retrenchment measures produced. In 1993, as several provinces joined the 
national government’s plans to reform the state (Adam, 1993: 1), violent protests and 
riots spread to the interior of the country (Powers, 1995: 123; La Nación, 17-12-
1993). 
 
The government’s response to these actors was twofold: it continued to deny the 
existence of poverty and, therefore, the need for intervention to address it; and at the 
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same time it gradually incorporated poverty reduction into its agenda. The 
government avoided talking about poverty and instead highlighted the achievements 
of social programmes and the economic plan as a whole and re-interpreted data on 
poverty to stress the reduction of structural poverty (Powers, 1995: 94-103, 111-114; 
La Nación, 29-07-1993). While the Church claimed that poverty was at the root of the 
spread of cholera, the government claimed that it was due to poor personal care and 
hygiene (La Nación, 17-02-1993). The government responded with force to social 
unrest. (Powers, 1995: 124) and the President declared that he did not understand “the 
game UNICEF [was] trying to play” (La Nación, 18-06-1993) with its publications on 
poverty. Nevertheless, the government approved a programme designed and backed 
by UNICEF – PROMIN – and launched a Social Plan in early 1993, with both 
UNICEF and the Church called to participate in monitoring activities (La Nación, 28-
01-1993). Later, on the verge of the election of representatives to the Assembly that 
would deliberate Constitutional reform and the possibility of re-election, the 
government realised that its plans needed to be more comprehensively formulated and 
acquire further visibility. Thus, it created the SDS in late 1993 and launched a new 
Social Plan in late 1994. 
 
This twofold response led to the emergence of the distinctive institutional features of 
the poverty reduction area which constituted the institutional conditions within which 
the approach to poverty took shape – the inclusion of the MDBs, the importance of 
informal channels and, linked to both, the weight of policy makers and their technical 
and political background. The design of PROMIN, the first MDB-funded poverty 
reduction action of the decade, and the creation of the SDS illustrate the emergence of 
these features. 
 
The approval of PROMIN represented the government’s incorporation of UNICEF’s 
criticism and the attempt to adapt them to the government’s views. It also showed the 
importance of informal connections, policy makers’ technical background and MDB 
funds in shaping the policy. The design of PROMIN was begun in the first days of 
Menem’s government by a UNICEF-based team, yet the programme was not 
approved until 1993. When the government took on this initiative, its project leader, 
UNICEF’s Pablo Vinocur, rather than being assigned a government post, was 
contracted as an external consultant, arguably because of his links with the PJ 
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dissident Grupo de los 8. According to a source close to UNICEF Argentina “the war 
[between the government and UNICEF] broke out when UNICEF lost control of 
PROMIN” (Rovere, 2002), and the focus in UNICEF media appearances on mother 
and child health issues seems to confirm this assertion (eg La Nación, 7-02-1991). 
Yet, when Avelino Porto became Minister of Health, a member of the Vinocur team – 
Elsa Moreno – became Secretary in his Ministry, which created an initial informal 
channel through which UNICEF could continue shaping PROMIN (Vinocur, 2002). 
Later on, Julio Cesar Araoz replaced Porto and appointed Alberto Maza as Secretary 
in his Ministry. Friendships going back to university between Maza and PROMIN 
team members signified a new space through which UNICEF could advance its views. 
The team then resumed negotiations with the WB to secure funds for the programme 
in view of the government’s lack of commitment to it. The negotiations built on the 
programme designers’ links with the WB developed in the framework of their work in 
the WB Programa Nacional de Asistencia Técnica para la Administración de los 
Servicios Sociales (PRONATASS – National Programme of Technical Assistance for 
the Administration of Social Services) during Alfonsín’s government (Vinocur, 2002). 
Additionally, as a member of the PROMIN staff asserted, the technical character of 
both the team members’ profile and the language used in the programme proposal was 
crucial in getting WB funds (Barral, 2002). 
 
The setting up of the SDS led to the emergence of these same institutional 
characteristics. The government created the SDS in February 1994. Its objectives were 
coordinating initiatives to combat poverty based in different national agencies and 
implementing control and evaluation mechanisms (Repetto, 2000: 211; Díaz Muñoz, 
2004: 15). Being directly dependent on the Presidency gave it a strong mandate. Yet, 
the government’s unremitting non-interventionist stance put the SDS in conflict with 
the rest of the ministries and meant that it had no new resources (Repetto, 2000: 611, 
Cortés and Marshall, 1999: 201). The main consequences of this were that SDS policy 
makers became crucial in decision-making processes in the poverty reduction area but 
also that they had to resort to MDB funds and rely on informal channels and their 
technical profiles to enable the SDS to gain leverage within the government. 
 
SDS’ policy makers used informal connections and their technical backgrounds to 
deal with conflicts with the cabinet and with the insufficiency of funds. Some of these 
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conflicts stemmed from the division produced in the Ministry of Health, which until 
then had managed social action, by the creation of the SDS. Other conflicts arose from 
the SDS coordinating mandate, which entailed overseeing the policies of different 
ministries. Crucially, the SDS had to deal with a Ministry of Finance opposed to 
intervention in social areas and thus reluctant to approve funds for them. Yet, the SDS 
authorities’ technical knowledge and links with the Ministry of Finance and the 
MDBs helped. The first head of the SDS, Luis Prol, did not have experience in the 
social area (Repetto, 2000: 611) but was a renowned efficient functionary, especially 
because of his work at the Ministry of Economy on the privatisation of state 
companies. One of Prol’s key advisers was Viviana Fridman. She identified herself, 
and was viewed, as “... a technical Under-Secretary…I came from the capital 
markets… I had no experience of public service” (Fridman, 2002). She also had good 
friends in Cavallo’s Ministry of Finance – Daniel Marx and Carlos Sánchez, Secretary 
of Finance and Under-Secretary of External Debt respectively – and both she and Prol 
had worked with the WB and were friends of Myrna Alexander, the WB 
representative in Argentina at the time (Fridman, 2002). The MDBs were willing to 
lend to a country such as Argentina, which had increasingly good rates in the 
international creditor market (Etchegaray, 2002 and Flood, 2002). Yet, as Fridman 
explained, the mastery of the technical language required in negotiating with the 
Ministry and international creditors, and personal connections, were central in 
developing the strategy that enabled the SDS to get the funds needed to increase its 
budget (Fridman, 2002). 
  
Informal channels and policy makers’ technical knowledge brought MDB funds and 
neoliberal views into the SDS. Neoliberalism could expand subtly and the chances for 
non-neoliberal alternatives to be articulated were reduced both because of the 
neoliberal stress on technical issues and the importance of informal channels in the 
formation of the SDS. The importance of informal channels made the formation 
process seem random and disconnected from any clear political objective. The 
coordination mandate of the SDS seemed apolitical and policy implementers involved 
in poverty reduction action during that period viewed the arrival of external loans as 
casual and detached from broader neoliberal reforms. The coordinator of FOPAR’s 
community participation area considered that: “Banks have to lend. …. There is a 
chain of complicity …leading to a loss of global rationality” (Flood, 2002). The 
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coordinator of SIEMPRO assumed that the formation of the SDS was detached from 
the process of state reform: “State reform is something different, in the hands of the 
Ministry of Finance” (Novacovsky, 2002). 
 
However, as the links between the SDS objectives and the broader neoliberal project 
were unnoticed, other political projects could permeate the neoliberal one without 
encountering significant resistance. The government’s increasing populism paved the 
way for policy makers to base their decisions not only on their technical knowledge 
but also on their experience within the populist project of Peronism. The appointment 
of Eduardo Amadeo as head of the SDS in July 1994 represented both the objective of 
reforming the Constitution and the appointment of a functionary with a strong 
technical profile but who was also a Peronist. Menem chose Amadeo because he was 
loyal to Eduardo Duhalde, Menem’s ex-Vice President who was becoming a key 
opponent within the PJ and whose support the President needed in order to guarantee 
favourable results in the Constitutional elections because he governed the politically 
important – in terms of PJ supporters and population size – province of Buenos Aires. 
Amadeo’s technical profile built on his training as an economist and his experience as 
president of the Provincial Bank of Buenos Aires between 1987 and 1991, where he 
built his reputation as a good administrator. As a PJ deputy he led the education 
committee and developed some expertise in social issues. His wife’s work in social 
organisations provided him with insights into social promotion and his alignment with 
Duhalde associated him with a preference for grass-roots politics, as reflected in 
Duhalde’s creation of the Liga Federal (Federal League) – a provincial PJ internal 
stream focused on municipal mayors and other local party leaders (La Nación, 12-06-
1990). Amadeo, once at the SDS, invited Fridman and her team to continue with their 
work in the SDS. This mix of technical, political and personal background reflected in 
the SDS approach to poverty. 
 
The institutional features that emerged during the setting up of the SDS constituted the 
conditions within which the approach to poverty took shape. The first attempts at 
articulating this approach appeared in the Plan Social 1993, but the Plan had little 
impact. It emphasised coordination and targeting but consisted of an aggregation of 
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programmes rather than an outline of an official position regarding poverty,124 and it 
retained a focus on nutritional programmes (Vinocur and Halperin, 2004: 28, 29). 
Furthermore, the Plan lacked funds and support from the government and relevant 
policy makers, such as the head of the Ministry in charge of the area, Araoz, whose 
attention, at the time the Plan was launched was focused on the PJ’s internal elections 
in his province of origin, Córdoba.125 
 
It was not until the Plan Social 1995 that the government’s approach to poverty took 
shape and showed its neopopulist character. This Plan, launched in late 1994, set up a 
three-year plan for the social area (SDS, 1994: 22) and although it did not include new 
government funds for poverty reduction, it had an impact because it was formulated 
from within an institutional space created with the specific mission of addressing 
poverty – the SDS. The key distinguishing features of the 1995 Plan’s approach to 
poverty were: 
 
1) a focus on coordination and targeting based on NBI indicators 
2) an understanding of poverty as integral, which stressed self-esteem 
factors and defined those in poverty as “the neediest” 
3) an emphasis on social organisation. 
 
 
The focus on coordination and targeting based on NBI indicators reflected the 
adoption of a key pillar of the neoliberal approach to poverty and of a structural 
conception of poverty developed in the years of populist hegemony in the country. 
The Plan’s core aim was the modernisation of the management of poverty reduction 
actions (SDS, 1994: 15; Díaz Muñoz, 2004: 17; Repetto, 2001). The Plan stressed 
that, in that modernisation, efficient technologies and re-organising existing policies 
were more important than resources, which therefore did not need to be increased (eg 
SDS, 1994: 13, 23). Targeting was the central tool in achieving modernisation (SDS, 
1994: 16). As Amadeo explained, the strategy consisted of targeting, re-organising 
existing actions and training staff: “I... say: objective “children”, objective “women”, 
objective “the old”. I organise programmes, staff them, set objectives and measure 
                                                 
124
 For more details on the measures included in the Plan see La Nación 8-01-1993a. 
125
 These elections were particularly important for Menem’s re-election plans since Córdoba was one of the few provinces 
governed by the UCR, and had a strong non-Menemist contender within the PJ, De la Sota. 
 146 
outcomes” (Amadeo, 2002). As in the MDBs’ strategies (chapter 4), targeted policies 
became synonymous with poverty reduction policies (SDS, 1994: 27) and through this 
displacement the SDS sought to legitimise its interference with other Ministries and to 
increase the budget it controlled. Thus the Plan included programmes that were 
beyond the SDS’s direct control but the SDS claimed it had to coordinate and monitor 
them because they were targeted at the poor.126 Making targeting synonymous with 
poverty reduction action also contributed to the avoidance of the term poverty, 
helping the government to continue to deny the existence of poverty. 
 
The targeting criterion chosen was NBI indicators. Therefore, while the government 
seemed to incorporate the critics’ focus on the “new poor”, in terms of those who 
needed state help for their re-integration into society (SDS, 1994: 14), choosing NBI 
indicators, which refer to long-standing and extreme situations of poverty, distanced 
the government from its critics, who stressed that new poverty was linked to income 
and unemployment problems. This choice adapted the term “new poor” to the 
government’s neoliberal position that unemployment-linked poverty was temporary 
and the proper functioning of free markets would correct it. As Amadeo put it: 
 
“When I came into Social Development … I … supposed ... we were 
experiencing ... a change of model… which would produce temporary 
unemployment…that ... my job was to protect the historically poorest sectors 
and those damaged by the transition” (Amadeo, 2002). 
 
However, choosing NBI as the key criterion involved the iteration of a concept that 
stemmed from structuralist approaches to poverty (chapter 4) dating back to the 
1960s, when populism was hegemonic in Argentina (chapter 3). Located within the 
framework of neoliberalism, the adoption of NBI indicators helped to avoid broad 
state interference in the economic sphere and saved state resources, since only NBI 
data were available and generating other data was costly. 
                                                 
126
 The existing programmes included in the Plan Social that fell directly under the remit of the SDS were Ayuda Solidaria para 
Mayores (ASOMA – Solidarity Help for the Elderly) and Programa Alimentario Nacional Infantíl (PRANI – National Children’s 
Food Programme); programmes with international funding created during Prol’s years, FOPAR and SIEMPRO; and two national 
programmes created under Amadeo, PFSC and CENOC. The rest of the Plan’s budget came from programmes considered to be 
targeted at the poor but not under the direct remit of the SDS. These comprised PROSOCO, PROSONU and the Fondo Nacional 
de la Vivienda (FONAVI – National Housing Fund), all in provincial hands since their decentralisation in the early 1990s 
(Ansolabehere, 2003: 630), the Programa Social Agropecuario (PSA – Social Farming Programme), in the Secretariat of 
Agriculture and Fisheries, Pro-Huerta (Pro-Farm), in the National Institute of Farm Technology, and PROMIN, in the Ministry 
of Health. 
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Second, the understanding of poverty as integral – defined by not just economic but 
multiple factors – with a focus on self-esteem factors and a definition of the poor as 
“los más necesitados” (“the neediest”), also reflected the articulation of neoliberalism 
and Argentinean populism. The notion of integral poverty and a focus on self-esteem 
reinforced the neoliberal focus on coordination and attempted to prevent actions to 
deal with it from interfering with the functioning of the economy. Seeing poverty as 
not just linked to nutritional problems but as the result of multiple material and non-
material dimensions, reinforced neoliberalism because it led, according to the Plan, to 
a focus on coordinating the multiple actions required to tackle such poverty rather 
than on expanding intervention (SDS, 1994: 17). Moreover, an understanding of 
poverty as integral shifted the focus beyond both income and structural factors, 
implying that poverty reduction policy did not involve interfering with the functioning 
of the economy. Yet, at the same time, this integral understanding entailed expanding 
the strategy beyond mere administrative reform and required intervention in the 
private sphere of individuals. Similarly, an interest in self-esteem, which was depicted 
as hindering the integration of the poor into the benefits of neoliberal reforms (SDS, 
1994: 10), showed the presence of non-neoliberal views, drawn from Amadeo’s own 
background as a developmentalist economist and his wife’s studies in social 
psychology (Amadeo, 2002), and required strategies that went beyond the neoliberal 
focus on managerial matters. Defining the poor as “the neediest” enabled a connection 
between the targeting of the poor and the populist historical and logical concern with 
the marginal and the underdog. The term displaced the word “poor”, in line with the 
government’s decision to avoid talking about poverty, and was a conceptual bridge 
that attempted to assimilate the targeted structural poor of the Plan with those not 
included in the 1940s’ Peronist welfare system and under the “marginal” of the 1960s. 
 
Third, the Plan proposed social organisation as a key strategy, together with the 
central aim of modernisation and the tool of targeting, to help to reduce poverty. It 
was in this feature of the approach that populism was more evident. This point is 
analysed next, since it specifically concerns the government’s discourse on civil 
society in poverty reduction policy. 
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5.3. The neopopulist discourse on civil society 
 
Before 1993, the government discourse on civil society in poverty reduction action 
was in accordance with the prevailing disjointed approach to poverty. As such, an 
individualist and market-based conception of civil society co-existed with the 
persistence of state-centred conceptions of community promotion and the continued 
inclusion of corporations and political actors in the government’s discourse on civil 
society, which corresponded o the neoliberal and populist projects’ normative 
components, respectively. 
 
When the neoliberal hegemony was consolidating and populism was gaining spaces, 
the neopopulist approach to poverty emerged. The discourse on civil society in 
poverty reduction action corresponded to the neopopulist approach to poverty, in 
which neoliberal and populist views mixed in a non-conflictive way under the 
hegemony of neoliberalism. However, populist elements were more significant in this 
discourse than in the approach to poverty. The neopopulist discourse on civil society 
in poverty reduction was articulated around the notions of: 
 
1) social organisation 
2) state promotion of social organisation 
3) solidarity. 
 
 
a. Disjointed neopopulism in the discourse on civil society (1990-1992) 
 
During this period, the discourse on civil society was a disjointed combination of 
elements drawn from the neoliberal and Argentinean populist discourses on civil 
society. This was not only the result of being part of a disjointed neopopulist approach 
to poverty but also reflected the government’s intention to dismantle political 
identities associated with the populist hegemony in order to construct new political 
identities around neoliberalism. The government’s preference for non-organised 
sectors over established political organisations or corporations reflected this aim. Yet, 
these organisations were still rooted in society and building political identities in itself 
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entailed the application of the populist logic. This disjointed co-existence of elements 
of the neoliberal and populist discourses on civil society can be seen in the three sets 
of policies referred to above – social emergency measures, decentralisation, and the 
PROSOL programme. 
 
Both PAN and Bonos Solidarios referred to civil society in their design and delivery 
but understood it in different ways. The Bonos focused on the marginal sectors, who 
were the worst affected by hyperinflation. They highlighted the role of individuals, 
markets and state retrenchment. Individuals received cash transfers and were free to 
decide how to spend that money. The delivery system was in the hands of market 
actors such as food producers and shops, and, since the staff was ad honorem and the 
system was funded by voluntary contributions from the private sector, its 
implementation did not entail an increase in state expenditure (Midre, 1992: 362, 364, 
371). In contrast, PAN attempted to involve community groups in programme 
activities such as training and programme delivery, and the state purchased the food 
and employed all the community workers involved in the programme (chapter 3). Yet, 
like PAN, where local party members distributed food boxes, representatives of 
traditional corporations – the heads of Caritas, the divided CGT and the Unión 
Industrial Argentina (UIA – Argentinean Industrial Union)127 managed the Bonos and 
the PJ and both CGTs distributed them128 (Midre, 1992: 361, 366-70). 
 
Decentralised measures and policies trying new approaches to poverty, such as 
PROSOL, tried to place centre stage the concept that later became the nodal point of 
the neopopulist discourse – social organisation. Yet, the disjointed co-existence of 
discourses continued. The decentralisation of PROSOCO and PROSONU was 
accompanied by the aim of including community organisations in their 
implementation, but this inclusion varied between provinces (Ansolabehere, 2003: 
635-640). In the province of Buenos Aires, for instance, PROSONU was soon 
incorporated into the provincial school kitchens programme, which already included a 
community organisation component, and in the province of Mendoza the programme 
included social organisations in order to align itself with the broader provincial aims 
                                                 
127
 The Bonos’ Managing Council also included government representatives: the Minister of Health and Social Action, The 
Minister of Work and Social Security and the Minister of Internal Affairs. 
128
 Peronist deputies received 70,000 bonds to distribute during their visits to the provinces, 7,000 were given to the armed forces 
and prison wardens, and civil society council members – both CGTs, Caritas and Cruz Roja (Red Cross) – received 64,000 
(Midre, 1992: 368, 370). 
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of efficient expenditure. Yet, the province of Córdoba, governed by the UCR, 
continued to prefer a state-centred model of social policy delivery, despite supporting 
the national neoliberal economic programme. PROSOL could be delivered through 
provincial or municipal governments and NGOs, grass-roots organisations and 
cooperatives (Salas, 1999: 59). Yet, the lack of importance given to this programme 
by the government and the differences in the provincial governments’ commitment to 
include civil society in policy implementation precluded the expansion of this 
programme’s ideas. 
 
 
b. Articulation of the neopopulist discourse on civil society (1993-1994) 
 
The Plan Social 1995 outlined an official discourse on civil society. In this Plan 
references to civil society appeared mainly in references to social organisation, which 
became a nodal point that articulated the neoliberal and Argentinean populist 
discourses on civil society. 
 
Social organisation entered the government’s approach to poverty with the aim of 
helping the neoliberal objective of re-drawing the dividing line between the public 
and the private by contributing to state retrenchment. While decentralisation was 
introduced in the poverty reduction area in the early 1990s, the other two pillars of the 
neoliberal social reform, targeting and privatisation, became central with the Plan 
Social 1995. Yet privatisation in this policy area referred to social organisations rather 
than to market actors, as had been the case with the privatisation of the social security 
and education systems in the early 1990s. The Plan regarded social organisation as 
the key strategy to aid its main objective – to modernise the management of poverty 
reduction policies without increasing state expenditure in that area. Social 
organisation was portrayed as a critical tool in combating poverty (SDS, 1994: 11) 
because an efficient use of resources would only emerge if framed within efforts to 
strengthen social organisation (SDS, 1994: 9). Amadeo reaffirmed this idea: 
 
“My objective was to make the administration of resources efficient ... What I 
did was to introduce organisation. That is, one of the principles of my 
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programme was that I would not have a single programme without a social 
organisation component.” (Amadeo, 2002) 
 
The focus on social organisation was in line with the other two elements of the Plan’s 
approach to poverty – an integral definition and targeting. The counterpart of an 
integral definition of poverty was an emphasis on re-integrating the poor into society, 
which, the Plan suggested, the involvement of beneficiaries in social organisations 
could help to achieve. Community participation experiences could reinforce the 
development of individuals’ capacities and their sense of integration into society 
(Díaz Muñoz, 2004: 17). In turn, as the coordination of policies targeted at the poor 
undertaken in different government agencies was central to achieving this multi-
purpose task of integrating the poor, the Plan also sought to mainstream a focus on 
social organisation across the ministries dealing with poverty. 
 
This focus not only reflected the background of the head of the SDS but also resulted 
from the financial strategy developed during the formation of the SDS. Amadeo’s 
inclination to work with social organisations drew on the influence of his wife 
experience with community work and on his Peronist background. It was already part 
of his worldview in his years at the Buenos Aires Province Bank when he said, 
referring to the early 1990s hyperinflation, that “the people responded very well by 
getting organised to help each other and this will be absolutely necessary in the 
1990s” (La Nación, 26-02-1990). Also, the incorporation of social organisations for 
the purposes of saving state resources aligned the SDS with the MDBs and the 
Ministry of Economy views, helping to negotiate resources with them. The SIEMPRO 
coordinator confirmed that 
 
“the money available for social programmes had been very little up to then and 
all this changed in 1994 when a clear strategy appeared. This strategy was 
clearly seen in work with civil society in the programmes.” (Novacovky, 2002) 
 
 
The focus on social organisation reflected the alignment with the MDBs’ neoliberal 
discourse but also enabled the entrance of the Argentinean populist discourse on civil 
society, in particular a notion of social organisation as a process and as an alternative 
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to individualist forms of political representation. Since in the early 1990s the MDBs 
were increasingly supporting the involvement of social organisations in combating 
poverty (chapter 4), the Plan’s focus on social organisation aligned the government’s 
discourse with the MDBs’ neoliberalism. However, while NGOs were the central 
actors of civil society in the MDBs discourse, the Plan did not refer to any particular 
form of social organisation, which implied a broader definition of civil society than 
that of the MDBs in these years and an emphasis on social organisation as a process 
and not just as an entity. Thus, the apolitical stance of neoliberalism appeared to be 
adapting to the populist rejection of political party divisions and a preference for 
social organisation as a form of political mobilisation. In fact, despite the importance 
given to technical issues, the Plan subordinated technical matters to the political 
objectives of constructing identities through the promotion of social organisation. 
Only in the last part of President Menem’s cover letter accompanying the Plan is 
reference made to the importance of rationalising and coordinating actions to deal 
with the problems of “the neediest”. In this letter, the reference to a rational and 
coordinated approach to social issues is framed in a call for social consensus: “allow 
me to stress the word ‘together’… because [poverty reduction] must be a concerted 
effort of all political parties and social organisations. A true state policy” (SDS, 1994: 
1). These words resembled a populist call for social and political agreement beyond 
party flags by resorting to the social field rather than the political one to find common 
ground for consensus. At the same time, the Plan incorporated the community 
promotion approach to poverty that emerged in the 1960s and the voluntaristic ways 
of dealing with social needs that flourished in the mid-1970s during the dictatorship 
and in the 1980s during hyperinflation in Argentina. 
 
The second feature of the neopopulist discourse was the emphasis on state promotion 
of social organisation. In the context of a focus on social organisation geared towards 
the objective of redrawing the dividing line between the private and the public and 
helping to save state resources, state promotion aimed to make social organisation a 
permanent supplement to the state in poverty reduction policies, as in the MDBs’ 
neoliberal discourse. However, the Plan stressed that the state was to play a central 
role in promoting social organisation, which involved the possibility that organisation 
could become dependent on state funds and guidance. The Plan states that the state 
should support any person’s initiative and intention to participate either as an 
 153 
individual or within communities or associations, instead of reducing them to the 
status of clients (SDS, 1994: 10). Furthermore, the Plan suggests that the state should 
make available instruments to support, and therefore promote, these initiatives: 
 
“… as long as this becomes a state policy and citizens are aware that there is a 
decision – and instruments – to foster solidarity and to support their vocation 
of organisation, they will find new incentives in order to solve, through that 
channel, their social problems.” (SDS, 1994: 10) 
 
Hence, the neoliberal discourse and its objectives of permanent supplementation 
prevailed. But the door was opened for organisations involved in programmes to 
develop a dependent relationship with the state and for them to expect that the state 
would resume intervention in the social sphere, as in the Argentinean populist 
discourse. Moreover, in conjunction with the understanding of social organisation as 
process and political mobilisation, state promotion could also be geared towards the 
generation of political identities. 
 
Despite the seemingly balanced amalgamation of the neoliberal and populist 
discourses in the notions of social organisation and state promotion, the third feature, 
solidarity, is presented as the basis of social organisation (SDS, 1994: 9) and revealed 
that populism weighed greater in this discourse than in the broader neopopulist 
approach to poverty in which it was inserted. 
 
Populism’s relatively greater presence in this discourse resulted from the focus on 
solidarity because, first, solidarity reflects a communitarian rather than an 
individualist view of society. Solidarity in itself relates to notions of social 
organisation that emphasise the homogeneity of a society united around a cause 
(Rosen, 1995: 1) rather than a differentiated society. Solidarity assumes the pre-
existence of community to which solidarity would come to enhance members’ ties, 
since it implies they share mutual concern for one another (Archard, 2006: 188). 
Considering solidarity as the basis of social organisation, which is crucial to achieving 
the objective of modernising the poverty reduction area, implies the need for political 
and not just administrative reform in this area. 
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Second, solidarity acted as a conceptual bridge between the Plan’s focus on state 
promotion of social organisation and the MDBs’ focus on sustainability as the core of 
efficiency solidarity, adapting the latter to the Argentinean populist discourse. As the 
Plan puts it: “there is no sustainable social policy if it does not take place in a 
framework of solidarity that maximises people’s organisation” (SDS, 1994: 1). This 
link with sustainability seems to put solidarity at odds with Argentinean populism 
since sustainability aims are contrary to long-term state intervention. Yet, the 
connection of sustainability with state promotion through the term “solidarity” – as in 
the title of the Plan, políticas de promoción y solidaridad con los más necesitados129 – 
highlighted solidarity’s association with another feature that developed within the 
Argentinean populist discourse from the 1960s onwards, community promotion. 
Therefore, while solidarity’s communitarian implications were iterated by being 
framed in a predominantly neoliberal approach to poverty which carried out 
promotional actions intended to stress the individual’s will to organise, associating 
solidarity with state promotion counterbalanced that iteration in favour of the 
Argentinean populist discourse. 
 
Third, the chain of equivalences that resulted from the articulation of sustainability 
and state promotion through solidarity inserted the rationalising aims that made this 
Plan neoliberal within the populist political aim of constructing collective political 
identities. The objective of constructing political identities was, in fact, the main 
objective of the Plan, despite its stated mission of technical reform. According to the 
Plan: “Resources and technology are important, but the ethical environment where 
social policies are implemented is fundamental: solidarity…” (SDS, 1994: 9), and 
solidarity was seen as the “soul” of the tough neoliberal priorities of saving state 
resources, rationalisation and coordination (Plan Social, 1994: 2). 
 
In summary, the discourse on civil society contained in the Plan Social 1995 to 
combat poverty articulated, through the key concepts of “social organisation”, “state 
promotion” and “solidarity”, elements of the neoliberal and populist political projects 
and discourse. Despite being inserted into a predominantly neoliberal approach to 
poverty, the discourse showed more populist elements. 
                                                 
129
 Promotion and solidarity policies for the neediest 
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5.4. Analytical summary and conclusions 
 
This chapter has shown how the neopopulist discourse on civil society in poverty 
reduction policy emerged. The discourse was neopopulist because it was inserted into 
a neopopulist approach to poverty and because it articulated neoliberalism and 
Argentinean populism and their discourses on civil society. In the first years (1990-
1992), elements of these political projects co-existed in a disjointed discourse. When 
the government incorporated poverty into its agenda, the approach to poverty and the 
corresponding discourse on civil society combined neoliberalism and populism in a 
non-conflictive way under the hegemony of neoliberalism. However, populism 
figured more in the discourse on civil society than in the approach to poverty in which 
it was inserted. 
 
The events and actors that influenced the formation of this discourse are mapped in 
table 2. The government’s adoption of neoliberalism (b1), aided by the existence of a 
discoursive dislocation (a1) such as the hyperinflationary crisis, was combined with a 
populist logic of discursive formation (b2), which became more visible in the second 
part of this period. This combination at the general government level defined the 
conditions of possibility for the formation of the approach to poverty and the 
discourse on civil society within it. 
 
Before poverty was incorporated into the government agenda, the disjointed co-
existence of neoliberalism and populism in the civil society discourse resulted from 
the broader government style of relating to social actors, trying to address them as 
individuals but with the aim of generating political support, and from being a 
discourse inserted in a similarly disjointed approach to poverty. When poverty was 
incorporated into the government’s agenda after non-partisan opposition demands on 
the state to do so (a2), policy makers in the poverty reduction area became crucial in 
shaping the area’s discourse. In the framework of the government’s non-
interventionist stance, policy makers acted in an institutional environment in which 
informal channels (c1) and their own technical backgrounds were pivotal in 
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TABLE 2: Actors and Factors Shaping the Neopopulist Discourse on Civil Society (1990-1994) 
Dislocation  
Hyperinflation (a1) 
 
 
   Neopopulist Approach 
to Poverty and 
Discourse on Civil 
Society  
Plan Social 1995 
  
     
 
  
Government’s  
neoliberal stance 
(b1) 
 Ministry of Economy’s 
resistance (b1.1) 
   MDBs’ entrance (d):  
 
(d1) technical 
requirements  
 
 
 
  
 
 Profile of policy makers 
(c2): technical (c2.1) and 
political background 
(c2.2) 
  
(d2) focus  on 
organisations 
Government’s 
growing populism 
(b2) 
 
      
 
Dislocation: 
Social costs of 
adjustment (a2): 
  
Non-partisan political 
pressures 
 Institutional processes in 
the introduction of 
poverty reduction action: 
(c1) 
SDS formation 
  
 
 
constructing the area (c2.1). Yet, given the presence of populism in the government’s 
discourse, policy makers’ political backgrounds, shaped by their allegiance to the 
populist project of Peronism, were also included in that construction (c2.2). 
 
Faced with resistance at the national cabinet level from sectors committed to the 
neoliberal project (b1.1), policy makers resorted to the MDBs to obtain the funds that 
the state did not grant to the newly created area. The MDBs, at the same time, were 
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starting to increase their work in social areas and were willing to lend to Argentina. 
Their neoliberal focus on the logic of difference, or institutional and technical 
responses to social demands (d1), highlighted policy makers’ use of their technical 
knowledge to shape the area’s discourses and reinforced the neoliberalism within the 
discourse. Yet, this focus on technical matters allowed for political projects centred on 
the formation of political identities to permeate the discourse and policy makers 
introduced their views, which were also shaped by their political allegiances. In 
addition, (d2) the MDBs’ ongoing redefinition of their approach to poverty and 
discourse on civil society was going through a shift of focus from individuals to 
organisations, facilitating further the entrance of political projects prioritising the 
community over the individual, such as populism, into this discourse. 
 
The resulting approach to poverty reduction, in which the discourse on civil society 
was inserted, had three distinctive features – a focus on coordination and targeting, a 
definition of poverty as “integral”, and an emphasis on social organisation. Within 
these three features, elements of neoliberalism and Argentinean populism were mixed. 
Coordination and targeting appeared to be in line only with neoliberal aims, yet the 
choice of NBI indicators introduced a key element associated with the years in which 
the populist project was hegemonic. Defining poverty as integral called for a 
neoliberal focus on coordination but also required intervention beyond pure 
administrative reform. Social organisation was presented as at the service of the 
neoliberal aim of rationalisation and therefore as limiting the intervention of the state 
in the private sphere. However, this element of the approach had more affinities with 
populism, as the characteristics of the discourse on civil society of those years 
indicated. 
 
The neopopulist discourse on civil society articulated around the nodal point of social 
organisation and included two other central features – state promotion of social 
organisation and solidarity. The chains of equivalences constructed around the nodal 
point of social organisation and the notion of state promotion suggested that the 
government’s discourse agreed with both the neoliberal and the Argentinean populist 
discourse on civil society. Yet, the importance given to the notion of solidarity 
showed a preference for views that prioritised the community over the individual, 
which in Argentina had been historically embedded in populism. Therefore, the notion 
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of solidarity was key in allowing for a greater importance of populism in this 
discourse than in the government’s broader stances and the approach to poverty in 
particular. 
 
In terms of hegemonic analysis, in this period there was a non-conflictive articulation 
of neoliberalism and Argentinean populism, but neoliberalism set the boundaries for 
the possibilities of discursive articulation. Populism was absorbed by and reframed 
within a predominantly neoliberal approach to poverty and discourse on civil society, 
which revealed the expansion of neoliberalism’s hegemony. Populism, however, 
permeated the overall neoliberal orientation of the Plan Social and it occupied an 
important space in the discourse on civil society. 
 
During Menem’s first presidency neoliberalism and populism co-existed well in the 
neopopulist discourse on civil society. Yet, the antagonism between these political 
projects, stemming from their opposite normative components and their historical 
struggles for hegemony, did not vanish behind this discursively articulated co-
existence. As the next chapter shows, when the first policies based on the Plan Social 
1995 were negotiated and implemented, populist views grew within the neoliberal 
hegemony over the discourse on civil society in poverty reduction policy and brought 
to light the ineradicable contradictions between the two political projects. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Neopopulism at work: the technopopulist years (1995-1999) 
 
 
 
This chapter looks at Menem’s second presidency (1995 to 1999). It analyses poverty 
reduction policies130 that implemented the neopopulist discourse on civil society 
outlined in the Plan Social 1995 and maps the factors and actors embedded in the re-
articulation of that discourse. In these years the discourse on civil society in poverty 
reduction policies became a technopopulist version of neopopulism, as populism 
gained ground and neoliberalism strengthened its focus on technical matters in order 
to retain hegemony. 
 
Between 1995 and 1997 the neopopulist discourse gained specificity. Neoliberalism 
consolidated its hegemony in the discourse since the key features of the neopopulist 
discourse – social organisation, state promotion and solidarity – were filled with 
contents predominantly attuned to neoliberalism. However, populism retained its 
presence in the discourse. First, some political organisations and organisations 
moulded during the years of populist hegemony were included alongside mostly 
technical organisations in programme implementation. Second, state promotion of 
social organisation did not strengthen organisations enough for them to become a 
permanent supplement of the state in policy implementation; it made them dependent 
on state funds and guidance. Third, as solidarity contributed to interpreting voluntary 
organisations in terms of “voluntary (unpaid) work”, the neoliberal focus on the role 
of individuals’ will and interests in creating organisations independently from the 
state was downplayed. This enabled communitarian views of society and the objective 
of constructing political identities, both central to populism, to permeate the focus on 
unpaid work. 
 
After 1997, populism expanded within the discourse but neoliberalism remained 
hegemonic by stressing technical and methodological issues, to which the 
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 For details on the selection of programmes, and a list and summary of those analysed here, see chapter 1, and annexes II and 
III. 
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advancement of populism had to adapt. Populism advanced by resignifying the new 
features that were emerging in programme contents and implementation – 
municipalisation, employment strategies, the importance of leaders, and the concept 
of social capital – which appeared as floating signifiers available for discursive 
articulation. Yet, as neoliberalism had taken root in the SDS in the first two years of 
the implementation of the Plan Social, the expansion of populism was framed within 
a marked stress on neoliberal methodologies and technical language, which were 
expected to keep the advance of populism at bay. Therefore, while the discourse was 
becoming more populist, neoliberalism remained hegemonic and the non-conflictive 
co-existence of the two projects was maintained. 
 
While policy makers had been highly influential in moulding the approach to poverty 
and its corresponding discourse on civil society during Menem’s first administration, 
in this period the President’s second re-election plans were crucial in defining the 
direction of change in this policy area, and state actors – policy makers and 
implementers – and the MDBs defined the specificities of these changes. The 
President’s objective of running for a second re-election became paramount and led to 
a focus on the re-construction of political support and the reduction of neoliberalism 
to a veneer. Institutional changes in the poverty reduction policy area and 
programmatic changes reflected this advance of populism. However, mainly to keep 
the IFIs’ support despite macroeconomic problems, the government maintained the 
neoliberal veneer, which limited the expansion of populism and was reflected in the 
increased focus on the formal and technical aspects of neoliberalism. Within the 
framework set by the changes in the government discourse, state actors and MDBs 
facilitated the expansion of Argentinean populism but, at the same time, adopted a 
focus on neoliberal formal requirements and techniques as an antidote to the advances 
of populism. Nevertheless, as the conclusion highlights, the neoliberal hegemony was 
weakening as the normative and contingent levels of the discourse were being 
colonised by populism. 
 
The first section of this chapter deals with the transformations in the government 
discourse. The second section explains the changes introduced in the poverty 
reduction area. The third section analyses the formation of the technopopulist 
discourse on civil society and explains its characteristics. The conclusion summarises 
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the chapter and explains how the hegemonic struggles between neoliberalism and 
populism were reflected in the technopopulist discourse. 
 
 
6.1. Menem’s second Presidency: second re-election with a veneer of 
neoliberalism 
 
During Menem’s second government, neoliberalism became a veneer as the focus 
shifted from neoliberal economic reform to a new re-election. Increasing criticism of 
the Washington Consensus ideas at the international level (chapter 4) helped the 
government to distance itself from neoliberalism. But it was the President’s decision 
to run for a second re-election and two dislocations – rising unemployment and the 
official party’s electoral defeat – that led to this departure. The urban rate of 
unemployment was over 18% in May 1995 (Annex I, figures 6 and 7). This was 
linked to the international ‘Tequila Crisis’131 but was not detached from the 
consequences of the implementation of neoliberal reform, as the opposition, who were 
becoming more influential because they were reorganising as a political force, pointed 
out. The opposition’s increasing importance resulted in the second dislocation – the 
defeat of the official party in legislative elections in 1997.132 After this defeat, the 
President’s interest in a second re-election, which he had expressed soon after 
assuming this second presidency (Monti and Vega, 1995), intensified. The President 
interpreted the defeat as a lack of popular support for ex-Vice-President Eduardo 
Duhalde (Ollier, 2001: 109), who led an anti-Menemist stream in the PJ with the aim 
of becoming the 1999 presidential candidate, and whose wife lost in the highly 
populated and traditionally Peronist province of Buenos Aires. With increasing 
unemployment and a stronger opposition, the President sought support for his new re-
election plans in sectors traditionally loyal to Peronism – the popular sectors. Yet, 
since neoliberal reform had up to then provided the government with important 
electoral victories, he also had to show that there was no return to the populist past. 
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 A financial crisis triggered by the abrupt withdrawal of external capital in late 1994 in Mexico. 
132
 The governing party came second behind the Alianza, and obtained only 36.3% of the votes, compared to 44.9% in the 1995 
presidential elections (Dirección Nacional Electoral, 1997 and 1995). 
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The reduction of neoliberalism to a veneer was evident in the handling of fiscal 
accounts, a neglected state reform project and the relegation of economic and 
neoliberal sectors within the government. Fiscal deficit objectives agreed with the 
IMF were achieved not by controlling state expenditure but by renegotiating them, as 
in 1998, and by taking out more loans. The latter became apparent in 1999, when debt 
repayments caused the deficit to soar to $7,094.5 million, 39% above the target agreed 
with the IMF (La Nación, 26-01-2000 and 20-05-1999).133 Regarding state reform, the 
government approved the Second State Reform Law in 1996 to reduce the state 
structure. Yet, by early 1998, seven Secretariats and other Under-Secretariats had re-
emerged and numerous decrees had modified the law (La Nación, 29-01-98). 
Similarly, in July 1996, Roque Fernández, known as a neoliberal economist but more 
open to political sectors of the government, replaced Cavallo, whose political 
aspirations were beginning to jeopardise Menem’s objectives for 1999 (Morales Solá, 
1996). The economic area of the government lost importance in favour of the Cabinet 
Chief. This newly created post, instead of limiting presidential power, as the UCR 
intended when it proposed its creation through Constitutional reform, was reduced to 
an instrument of presidential will. Furthermore, the Second State Reform Law 
delegated to the Cabinet Chief parliamentary powers to modify the national budget 
(Novaro, 2001: 71). 
 
The government’s responses to social demands appeared to be acquiring a higher 
level of institutionalisation, but the bypassing of institutions continued and was used 
to advance populist objectives rather than neoliberal reform, as during Menem’s first 
government. Several scholars have indicated that centralised decision-making and the 
bypassing of institutions had decreased by the mid-1990s, as representation improved 
with a more organised opposition (Novaro, 2001: 103) and political and social actors 
were included in decision-making processes (Bambaci, 1999). Yet, the strategies the 
President used to seek its core objectives, such as the second re-election, showed that 
the bypassing of established rules continued. The President tried to modify the 
Constitution via the Senate – where the President had a loyal majority – and resorted 
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 In 1996 the government carried forward expenditure to the following year’s accounts and issued bonds to avoid exceeding the 
US$6,500 million fiscal deficit agreed with the IMF (La Nación, 3-01-1997). In 1997 the state spent US$883 million more than 
in 1996 but argued that improvements in tax collection had helped it to comply with the deficit agreed with the IMF (Oviedo, 
1998). In 1998, fiscal deficit decreased but the target of US$3,500 million agreed with the IMF could not be achieved, and the 
government had to renegotiuate with the IMF a new target of US$3,850 million to accommodate the end-of-year deficit of 
US$3,849 (La Nación, 20-01-1999). 
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to the Supreme Court of Justice – where he had supportive judges – to remove the 
sections of the Constitution that stated he could not run for re-election twice. 
Similarly, the President’s insistence on having internal elections in the official party, 
and the formation of the Alianza (Alianza por el Empleo, la Justicia y la Educación – 
Alliance for Jobs, Justice and Education) in August 1996, uniting the two main 
opposition forces, FREPASO (Frente País Solidario – Solidarity Country Front) and 
UCR, seemed to be improvements in the system of representation. Yet, Menem sought 
internal elections because Ramón “Palito” Ortega, his candidate for 1999 if the re-
election plans failed, lacked the support of the party structure, which was under 
Duhalde’s control (Levit, 1996). Also, the Alianza’s criticism of the government’s 
lack of respect for institutions and of the spread of corruption (Charosky, 2002: 198-
9) did not make the government improve in these respects. Instead, Menem avoided 
responding to this criticism and, instead, focused on articulating in his discourse 
demands relating to what had historically been at the core of the Peronist discourse, 
and which he had neglected until then – social issues. Regarding trade unions, the 
government continued to resort to decrees and secret negotiations in dealing with 
them and aimed more to obtain their political support than to implement neoliberal 
labour reform. Threats to use, or actual use of executive decrees, were aimed at 
advancing the government’s labour reform plan, which was different from that 
promoted by the IMF, and at preventing the CGT from supporting Duhalde’s 
candidacy for 1999 (Ollier, 2001: 108). The popular sectors, treated as atomised 
individuals for most of Menem’s first government, were looked at in a different light 
in this period because important sectors of the government held that if Menem sought 
a second re-election he needed to establish more visible links with those sectors. 
Hence, he started to have more public engagements, especially of the type concerned 
with social action (La Nación 30-08-1996). 
 
After 1997, the populism’s colonisation of the neoliberal hegemony became more 
marked. Reading Duhalde’s wife’s electoral defeat as the opportunity to advance 
further with his second re-election plans, Menem reshuffled the cabinet (Obarrio, 
1997) and intensified efforts to regain contact with the popular sectors. He stopped 
calling for internal elections in the PJ and appointed Ortega as head of the SDS, from 
where they could challenge Duhalde’s control of the PJ structure and establish direct 
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contact with the popular sectors. Erman González – who had close links with the 
unions – replaced Caro Figueroa – who, as Minister of Labour, agreed with the IMF 
and the Ministry of Economy views on labour reform. The reform approved in 
September 1998, therefore, reflected more the views of the CGT, which were rooted 
in the populist project of Peronism. Negotiations leading to that reform continued to 
be characterised by threats of issuing decrees, of secret negotiations, and by the 
exclusion of dissident sectors of the CGT or business groups (La Nación 1-10-98), 
rather than by plural, institutionalised dialogue. Popular protests with roadblocks and 
pickets led by the unemployed came into the limelight in 1996 and 1997 in the 
provinces of Neuquén, Salta and Jujuy.134 The government responded by sending in 
the army and by implementing temporary employment programmes and transferring 
money directly from the Executive to the communities and municipalities affected. 
These actions represented an arbitrary distribution of social funds, an intervention in 
the labour market and a bypassing of established institutions, all of which were in line 
with distinctive features of Argentinean populism. 
 
A wider adoption of elements of Argentinean populism was limited by the increasing 
need of IMF’s. The Argentinean economy was not as healthy as the high growth of 
those years seemed to indicate.135 International lenders and investors were concerned 
with the slow reduction of unemployment,136 with the ability of the banking system to 
cope with the high level of debt, and with current and trade account imbalances. The 
devaluation of the real in Brazil and the overvaluation of the Argentinean peso that 
resulted from maintaining the exchange parity with the dollar, made the scenario more 
unstable. To retain access to funds, the government focused increasingly on pleasing 
the IMF, whose views affected the international lenders and investors. 
 
Nevertheless, the IMF seemed satisfied with the government complying with only 
basic neoliberal requirements. The IMF objected to the advances of populism and the 
government’s attempts to regain contact with the popular sectors. For instance, in the 
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 In June 1996, the protests in Neuquén were in Cutral-Có and Plaza Huincul and were about the new governor’s plans to cancel 
a contract for the production of fertilisers signed by his predecessor with a foreign company (La Nación, 26-06-1996). In the 
same areas in May 1997, a large teachers’ protest involved a fatality. Between June and August 1997, unemployed workers from 
the state and the privatised YPF led protests in Jujuy and Salta. 
135
 While GDP growth in 1995 was -2.8%, it was 5.5% in 1996 and 8.1% in 1997. In 1998 the overall growth was 3.9%, but 
recession started in the last trimester of that year with -0.4% of annual variation. (Annex I, fig. 13 and Ministerio de Economía, 
2005). 
136
 Despite improvements in 1998, in 1999 unemployment was around or above the 1995 record high, eg 17.5% in Greater 
Buenos Aires, 19.2% in Tucuman and 18.2% in Mar del Plata (Annex 1, figure 7). 
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negotiations for the extended facilities loan,137 the government planned to place the 
funds from the privatisation of Banco Hipotecario in a special fund to combat poverty 
(La Nación, 5-04-1997), but the IMF recommended using them to reduce debt, 
thereby reducing state expenditure on debt servicing and reducing state deficit. Yet, 
after the PJ’s electoral defeat, the IMF reaffirmed its support for the government in 
order to, in the context of the Asian crisis,138 avoid the failure of another country 
renowned for its commitment to neoliberalism. Signs of confidence were the 
announcement of the extended facilities agreement just two days after the official 
party electoral defeat (La Nación, 29-10-1997), and the re-setting of fiscal deficit 
targets at the end of 1998, to avoid the need for a waiver. Also, as second re-election 
plans were gaining momentum, compliance with formal IMF requirements became 
almost the only indicator of government adherence to neoliberalism. The formalities 
observed by the government included passing labour reform legislation through 
Congress, keeping up the appearance of a pluralist dialogue during the negotiations 
leading up to that, and responding to social protests with employment programmes 
designed and funded jointly with the MDBs. 
 
 
6.2. Poverty: the technopopulist approach 
 
In accordance with the government’s combination of a veneer of neoliberalism with 
the increasing importance of populism, in the poverty reduction area populism grew 
but was adapted to an increasing focus on technical matters linked to the neoliberal 
project. At the institutional level, the influence of sectors favourable to populist views 
increased. At the programme level, populism permeated changes that were emerging 
in programme design and implementation: 
 
1) universal poverty reduction actions, 
2) employment strategies, and 
3) work with municipalities. 
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 The extended facilities agreement concerned second-generation reforms – labour flexibilisation, tax reform and judicial 
reform. 
138
 The first global economic crisis followed a crash in the Hong Kong housing market that led to plummeting markets in Wall 
Street. 
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The Second State Reform Law, the announcement of new Social Plans, and the 
replacement of Amadeo with Ortega as head of the SDS modified the SDS’s internal 
organisation and within it sectors favourable to the populist project gained presence to 
the detriment of those advocating neoliberalism. The Second State Reform Law 
established that international loans had to be administered by the Ministry of Finance 
rather than by the agency that obtained the loan.139 While the aim was to rationalise 
the use of state resources, the measure contributed to the construction of the neoliberal 
veneer, since once in the hands of the Ministry of Finance the funds could be 
redirected to comply with fiscal deficit targets. In the SDS, the area dealing with 
international funding – the Unidad de Financiamiento Internacional (UFI – 
International Funding Unit), coordinated by a renowned technical functionary, 
Viviana Fridman – became less influential as it lost control of those funds. Moreover, 
the restructuring of state dependencies entailed in the Reform involved replacing 
Fridman at the Under-Secretariat of Social Projects with Silvia Gascón,140 who had a 
sound knowledge of the politics of poverty reduction policy, as opposed to Fridman 
who, as she explained, “... had practically nothing to do with the Ministries in the 
provinces…” (Fridman, 2002). The Social Plans announced in 1996 and 1997 
designated the Cabinet Chief as coordinator of poverty reduction funds. The measure 
was not implemented but it meant a reduced presidential support for the SDS and its 
predominantly neoliberal approach to poverty (Díaz Muñoz, 2004: 17), and the 
concentration of the management of poverty reduction action in the hands of the 
President, since the Cabinet Chief echoed the Executive’s will. In 1998, Ortega 
replaced Amadeo at the SDS, reflecting a further move towards populism since, as 
explained above, the replacement was intended to help the President’s re-election 
plans. 
 
Yet, due both to a path-shaping effect and the need to comply with MDB 
requirements, the technical aspects of the neoliberal-dominated approach to poverty 
continued to be stressed and populism adapted to them. The neopopulist approach to 
poverty expressed in the Plan Social 1995, in particular its coordination priorities and 
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 “Before, if you secured international funding for a programme, the funds were sent directly to it. Afterwards, everything had 
to go to the National Budget and the Ministry of Finance had to approve the release of the funds. That is when ‘international 
funding’ became ‘fuente 22’ [of the National Budget]” (Rodríguez Larreta, 2002). 
140
 Until then she had been ASOMA coordinator. 
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the aim of technifying poverty reduction policy, took root in the SDS in the Amadeo 
years. Therefore, although the weight of the sectors linked to the MDBs and their 
neoliberal perspectives decreased in the overall focus of the SDS, the programmes 
continued to implement the approach. Moreover, the MDBs’ influence continued 
because most MDB programmes were already being implemented and because the 
SDS staff’s reputation as good technocrats helped in negotiating new MDB funds 
(Díaz Muñoz, 2002). 
 
When Ortega became Secretary he encountered an SDS staff identified with a 
discourse of technification and coordination priorities, and programmes designed 
along those lines. Two divisions emerged within the SDS. First, the programme staff 
remained loyal to the outgoing Secretary’s approaches and regarded those who arrived 
with the new Secretary as “técnicos” supporting a political project (Tamargo, 2002). 
Second, the head of the SDS focused on achieving high visibility of SDS actions, 
whereas the Under-Secretary of Social Development, Rodríguez Larreta, focused on 
the efficient administration of the SDS budget. This split involved the separation of 
technical matters from the increasing efforts to regain direct contact with the popular 
sectors, and helped to make those efforts appear to be aligned with the neoliberal-
dominated neopopulist approach. Rodríguez Larreta, for instance, pointed out how the 
execution of funds remained tied to budget plans. 
 
“For sure the image was one of a more political management, because he put 
his face out there, he was there in the floods with his boots on, with the water 
up to his knees. From that point of view it became politicised… but that had 
nothing to do with the use of funds” (Rodríguez Larreta, 2002). 
 
Yet, in the administration of SDS funds his focus was on using all the available 
resources, rather than on ensuring that they were utilised according to objectives: “in 
1998 fund execution reached a high level… around 88-90%, that is a very good 
figure” (Rodríguez Larreta, 2002). In fact, the increase in national public expenditure 
on poverty reduction action from around $200 million between 1995 and 1997 to 
almost $300 million in 1999 (Annex 1, figure 9)141 was generally spent on 
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 The increase is more significant when the provincial and municipal levels are included – consolidated public expenditure – 
$1,887 million in 1995 and $3,184 million in 1999 (Annex 1, figure 8). 
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emergencies such as floods and other highly visible actions (Rodríguez Larreta, 
2002). Sometimes the funds were used to comply with fiscal deficit targets, 
disregarding SDS arrangements with the MDBs and the Ministry of Finance about a 
“blindaje social” (social armour),142 guaranteeing that poverty reduction funds were 
not affected by adjustment (Díaz Muñoz, 2002; Makón, 2002; Etchegaray, 2002; 
Novacovsky, 2002). 
 
Although the neopopulist approach expressed in the Plan Social 1995 was not 
officially redefined, discursive elements linked to populism started to gain spaces in 
the neopopulist approach by resignifying the three characteristics that were emerging 
in the design and implementation of programmes – universal poverty reduction action, 
unemployment strategies and municipalisation. Yet, these new elements had to adopt 
the techniques and methodologies of the neopopulist approach in order to permeate it. 
Universal action did not become part of the approach, unemployment did so only 
partially, but municipalisation, despite most openly incorporating populist objectives, 
was easily integrated. 
 
First, challenging the first pillar of the neopopulist approach to poverty, there were 
attempts to move from targeting to universal approaches that based poverty reduction 
policy on income poverty indicators, linked to unemployment, rather than on 
structural poverty ones. In 1997 Amadeo challenged the MDBs’ understanding of 
unemployment as a temporary problem, and the idea of universal poverty reduction 
action based on guaranteeing a minimum threshold of income – what interviewees 
referred to as “human income” or “citizen income” – started to emerge among SDS 
policy makers (Amadeo, 2002; Cafiero, 2002). This challenge informed two 
programmes launched in this period – Becas and Trabajar. However, in their final 
design the programmes constituted temporary solutions to employment problems, and 
thus a view of unemployment as a transitional situation continued to be reproduced 
and universal approaches were not adopted (Amadeo, 2002).  
 
New IDB programmes incorporated a notion of poverty based on income poverty 
indicators, but NBI continued to be the main targeting criteria in both MDBs. In part, 
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 With the IDB, this occurred in the framework of sectoral loan 871/AC-AR. 
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this resulted from the MDBs’ non-interventionist approach and their reluctance to 
expand intervention in the labour market by adding unemployment-linked issues such 
as unemployment indicators or actions that resembled income supplements to its 
programmes. However, IDB programmes approved after 1996 included income 
poverty as a targeting criteria. PAGV combined unemployment rates with NBI and 
the poverty line (IDB, 1997: 42, 43) to target beneficiaries. PROMEBA’s targets were 
neighbourhoods with 75% of their population with NBI, but the programme 
documents made it clear that that target covered people in the first income quintile, 
which was the WB’s poverty line (IDB, 1996c: 32). However, since the WB’s 
preferred measurement of poverty was the poverty line, which refers to income 
poverty, the persistence of targeting with NBI indicators did not denote the endurance 
of neoliberalism but, more specifically, the endurance of neopopulism and its 
particular mix of neoliberalism and populism. The lack of data on income poverty was 
what prevented the widespread use of income poverty to target poverty reduction 
actions, which, ultimately, reflected the increasing challenges faced by domestic 
supporters of the MDBs’ views and the consequent insufficient strength to impose 
their priorities. 
 
Second, unemployment issues nevertheless permeated the second pillar of the 
neopopulist approach – the understanding of poverty as integral – through the concept 
of vulnerability, as FOPAR II, PROAME and PAGV (World Bank, 1998c: 8, 9; IDB, 
1998: 1; IDB, 1997 respectively) showed. Tackling unemployment entailed, on the 
one hand, interfering in the economic realm, which went against neoliberal 
reccomendations, and, on the other, a consideration of poverty in terms of income, 
which implied a move away from the structuralist definitions of poverty tied to the 
years of populist hegemony. But, since structural poverty remained the main targeting 
criteria, the departure from neoliberalism stood out. Vulnerability was related to the 
notion of integral poverty, since it considered poverty beyond its material dimensions 
(IDB, 1997: 3) but also referred to those more at risk of falling into poverty because 
of a reduced income. Tackling unemployment continued to be excluded from 
programme objectives (eg FOPAR II, see World Bank 1998c: 2) but policy makers 
and implementers included actions to combat unemployment at the implementation 
stage without reporting on them (Etchegaray, 2002). These actions were implemented 
by disregarding rules established in programmes and in accordance with the level of 
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social unrest or the potential for the political support of certain localities, ignoring 
programme targeting criteria and the neoliberal preference for the logic of difference. 
However, despite the advances of populism implied in the introduction of actions to 
tackle unemployment, these actions were adapted to targeted policies and were 
delivered according to a methodology in which social organisations supplemented 
state action, as prescribed by the neoliberal-dominated neopopulism. 
 
Finally, municipalities started to be included at different stages of programme 
implementation, and that affected the neopopulist approach’s focus on social 
organisations. Since the incorporation of municipalities into social programmes 
affected in particular the third pillar of the approach to poverty – a focus on social 
organisation – this innovation is analysed in more depth in the next section. 
 
 
6.3. The technopopulist discourse on civil society 
 
This section looks at how the discourse on civil society in poverty reduction policies 
became a technopopulist version of neopopulism, as populism gained ground and 
neoliberalism strengthened its focus on technical matters in order to retain hegemony. 
This transformation was seen in the design and implementation of poverty reduction 
programmes with civil society participation components, which put in practice the 
neopopulist discourse outlined in the Plan Social 1995. The programmes studied here 
typically operated along the lines explained in Table 3. 
 
 
a. The specification of the neopopulist discourse: neoliberalism’s expansion and 
populism’s resilience (1995-1997) 
 
Between 1995 and 1997 the neopopulist discourse gained specificity. The key features 
of the neopopulist discourse – social organisation, state promotion and solidarity – 
were filled with contents predominantly attuned to neoliberalism, but populism 
remained part of the discourse. 
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First, in line with neoliberalism, the policies analysed focused on technical social 
 
 
TABLE 3: Typical model of programme implementation 
 
  National Programme / Policy  
(Project for the MDBs) 
Programme Implementation Source of 
Funds 
 
National 
Agency 
  
Project-
Loan 
MDBs 
 
 
 
(after 
1996)
 
  
National 
Budget 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SDS 
 
Selection: 
 
PROMIN (Min of Health) 
FOPAR 
SIEMPRO 
PAGV 
PROAME           (funds transference) 
PROMEBA  
                           (project presentation 
CENOC           for prog selection for 
PFSC                funding)          
 
                            (evaluations) 
 
[provincial or 
local 
government] 
After 1997 
 
 
NGO  
(1 or 2 per 
targeted 
province) 
 
(identification of 
COs and Sub-
Projects – 
government also 
before 1997) 
 
(funds 
transference) 
 
 
(sub-project 
presentation) 
 
(presentation of 
results) 
In targeted 
localities: 
 
Community 
Organisation 
CO (1) 
 
CO (2) 
 
CO (N) 
 
 
 
Sub- 
Project 
(1) 
 
Sub-
Project 
(2) 
 
Sub-
Project 
(N) 
 
 
organisations and avoided political organisations. In accordance with the Plan Social 
1995 the programmes focused on social organisations. However, in a move towards 
neoliberalism and away from the Plan’s view of organisation as a process, technical 
organisations were central. The programmes claimed to work with a wide range of 
organisations, from NGOs to community organisations. Programmes such as FOPAR, 
PAGV, PROAME and PFSC even sought to include local organisations not formally 
constituted as such (“informal groups”), like the Núcleos de Beneficiarios (NuBs – 
Beneficiaries’ Groups) in FOPAR.143 Yet, technical NGOs had overall control of the 
projects. The importance of administration and state-saving aims in the 
implementation of the Plan Social made specialist organisations central. NGOs were 
the intermediary organisations that selected community-based organisations and their 
projects, administered programme funds and provided training (table 3). While 
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 In Argentina, social organisations have to register as a “persona jurídica” (a legal entity) in order to receive funds from the 
state. 
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nationally funded programmes appeared to be keener on working with community 
organisations (PFSC, 1995), NGOs controlled the PFSC in each province (Denis, 
2002) and CENOC’s most important activity, training, was in the hands of specialised 
and technical NGOs (Orlowsky, 2002). Furthermore, according to programme 
documents organisations from the political sphere were excluded from programme 
implementation and policy implementers also avoided working with state or party 
organisations. They preferred to work with what they regarded as “the purest level of 
civil society” (Tamargo, 2000) because they believed it was free from corruption. 
They “… sent the money to NGOs to ensure quality, transparency, to avoid suspicion" 
(Candiano, 2002). 
 
Second, state promotion of social organisation aimed to generate a civil society 
capable of permanently supplementing the state in poverty reduction policy delivery. 
As a programme coordinator of those years noted: “there was the idea 
that…implementing programmes through social organisations was a way of working 
that would have to be adopted more and more frequently” (Luna, 2002). The 
assumption in all of these programmes including civil society organisations was that 
by working within these programmes organisations would be strengthened by 
acquiring skills and experience. More straighforwardly, PROMEBA aimed to build an 
alternative to state direct building of social housing. The programme only provided 
cash subsidies to, and undertook the monitoring of, private companies and community 
organisations that were in charge of construction (Pisoni, 2003: 32). In PROAME, the 
budget section of the project loan document even included the financial contribution 
of the executing organisations. Further contributing to this aim of permanent 
supplementation, two national programmes were specifically devoted to strengthening 
social organisations, PFSC and CENOC, and some MDB-funded programmes 
included training, resources and assistance for organisations’ development.  
 
Third, solidarity was interpreted as “voluntary work”, which, together with the aim of 
making social organisations a permanent supplement of the state, was in line with 
objectives of saving state resources. The programmes rearticulated the notion of 
solidarity by using it as an anchor to resignify the neoliberal focus on voluntary 
associationism in terms of voluntary or free work. As such, the organisations involved 
in programmes could not charge for services and human resources provided; they 
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could only get funding for materials and activities. In accordance with neoliberalism, 
civil society in neoliberal terms – while no longer an amalgamation of individuals in 
the market – was regarded as a sector that contributed to a country’s economy through 
unpaid work, in this case by saving state resources (Anheier and Seibel, 1990; Luna, 
2002). 
 
Furthermore, the importance of solidarity – the discourse feature in which populism 
had most weight – was eclipsed by the restriction of civil society participation to the 
level of sub-projects, which was in accordance with the MDBs’ neoliberal discourse, 
and precluded the formation of political identities, so central to populism. Limited to 
sub-project level, participation in poverty reduction policies generated a low level of 
social synergies in the communities, which precluded the emergence of solidarity 
links among its members and hampered the articulation of social demands other than 
those the programmes addressed. Additionally, the referent to which those demands 
should be presented was unclear, as community organisations rarely knew where the 
funds and the programme contents came from (Etchegaray, 2002). Even at the sub-
project level, although according to programme documents the community 
participated in the design, evaluation and execution of projects, in most programmes 
participation was narrower than that. In PROMEBA it was limited to “workshops of 
agreement” about projects that had already been designed (Tau, 2002) and in the 
health component of PROMIN it was limited to the promotion of the programme 
(Barral, 2002). Limiting participation to sub-project level reflected both the MDBs’ 
neoliberal discourse and policy implementers’ idealisation of civil society. Policy 
implementers defended restricting participation to the level of sub-projects. Even 
those who had been committed militants in social organisations considered micro-
level participation positive. They argued that it isolated the activity of social 
organisations from interests at play in the political sphere that could interfere with the 
community’s projects. In the words of PROMIN’s coordinator for community 
participation, "if participation exceeds the micro-level, proposals that damage political 
interests can appear…. and that would be the start of a little problem” (Anigstein, 
2002). 
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Although the specification of the contents of the main features of the neopopulist 
discourse showed the expansion of neoliberal features, Argentinean populism 
continued to be part of the discourse. 
 
First, some political organisations, state institutions, and organisations moulded 
during the years of populist hegemony were in practice included in programme 
implementation. Therefore, the neoliberal aim of redrawing the boundaries between 
the public and the private was jeopardised by this reinforcement of existing overlaps 
between these spheres in the provinces and localities where programmes were 
implemented. The programmes frequently encountered a low level of community 
organisation in the localities where they were implemented (Etchegaray, 2002). They 
tried to encourage the formation of groups but the organisations involved in the 
programmes were usually existing community organisations such as parish groups, 
neighbourhood associations and nurseries (Barral, 2002; Etchegaray, 2002; Pucci, 
2002), which had operated in the past within the hegemony of populism. Also, while 
organisations involved in programme implementation may not have been political, 
they were “politicised” in that for the organisations’ members their past or current 
political militancy was important. As an interviewee put it, while NGOs did not have 
political labels, there was a “diaspora politicisation” (Flood, 2002). This was 
especially so in programmes working in areas where the organisations had been born 
out of political struggles, for example the PSA, which worked in rural locations 
(Bordelois, 2002), and PROMEBA, which dealt with habitat organisations (Tamargo, 
2002). Additionally, in order to be included in the programme, that “politicisation” 
had to be linked to the official party and official party organisations could even be 
included in programmes if, for instance, they posed as newly formed groups that were 
independent from the party (Manóvil, 2005). State institutions, also part of the 
political sphere, could also be included in these programmes. In many localities where 
the programmes were implemented the sphere of civil society organisations and the 
state markedly overlapped. Sometimes members of the most important community 
organisations were also part of the local or provincial state bureaucracy (Martina, 
2002), or state-funded organisation, eg nurseries, were the most important community 
organisations (Barral, 2002). 
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While policy implementers’ “idealisation of civil society” (Flood, 2002) led them to 
express a preference for excluding political organisations from poverty reduction 
policies, in practice they tended to favour the inclusion of some of them They valued 
working with existing community organisations over groups that emerged or grew 
alongside neoliberal-inspired programmes, because of their roots in the community. 
They assumed those roots would guarantee project sustainability and thus efficient use 
of resources, but they also chose existing organisations because of their history of 
commitment to the social struggles of the community (Candiano, 2002; Barral, 2002). 
Policy implementers regarded the overlaps between state and private organisations at 
the community level as part of the reality of the programme context and thus believed 
they had to adapt to them (Peña, 2002). Moreover, policy implementers valued the 
potential of politicised organisations for channelling community demands, and 
therefore welcomed their inclusion (Richards, 2002).  
  
Second, since state promotion of social organisation was directed towards the 
objective of saving state resources and civil society participation was limited to sub-
projects, organisations were not sufficiently strengthened to become a permanent 
supplement of the state in poverty reduction policy implementation. Instead, state 
promotion made them dependent on state funds and guidance, which reinforced the 
blurred dividing line between the private and public spheres. As saving state resources 
prevailed over state promotion, targeting and a small budget reduced the scope and 
impact of the promotion of social organisation. Nationally funded programmes 
created especially for the purpose of strengthening civil society had few funds. The 
MDBs’ advocacy of participatory strategies was not accompanied by MDB funds 
earmarked for strengthening social organisations (Etchegaray, 2002). Moreover, 
several interviewees highlighted the lack of attention given to civil society 
participation in the MDBs’ evaluations, which focused mainly on fund execution 
(Vinocur, 2002; Barral, 2002) or bureaucratic compliance (Sabra, 2002). In fact, the 
promotion of social organisation depended on the will of programme and area 
coordinators. For example, PROMIN’s coordinator prioritised infrastructure 
construction and fund execution, in line with the government’s interest in visible 
actions and the MDBs’ measurement of efficiency based on fund execution. But even 
when a programme’s explicit aim was to create a culture of participation, or its 
coordinators, as in PAGV and PFSC, were committed to promoting social 
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organisation, participation also depended on the predisposition of local communities 
to participate, which varied considerably across geographical areas (Alonso, et al., 
2003: 112; Barral, 2002; Etchegaray, 2002; Candiano, 2002). The programmes could 
only foster this culture if it already existed (Díaz Muñoz, 2002; Barral, 2002) and, as 
participation in programmes could be included as a programme component but be 
minimal during implementation, the chances of strengthening civil society through 
involving social organisations in programme implementation were reduced. As a 
result, very few of the new groups survived after the projects had finished (Díaz 
Muñoz, 2002; Etchegaray, 2002) and the expansion of already existing organisations 
became dependent on state funds. The latter was the case of large specialist 
organisations working with PROMIN such as the Sociedad Argentina de Pediatría 
(SAP – Argentinean Society of Paediatricians) and the Argentinean branch of the Red 
Cross (Barral, 2002). 
 
Third, as solidarity served as an anchor for interpreting the neoliberal notion of 
voluntary organisation in terms of “voluntary work” (trabajo voluntario), the 
neoliberal focus on the role of individual will (voluntad individual) in creating 
organisations independently from the state was de-emphasised. This enabled 
communitarian views of society and the objective of constructing political identities, 
both central to populism, to permeate the focus on unpaid work and turn it into 
“solidarity work” (trabajo solidario). Although the importance of solidarity in the 
Plan Social 1995 decreased when the Plan was implemented, solidarity was still 
expected to motivate organisations to engage in unpaid activities; it was about doing it 
for the community rather than for individual gains. Similarly, unpaid work 
perpetuated organisations’ reliance on state funds, which appeared compatible with 
the populist logic of the constitution of political identities. Providing numerous 
project-based subsidies to a significantly stable group of intermediary NGOs 
contributed to their constitution as such, and NGOs started to develop a political 
identity despite their participation being limited to contribute to make sub-projects 
efficient. Although with the exception of PROAME (PROAME, 2000; PROAME, 
2000b) interviewees refused to show lists of the organisations to which the funds were 
transferred, several organisations were repeatedly mentioned. These included, for 
example, Servicio Habitacional y de Acción Social (SEHAS – Housing and Social 
Action Service) of Córdoba Province (PFSC, PAGV, PROMEBA) and Casa de la 
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Mujer (Woman’s House) of Misiones Province (FOPAR, PAGV, PFSC). Therefore, a 
significantly stable group of organisations emerged and became strong supporters of 
the neopopulist approach to poverty reduction. Their influence started to be seen 
during the Ortega years, when they joined the internal SDS staff in supporting the 
outgoing Secretary’s methods and priorities. The role of policy makers was crucial in 
the formation of this stable group, since they selected the NGOs when a programme 
arrived in a new province – to a great extent in accordance with the experience of 
other programmes there (Orlowsky, 2002). 
 
Finally, the difficulty in strengthening civil society via involving social organisations 
in policy implementation was not only the consequence of focusing on the neoliberal 
priority of saving state resources or limiting participation to sub-project level. It also 
reflected the resilience of populism – its focus on constructing political support and 
the government’s prioritisation of constructing direct links with the people in an 
attempt to regain support from the popular sectors, which led to a focus on 
infrastructure rather than on community development objectives. The MDBs’ focus 
on the execution of funds as a project evaluation criteria facilitated this (Barral, 2002; 
Mori, 2003). For instance, while PROMEBA documents stated that the programme 
was not one of infrastructure construction with a community development component 
but the other way around, the coordinator said that community participation was 
“window dressing” (Tau, 2002). Similarly, in PROMIN’s most participatory 
component – child development – participation was hindered by the programme 
coordinator’s focus on fund execution and infrastructure (Barral, 2002), and FOPAR 
increasingly focused on inaugurating infrastructure and buildings (Etchegaray, 2002). 
 
 
b. New features: more populism and an increased neoliberal accent on technical 
matters 
 
From 1997 onwards, populism progressed within the discourse by resignifying the 
new features that were emerging in programme content and implementation because 
of the changes in the approach to poverty. These new features were municipalisation, 
employment strategies, the importance of leaders, and the concept of social capital. 
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All of them were only loosely articulated within the neoliberal project and thus 
emerged as floating signifiers available for other discursive articulations. 
 
The inclusion of municipalities attempted to complement the neoliberal institutional 
reform of the post-Washington consensus years. Yet, in practice, it challenged the 
neoliberal aim of drawing a clear divide between the private and public spheres that 
had led to the exclusion of political organisations. While in the first years of the 
implementation of the Plan Social 1995 provincial and municipal levels were 
bypassed, from 1997 onwards the programmes analysed here started to incorporate 
municipalities into their implementation model (table 3). Initially, all the programmes 
avoided including the provincial and local levels of government in their 
implementation. CENOC, PROAME I and PFSC did not sign agreements with the 
provincial or local governments to operate in their jurisdictions. FOPAR signed 
agreements with the provinces where it operated, but only because the WB required it. 
FOPAR’s coordinator explained that "... we wanted the money to reach the people 
directly, we didn’t want local governments to get involved… it didn’t even go through 
the provincial government..." (Etchegaray, 2002). An exception was PROMEBA, in 
which the provinces and the national government applied for the IBD loan jointly 
(Tau, 2002). However, starting in 1997, all the programmes included municipalities in 
their implementation. PFSC started with the “mesas de gestión asociada” (associated 
management committees), and PROAME II included a component of project funding 
for social organisations and another budget line for strengthening provincial and 
municipal child and adolescent services (IDB, 1998: 2). At the end of the decade, 
FOPAR and PAGV transferred money to both social organisations and municipalities 
to execute projects (Calamante, 2002; Díaz Muñoz, 2002). While between 1995 and 
1997 municipalities could select projects and organisations for programmes approval, 
from 1997 they were also entitled to administer programme funds, which only NGOs 
had done up to then, and to present projects and implement them, which only 
community organisations had done before 1997. 
 
Including municipalities was in accordance with the post-Washington consensus focus 
on institutional reform and was aimed to improve decentralisation processes. In 
Argentina, however, strengthening links with local leaders and mayors was guided by 
the aim of building political support for the President by eroding Duhalde’s power. It 
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entailed bypassing the party structure, because local mayors and party leaders were 
mainly Duhaldists (La Nación, 2-04-1998), and bypassing provincial governors, 
whose power had increased, particularly because their provinces’ participation in 
national revenues had grown since Menem did not reformulate the 1992 and 1993 
Fiscal Pacts (Eaton and Dickovick, 2004: 109, 110). 
 
Tackling unemployment became a central objective of involving social organisations 
in poverty reduction programmes, leading to the use of funds earmarked for social 
organisations as a form of wage, which in turn, eroded the previous emphasis on 
unpaid work. Therefore, the departure of the discourse on civil society from the 
neoliberal reluctance to intervene in the economy implied in the incorporation of 
employment strategies, was evident in changes in the programmes’ work with civil 
society organisations. Although FOPAR’s Project Appraisal Document (PAD)144 
established that “employment generation is not part of the objectives of [FOPAR II]” 
(World Bank, 1998c), some paid work was included in the projects it funded and it 
was framed in the work of the programme with civil society. 
 
“We managed to include a covert form of … unemployment insurance, even 
though the Banks were not totally in agreement… in a fund in the South [of 
Argentina] in the building sites they were paid... Also we paid wages to many of 
the [voluntary] groups…” (Etchegaray, 2002). 
 
In IDB programmes, state actors could introduce strategies for coping with 
unemployment in the implementation stage sooner and more openly. In PROAME I, 
wages could be paid with funds transferred for projects under the programme’s 
objective of strengthening social organisations (IDB, 1995: 3-5), and in PROMEBA 
the funds sent to private companies that managed the construction were also used for 
wages. The IDB refused to include a requirement in PROMEBA for companies to 
employ people from the community in order to deal with unemployment issues in the 
targeted community, but in the field the programme negotiated separately with the 
companies to persuade them to contract local staff (Pisoni, 2002b; Pucci, 2002). 
National programmes continued to stress voluntary work, but transfers for NGO 
training courses were used to pay tutors’ wages, in CENOC, and PFSC developed a 
                                                 
144
 PADs are WB documents describing the project loans they approve for programme funding. 
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scholarship system to compensate for the productive hours attendees spent at the 
training sessions (Candiano, 2002). 
 
During programme implementation, leaders became increasingly more important than 
NGOs. While this somewhat resembled the early neoliberal focus on individuals 
rather than on social organisation, it actually revived key distinctive features of the 
populist discourse, the importance of strong leadership and a conception of an 
intertwined relationship between state and civil society. The “Animadores 
Comunitarios” (Community Organisers) component of the PFSC focused on 
strengthening social leaders right from the start of the programme, and the IDB-
funded PROMEBA also included local leaders as a target group in its "social 
intervention action" component (IDB, 1996c: 2). The centrality of leaders also grew in 
programmes in which, on paper, individual leaders were not central. Most programme 
staff acknowledged that although they encountered many difficulties in generating 
social organisation, after some years the programmes had become very successful in 
training social leaders and strengthening the ability and resources of these individuals. 
In FOPAR, for instance, “the role of the NGO was watered down... in most cases they 
ended up being individual technicians” (Flood, 2002). PROAME evaluation 
documents highlighted the centrality of leaders and suggested that this was linked to 
the importance given to strong leadership by the organisations’ members and the 
community (PROAME, 2000: 22; PROAME, 2000b: 12, 21, 26). While the selection 
of leaders was based on their technical skills and their educational background or 
training, the importance they acquired in programme implementation reaffirmed the 
importance of strong leadership in civil society, key in the populist discourse. 
Furthermore, in many cases, especially with community organisations, the social 
leaders were local political leaders known as “punteros”, ie local political brokers 
who exchanged “favours” for the population for “votes” for a given political force 
(Auyero, 2001; 105, 106). For instance, in PROME these leaders usually occupied the 
role of technical supervisor and their connections with the political sphere was a 
valued capacity. As a PROAME coordinator explained, “... if an NGO community 
kitchen doesn’t help pupils with their schoolwork, the government can provide that 
help and the intermediary who connects them is the technical supervisor” (Morales, 
2002). Praising these leaders’ ability to negotiate things for the community, another 
PROAME member remarked that “… it is good that they have additional resources. 
 181 
The programme itself provides training in the generation of resources for 
sustainability, in a way that is an established technical capacity [for community 
organisations] (Richards, 2002). 
 
The notion of social capital started to emerge in some programme documents. While 
this suggested a realignment of the discourse with the neoliberal discourse of the post-
Washington consensus, the introduction of the notion of social capital was not 
reflected in concrete policy changes at the time. Therefore, the notion was not 
significantly redefined to make it attune to populism but, nevertheless, in the few 
documents where it was incorporated, the notion was de-linked from neoliberalism. In 
line with the MDBs, a PROAME evaluation document stated that “... the generation of 
social capital and institutional capacity will result in efficient management and in a 
greater chance of the processes implemented being sustainable” (PROAME, 2000: 
39). Yet, the Fondo de Capital Social (FONCAP – Social Capital Fund), for example, 
took social capital to mean “social microenterprise”. Also, a 1998 document reflected 
an attempt to reorganise the work of the SDS and create a social capital area that 
grouped together the programmes with civil society involvement. Although this 
reorganisation was never implemented, the document tried to adapt the MDBs’ 
definition of social capital to the neopopulist approach to poverty. By associating 
social capital with the notion of human capital and linking the latter with solidarity 
and self-esteem, the document argued that the  
 
“attributes of human capital, as manifest in identity, self-esteem and solidarity, 
and the ability to commit and participate, produce a combination of 
relationships, interconnections and synergies that enables a higher level of 
social productivity than human beings could produce on their own” (SDS, 
1998).  
 
The resignifications of the notion were possible because social capital was still under 
considerable debate in the MDBs. The introduction of the notion of social capital did 
not lead to effective programme changes, principally because when the notion started 
to be debated in the SDS Ortega was appointed Secretary and under his direction the 
SDS did not prioritise work with social organisations (Candiano, 2002). 
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Despite the advances of populism from 1997 onwards, neoliberalism retained 
hegemony by stressing technical and methodological issues. Neoliberalism had taken 
root in the SDS in the first two years of the implementation of the Plan Social and 
thus the advances of populism were framed within neoliberal methodologies and 
technical language, which were expected to keep populism at bay. Therefore, while 
the discourse was becoming more populist, neoliberalism remained hegemonic and 
the non-conflictive co-existence of the two projects was maintained. Nevertheless, the 
neoliberal hegemony was weakened as the normative and contingent levels of the 
discourse were colonised by populism. 
 
As neoliberalism took root in the SDS in its first years of operation, policy makers 
identified themselves as technically minded functionaries and defended the 
neopopulist approach to poverty and its focus on efficiency and methods. Policy 
makers and implementers believed that the programme’s delivery model, evaluation 
methodologies and good administration were going to keep at bay attempts to 
construct direct links between political leaders and the people. In turn, this focus on 
methodologies and techniques reflected the neoliberal discourse, not only because 
they embodied the logic of difference but because they were tied to the MDB loans 
designed on the basis of the Banks’ neoliberal views. The continuation of these loans 
after populism started to advance in the government and the SDS, was crucial in 
helping state actors to stress the importance of methodological and technical 
requirements. If put under political pressure to use programme funds to construct 
political support, state actors fell back on the argument that as a programme funded by 
the MDBs they had to comply with all those technical requirements (Díaz Muñoz, 
2002). Faced with pressures to include politically oriented organisations or individual 
leaders, some state actors acknowledged that “… some mechanisms could help to 
generate more transparency … but techniques did not necessarily break with cultural 
habits” (Díaz Muñoz, 2002). However, many were confident that “[i]f there was a 
political decision, an arbitrary decision, it didn’t matter; what mattered was that the 
requirements were met” (Etchegaray, 2002) and others explained "we accepted the 
‘punteros’ or ‘recommended’ groups, but we incorporated them into the programme, 
we incorporated them into our methodology” (Denis, 2002). 
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As such, the advances of populism were framed within the priority of obtaining an 
efficient implementation of policies via the use of techniques and methods associated 
with the neoliberal discourse. State actors, attached to the neopopulist approach to 
poverty and its focus on efficiency and methods as well as the continuation of MDB 
programmes, were behind the framing of populist advances. Thus, while the transfer 
of funds from national government to the municipalities had political aims, in most 
cases municipalities were incorporated into programmes designed within the 
framework of the neoliberal-dominated approach to poverty and its emphasis on 
methodologies and techniques. Similarly, the attempt to introduce the notion of social 
capital was an attempt to redirect the state’s work with social organisations in poverty 
reduction action into the new developments in the MDBs’ neoliberal discourse, in 
which social capital was tied to objectives of efficiency. In the case of employment 
strategies, these were channelled through the same model of policy delivery which, in 
order to reduce state expenditure and involvement in the social sphere, suggested 
transfering programme funds to social organisations for them to administer them. 
 
 
6. 4. Analytical summary and conclusions 
 
This chapter has shown how the discourse on civil society in poverty reduction 
policies became a technopopulist version of neopopulism during Menem’s second 
government. It has detailed how populism gained ground and how neoliberalism 
strengthened its focus on technical matters and thus could remain hegemony. Table 4 
shows the map of events and actors involved in the formation of the technopopulist 
discourse. 
 
In this period, the President’s second re-election plans were crucial in defining the 
direction of change in the poverty reduction policy area and its discourse on civil 
society. As the government focused on a second re-election, it gave more spaces to 
populist objectives (b2). The pursuit of a second re-election in the context of 
dislocations (a) comprising increasing unemployment, decreasing political support, 
and a reorganised opposition led the government to opt to reconstruct its links with 
the popular sectors. This option paved the way for institutional changes affecting the 
SDS (c1) and changes in the approach to poverty reduction policy (c2 and c3). The 
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most salient institutional modification was the sidelining of the technical and 
neoliberal sectors of the SDS in favour of sectors sympathetic with addressing social 
demands in accordance to aims of political support construction (c1.1). In line with 
the government, poverty reduction policies emphasised highly visible actions in order 
to regain popular support for Peronism (c2). The resulting programmatic changes (c3)  
 
TABLE 4: Actors and Factors Shaping the Neopopulist Discourse on Civil Society (1995-1999) 
 
Underlying 
Dislocations (a) 
Technopopulist 
- Unemployment 
 
- Reorganised 
opposition 
 
- Debt-based 
growth 
 
   
Approach to 
Poverty  
(c3) 
reflected in 
programmes 
changes 
Discourse 
on Civil 
Society 
  
     
 
 State Actors: (d2) 
- technical profile 
- path-shaping effect 
Government’s  
neoliberal veneer 
(b1) 
   SDS  
Approach changes (c2) 
Focus on technical aspects of 
neopopulist approaches and 
discourse 
  
MDBs: (e2) 
neoliberal accent on 
techniques and efficiency 
 
 
 
 
 SDS 
institutional 
changes: (c1) 
 
    
Government’s 
growing populism 
(b2): 
 
- second re-
election 
- search for 
reconnection with 
popular sectors 
- bypassing 
institutions 
 
 Relegation of 
neoliberal sectors 
within the 
government (c1.1) 
 
Emergence of 
Cabinet Chief 
coordination 
 
Head of SDS with 
populist objectives 
 Visibility of actions leading to 
direct contact leader/people 
 State Actors: (d1) 
- own experiences of 
participation 
- contact with the field 
 
MDBs: (e1) 
- weak discourse on 
participation 
- differences between 
IDB and WB 
- MDB staff differences 
with MDB policies 
 
 
reflected the emergence of challenges to the three key features of the neopopulist 
approach to poverty outlined in the Plan Social 1995. First, the emergence of 
universalistic approaches challenged the priority of coordinating existing policies and 
the focus on targeting. Second, employment strategies questioned the integral and 
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self-esteem-based view of poverty and the neoliberal reluctance to interfere with 
markets. Third, programmes’ increasing links with municipalities implied a correction 
of the focus of the neoliberal discourse on civil society on technical organisations.  
 
However, mainly to keep the IFIs’ support despite macroeconomic problems, the 
government maintained a neoliberal veneer (b1), which resulted in an increased focus 
on formal and technical aspects of neoliberalism that limited the expansion of 
populism. In the poverty reduction area, while populism was becoming more visible 
in order to establish direct contact between political leaders and the people, technical 
issues stemming from the neopopulist discourse were retained and emphasised. 
 
Within the general direction of change set by the government and the changes in the 
poverty reduction policy area, state actors – policy makers and implementers – and 
MDBs defined the specific features of the technopopulist discourse on civil society. 
They facilitated the expansion of Argentinean populism but, at the same time, were 
key in retaining and emphasising the technical aspects of the neopopulist discourse 
and thus in keeping neoliberalism hegemonic. Programme coordinators and 
implementers deepened populist views (d1) that were part of the neopopulist 
discourse of the Plan Social 1995 by incorporating into their actions their experiences 
of social and political participation, and of the context in which the programmes were 
implemented and in which Argentinean populism was still deeply rooted. The MDBs 
allowed the advance of populism (e1) because their focus on efficiency and technical 
matters resulted in them paying lip service to civil society participation, which was 
then left in the hands of state policy makers and implementers – ie programme and 
programme area coordinators. Moreover, the differences between the IDB and WB 
strategies and in the views of MDB staff involved in policy design and 
implementation, as well as the changes in the MDBs’ approaches to poverty reduction 
and civil society from the mid-1990s, facilitated further the expansion of populist 
views.  
 
While the MDBs’ neglect of civil society participation matters sometimes led to 
“dibujar las evaluaciones del programa” (painting a false picture in the evaluations) 
(Anigstein, 2002), it also constituted an opportunity for discursive re-creations during 
implementation if programme coordinators were committed to including civil society 
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organisations. According to the PROMEBA community participation coordinator, “... 
you can change things according to what the fieldworkers see. They analyse what they 
see and then decide how best to work” (Pucci, 2002). The Banks accepted the changes 
suggested by the programmes, not only because of the technical language the policy 
makers used to justify these changes (Etchegaray, 2002; Vinocur, 2002; Barral, 2002) 
but because of the attention paid by the IDB to country-specific demands and the 
emerging WB discourse on ownership. For instance, while the WB made FOPAR sign 
agreements with the provinces, the IDB was more flexible and accepted the domestic 
preference to avoid signing agreements with provincial governors. Yet, framing it in 
the ownership paradigm, the WB, tolerated the introduction of actions to tackle 
unemployment in poverty reduction actions. Another possibility for the introduction 
of populist views lay in the fragmented character of the negotiations with the Banks. 
Interviewees regarded the Banks as “‘schizophrenic’ because those involved in 
project formulation are from the technical area of the Bank, but those who, once the 
loan has been approved, monitor execution, belong to the operations area” (Vinocur, 
2002), and pointed out that during negotiations, while some Bank sectors could block 
domestic proposals, others might help to get them approved. This was the case with 
the inclusion of informal organisations in FOPAR, which the WB legal department 
disliked but which the technical sectors approved of (Etchegaray, 2002). 
 
As the government reduced neoliberalism to a veneer, the predominance of 
neoliberalism was maintained in the discourse on civil society mainly through an 
increased focus on technical issues. State actors became the guardians of the 
neoliberal hegemony (d2), stressing further the Plan Social mission of rationalising 
the poverty reduction policy area and the emphasis on technical issues. This reflected 
policy makers’ and implementers’ own technical backgrounds and was the result of 
the path-shaping effect of the first years of SDS work, which focused on the 
rationalisation of poverty reduction action. The presence of MDB funds (e2) in 
programmes contributed to maintaining the predominance of the neoliberal project 
and limiting the populist colonisation, even after the transition from Amadeo to 
Ortega when civil society involvement in policies became more dependent on 
programme coordinators, and the weight of the neoliberal sectors of the SDS had 
decreased. 
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The discourse on civil society that emerged from these political struggles embedded 
in institutions and in actors’ decisions – which drew on their identities shaped by their 
technical profile, political allegiances and personal experiences – resulted in a 
discourse that first, reflected the consolidation of a neoliberal predominance although 
populism managed to remain within the discourse. Technical organisations were the 
main civil society actors involved in policies, state promotion of social organisation 
was aimed at making them a permanent supplement of the state in policy delivery, and 
solidarity was mainly interpreted as voluntary work (“trabajo solidario”). Populism’s 
resilience was seen in the fact that political organisations were sometimes included in 
programme implementation, social promotion was insufficient to make organisations 
permanent supplements of state policy implementation, instead making them more 
dependent on its funds and guidance, and objectives of political identity construction 
were behind the emphasis on solidarity as “voluntary work”. 
 
Second, Argentinean populism gained ground within the discourse by re-articulating 
the new features that were emerging in the implementation and new design of policies 
as floating signifiers – municipalisation, employment strategies, the importance of 
leaders, and the concept of social capital. However, as neoliberalism had taken root in 
the SDS in the first two years of the implementation of the Plan Social 1995, the 
advances of neoliberalism were framed within a marked stress on neoliberal 
methodologies and technical language, which were expected to keep the advance of 
populism at bay. Therefore, while the discourse was becoming more populist, 
neoliberalism remained hegemonic and the non-conflictive co-existence of the two 
projects was maintained. 
 
Nevertheless, the neoliberal hegemony was weakening. Neoliberalism’s core 
normative elements became less important while the discourse remained strongly 
attached to the logic of institutions and to technical approaches to social demands. 
Instead, the logical component of populism led this project’s expansion within the 
neopopulist discourse, since this expansion was guided by the President’s objective of 
regaining popular support for his second re-election plans, and also paved the way for 
the introduction of normative and contingent components of populism. 
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Chapter 7 
 
Challenging neopopulism (2000-2001) 
 
 
 
This chapter focuses on the Alianza government. It analyses its attempts to challenge 
the neopopulist discourse on civil society in the poverty reduction area, and the 
political struggles that hindered those attempts. In the previous two chapters the focus 
was on deconstructing the discourse to unveil the political struggles beneath, but in 
the Alianza years the discourse could not be fixed and thus this chapter concentrates 
on detailing the views of the different actors, which were the subject of constant 
debate. 
 
The Alianza attempted to challenge the neopopulist discourse by moving the focus 
from technical NGOs to government agencies and other types of social organisations, 
such as cooperatives and universities. They also abandoned the objective of 
supplementing the state with social organisations in programme implementation and 
preferred to strengthen the state to make to the core body delivering policy and to 
include organisations as advisers to the state. They sought to establish state-individual 
citizen relationships and thus shelved the notion of solidarity. They focused on 
criticising the aspects of that notion related to the generation of political identities 
rather than on considering those aspects related to the generation of social synergies 
that could lead to community improvements.  
 
The Alianza failed to articulate a new discourse on civil society. The difficulties in 
generating a new discourse on civil society were a reflection of the government’s 
failure to construct a new hegemonic discourse and to articulate a distinctive approach 
to poverty. State actors in the poverty reduction area were therefore highly 
fragmented. Those state actors seeking to fixate new elements in the discourse on civil 
society were unable to articulate a common discourse and were unable to overcome 
internal opposition of other policy makers and implementers, social organisations 
linked to poverty reduction policies in previous years, and the MDBs, who all joined 
 189 
together to oppose the attempts to change the neopopulist discourse. Crucially, the 
lack of policy execution precluded any implementation of the innovations reflected in 
programmes. 
 
However, the Alianza unintentionally contributed to the re-emergence of the 
Argentinean populist discourse on civil society. Its efforts to change the discourse 
broke the chains of equivalences and differences that kept the neopopulist discourse 
together and paved the way for the deepening of the ongoing colonisation of the 
neoliberal hegemony within that discourse by populism. The alianza contributed to 
this re-emergence not so much by bringing into the state discourse on civil society 
elements of the Argentinean populist discourse on civil society that emerged in the 
1970s and 1980s and elements that the neopopulist discourse had left out – social 
economy and human rights issues – but by failing to address social demands as a 
government. The isolation of the government was key in making civil society show 
the survival of their preferences for non-institutionalised forms of advancing their 
demands, revealing that the core of populism was still there despite the neoliberal 
predominance in the discourse on civil society throughout the1990s. 
 
The first section considers the Alianza’s failure to construct a new hegemonic 
discourse. The second section describes the main debates on approaches to poverty 
that could not be settled and articulated as a discourse during this government. The 
third section focuses on the efforts to redefine the neopopulist discourse on civil 
society in poverty reduction action and how these efforts appeared in the redefinitions 
of programmes. The concluding section summarises the chapter and shows the main 
political struggles that hampered the Alianza’s attempts to redefine the discourse on 
civil society. 
 
  
7.1. The Alianza’s failure to articulate a new hegemony 
 
In October 1999 the Alianza candidates for President and Vice-President, Fernando de 
la Rúa from the UCR, and Carlos Álvarez from FREPASO, won the elections with 
48.5% of the votes. Their campaign was based on the continuation of the key tenets of 
 190 
neoliberalism, but they differentiated themselves from the outgoing government by 
their focus on helping the poorest sectors, fighting corruption and strengthening 
democratic institutions (Novaro, 2002a: 2; 1998: 3; Vilas, 1998: 1). 
 
Once in government, the Alianza failed to articulate a new hegemonic discourse 
(Portantiero, 2002). They tried to revive neoliberalism, which Menem’s second 
government had reduced to a veneer, and rejected populism to frame neoliberalism in 
a more liberal-democratic context. Yet, the Alianza, which was a young coalition 
formed in 1997, bringing together FREPASO, made up of dissident Peronists and left-
wing political forces, and the UCR, which comprised both left-wing, led by Alfonsín, 
and conservative sectors, aligned with De la Rúa, remained in the construction of a 
constitutive outsider without generating chains of equivalence and difference within 
the discourse. They stayed focused on emphasising the difference between themselves 
and the outgoing government by using a rhetoric of institutional strengthening, and 
refused to develop an unmediated relationship between a leader from the coalition and 
the people. 
 
The fact that the Alianza was a newly emerged coalition, which lacked a clear 
leadership capable of dissolving the difference of the parties that constituted it, and 
the President’s rejection of focusing on the construction of political identities, was at 
the core of the Alianza’s failure to internally articulate its discourse. These same 
factors made the Alianza’s adoption of neoliberalism inconsistent, since this 
inconsistencies reflected not only internal dissidence but also a preference for pleasing 
international actors rather than addressing the population’s demands. Also internal 
dissidence combined with institutionalism and avoidance of unmediated relationships 
with the people led to the use of centralised decision-making that ignored established 
institutions in key decisions. This added up to the reluctance to liaise with the 
population and created an increasing distance between the President and social and 
political actors145 that further difficulted the possibilites of the Alianza to address the 
dislocations its discourse had to address. 
 
                                                 
145
 Novaro, 2002: 13 considers the Alianza’s isolation from society and Corrales, 2002a: 30 indicates the key role that the 
President’s isolation from the leading members of the official party – which he calls the state-without-a-party condition – played 
in the Argentinean crisis of 2001. 
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The Alianza adopted neoliberalism in the economic field, but inconsistently. The 
government started aspiring to a model of social capitalism that aimed to combine 
“more market and more state” (Novaro, 2002b: 97). However, the first measures, far 
from leading to “more state”, focused on reducing fiscal deficit, which in 1999 was 
US$7,100m exceeding the US$6,500m limit set in the law of fiscal responsibility.146 
Neoliberalism was also reflected in the deepening of second-generation reforms. For 
instance, in 2000, the Congress approved a labour reform law. But, since reducing 
fiscal deficit curtailed productive investment and consumption, and thus the recession 
that had begun in late 1998 continued (Annex I, figure 13), and the $6,600m fiscal 
deficit of 2000 exceeded the $4,700m147 target set with the IMF (La Nación, 11-01-
2001), the Economy Minister, José Luis Machinea, tried the original “more market 
and more state” solutions. A $7,000m budget was approved for 2001, including funds 
for intervening in the economy with infrastructure plans, more social programmes, 
and the creation of a Ministry of Production to promote employment and reactivate 
the economy (Bonvecchi, 2002: 140-2). However, as fears of devaluation increased 
and the macroeconomy showed no improvement, Ricardo López Murphy replaced 
Machinea in March 2001 and resumed a neoliberal orientation. His adjustment 
measures annoyed the population and most political sectors, and Cavallo soon 
replaced him. The new Minister tried again to expand the role of the state in 
reactivating the economy although it tried to restore fiscal solvency (Bonvecchi, 2002: 
148-9). But he failed to regain the markets’ trust (La Nación, 20-03-2001) and hence 
he refocused on fiscal balance priorities. He launched a debt swap (“megacanje”) to 
defer 2001 debt interest repayments (Broda, 2001; Bonvecchi, 2002: 153) and, in 
July, adopted a “zero deficit” package of adjustment measures (Bonvecchi: 2002: 
156). Nevertheless, the scepticism of financial analysts, the growth of social protest, 
and persistent fears of devaluation led to a dramatic flight of capital amounting to 
US$8,546m between July and August (Bonvecchi, 2002: 157) which made Cavallo 
limited bank withdrawals with a measure known as the “corralito”148. The measure 
triggered protests by savers that joined ongoing protests by other actors excluded from 
the government’s decisions. The protests grew and led to the resignation of De la Rúa, 
the end of the Alianza and the default in December 2001 on a US$155 billion debt 
(Tedesco, 2003: 166). 
                                                 
146
 This law, passed in 1999 under Menem’s presidency, tied fiscal deficit to GDP growth (Bonvecchi, 2002: 140). 
147
 $1=US$1. 
148
 In Spanish corralito means both small animal’s pen and child’s playpen. 
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Despite its campaign promises to strengthen institutions, the Alianza made extended 
use of centralised and extra-institutional means of political decision-making to deal 
with internal political differences and a fragmented but strong opposition. The Senate 
bribery scandal and budget negotiations with the provinces illustrate this. Suspicions 
of bribery in the Senate in order to get the labour law passed triggered confrontations 
between different sectors of the Alianza. The Vice-President felt that his project of 
state and political reform was under threat and decided to investigate the claims 
(Makón, 2002).149 But the President protected his party and gave the suspects of 
corruption his full support by keeping them in the cabinet after a re-shuffle, carried 
out without consulting with the Vice-President or the coalition parties. The Vice-
President resigned and the Alianza began to split (Morales Solá, 2001: 85-8, 148-51; 
Novaro, 2002b: 86-96).150 Regarding the budget negotiations with the provinces, since 
the provinces generated most of the fiscal deficit, the Alianza needed the provinces to 
reduce expenditure to restore fiscal solvency. Yet governors, mostly from the PJ, 
were reluctant to retrench (Ollier, 2003: 197). The government made the provinces 
reduce their share in the co-participation of tax revenues, as required by the IMF for 
the approval of a large loan known as blindaje (financial armour), by negotiations 
centred on the President which included threats of approving the new co-participation 
pact by executive decree. 
 
The Alianza’s by-passing of institutions, however, did not involve a direct contact 
with people to address their demands trying to construct political support. The Alianza 
neglected a key popular demand – to tackle unemployment and reactivate the 
economy. Instead they persistently chose to please creditors and avoid devaluation 
and default (Bonvecchi, 2002: 123). In the first year of this government the 
divergence from neoliberalism received IMF approval. The IMF approved the 
US$39.7m (La Nación, 19-12-2000) blindaje loan, accepting Machinea’s attempt at 
“more market and more state” solutions (Bonvecchi, 2002: 142). Yet, in 2001 the US 
Treasury and the new IMF management were harsher and less tolerant of deviations 
from their recommendations (Corrales, 2002b; 2002a: 36). International creditors 
were especially concerned about the Alianza’s inability to generate broad popular 
                                                 
149
 For other interpretations see Novaro, 2002b: 86-96 
150
 Only after the popular rejection of the government in the October 2001 legislative elections (Escolar et al. 2002: 40) did 
FREPASO legislators separate from the official block of deputies, but they did not officially leave the Alianza. 
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support for its neoliberal reform plans and increasingly believed that a debt default 
was inevitable (La Nación, 26-10-2000). Thus the government chose to avoid default 
rather than to respond to the social conflicts stemming from recession and 
unemployment. While unemployment increased from 14.5% in 1999 to 15.4% in 
2000 and 16.4% in 2001 (Annex I, figure 12) and by 2001 income poverty levels had 
become close to what they were in the years of hyperinflation (Annex I, figure 11), 
the government focused on complying with fiscal balance objectives and tried to 
eliminate state employment subsidies such as Trabajar.  
 
The isolation of the government from the population was growing. The attempt to 
cancel employment subsidies led to popular protests in February 2001, which eroded 
the relationship the Alianza had established with groups such as teachers and the CTA 
during the electoral campaign. In these protests the dissident CGT and other worker 
and social organisations, especially the Corriente Clasista and Combativa (CCC – 
Classist and Combatant Stream) and the Federación Tierra y Vivienda (FTV – Land 
and Housing Federation) gained visibility and popular support. Cavallo’s “zero 
deficit” measures encountered widespread rejection by public workers, pensioners, 
human rights organisations, leftist forces and unions, including those grouped together 
in the CTA and both the dissident and the official CGT. By July 2001 there were 
almost 10,000 protesters at 37 roadblocks across the country (La Nación 1-08-2001). 
After the Alianza´s defeat in the October elections, those affected by the corralito 
joined the protests. 
 
In short, the Alianza was a weak coalition that did not prioritise the construction of 
political identities by processing, either in a mediated or an unmediated way, social 
demands. This further weakened an already weak coalition and jeopardised the 
possibility of the government deciding on measures that were unpopular or differed 
from the IMF and other creditors’ positions such as devaluation, in opposition to both 
external and domestic actors, or adjustment, which negatively affected the population. 
Having to choose between pleasing external or internal actors, the government chose 
to please international lenders, implementing neoliberal measures that distanced them 
further from the population’s demands. Moreover, neoliberal reforms were decided 
using centralised decision-making strategies, which added extra distance between the 
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President, including his closest advisers, and the political forces and society in 
general.  
 
 
7.2. Poverty: unsettled debates 
 
The Alianza aspired to build a welfare state regime (Esping Andersen, 1991 [2004]: 
2), which, like neoliberalism, preferred the logic of difference to address social 
demands. Yet, unlike neoliberalism, it emphasised the centrality of the state over 
individuals and the private sphere. They aimed to develop a form of social capitalism 
around that welfare state regime, based on the idea of the social right to a minimum 
living standard independent of market forces (Esping Andersen, 1990[2004]; 3). 
 
Therefore, the arrival of the Alianza paved the way for the increase of challenges to 
the core pillars of the neopopulist approach to poverty where neoliberalism had 
remained hegemonic in both Menem’s government – the focus on policy coordination 
and targeting using NBI indicators, the integral definition of poverty, and the focus on 
social organisations. The challenges consisted of deepening features that had emerged 
in the neopopulist discourse in the mid 1990s and which had implied a challenge to 
the neoliberal predominance in the approach to poverty, but which neoliberalism had 
domesticated through focusing on technical matters and transforming the discourse 
into a technopopulist version of neopopulism. Hence, with the arrival of the Alianza 
the objective of establishing a universal system of social assistance, addressing 
unemployment by focusing on income poverty and attempting minimum income 
schemes, and the inclusion of different government levels in policies, all gained new 
impetus. 
 
However, the government’s choice of neoliberalism, provincial pressures and the 
increasing social uprisings limited the possibilities of redefining the approach to 
poverty. Every time the government focused on achieving fiscal balance, initiatives to 
improve the coordination of existing policies prevailed over the objective of 
developing a universal minimum income system. The difficult relationship between 
the government and the provinces jeopardised attempts to change the approach to 
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poverty since the national government managed only 30% of social expenditure (La 
Nación, 27-4-2001). Also, dealing with social uprisings required a speed in decision-
making that prevented the emergence of new thinking. One of the Secretaries of the 
period explained that “you weren’t able to respond, you spent all your time dealing 
with conflicts ... the Ministers... spent their days dodging bullets...” (Isuani, 2002) 
 
Additionally, as the Alianza failed to articulate a new hegemonic discourse at the 
broad governmental level, neopopulist and new views in the field of poverty reduction 
remained in a permanent struggle for hegemony. Intra-government and intra-ministry 
divisions impeded the dissolution of differences in state actors’ views on poverty 
reduction and the MDBs played an important role in supporting the actors resisting 
change. Therefore, instead of the emergence of a new approach to poverty, the 
attempts to re-articulate the approach to poverty remained as unsettled debates.  
 
A combination of these factors led to a practical impediment to the implementation of 
the changes introduced to the programmes in an attempt to redefine the approach to 
poverty - the lack of policy execution. 
 
 
a. The debates and their reflection in programmes 
 
The challenges to the neopopulist approach to poverty were underpinned by the 
Alianza’s search for the construction of a form of social capitalism that was 
accompanied by an accent on implementing infrastructure plans to tackle 
employment. While these plans did not prosper, their introduction contributed to 
opening up the possibility of challenging the neopopulist approach to poverty. 
 
The debates that emerged from the attempts to redefine the approach to poverty were 
organised around a central struggle between the prioritisation of policy coordination 
and proposals for a system of universal social assistance, usually concerned with 
setting up minimum income schemes. Those focused on coordination were usually 
reluctant to redefine the neopopulist approach while proposing universal minimum 
income systems went against the neopopulist approach’s focus on targeting and its 
reluctance to interfere in the labour market.  
 196 
 
A second struggle concerned the conflict between the neopopulist view of poverty as 
an integral phenomenon and the reinforcement of the idea that unemployment and 
income poverty were at the core of poverty, from where the proposal of minimum 
income systems derived. The resolution in practice of a third debate related to this 
conflict between integral and income poverty – how to transfer goods or funds to 
tackle unemployment-related problems – showed the resilience of an integral view of 
poverty. While those defending the neopopulist approach continued to prefer the 
transfer of funds through projects managed by social organisations, those more 
attuned to social capitalism held that the state should provide goods and services, such 
as public works or food, whereas money transfers should take the form of universal 
benefits. In practice, cash was transferred through targeted programmes and delivered 
against counter-provisions, which consisted of activities that helped the recipients’ 
integration in their communities. Therefore, targeting continued and traces of the 
integral definition of poverty remained. 
 
Finally, and in relation to the third pillar of the neopopulist approach to poverty, a 
focus on social organisation, the Alianza’s institutionalist stance implied that direct 
state contact with the people – of the type they argued occurred in the model of 
implementation of targeted programmes through social organisations – was 
discouraged. Instead, they sought to establish mediated contact with individual 
citizens via institutionalised systems of benefits. 
 
The main Alianza poverty reduction initiatives and the modifications made to existing 
programmes echoed these debates. They showed that the closest the Alianza came to 
developing a universal minimum income system was the development of programmes 
the benefits of which, while not always cash income, were made available to the 
whole “universe” of targeted populations. Table 5 shows the main debates that 
emerged regarding the redefinition of the approach to poverty during the years of the 
Alianza government and how the position of the poverty reduction programmes of 
those years in those debates.  
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TABLE 5: Main Debates during the Alianza Government on the Approach to Poverty and their 
Reflection in Programmes 
Debates Poverty Reduction  Investment in 
Infrastructure 
Minimum Income System Coordination 
vs 
Redefinition 
 
 
 
 
 
Coordination 
Purists 
 
Plan Terragno 
 
Social Agency 
 
 
 
Solida 
 
Within targets 
(most NBI 
based) 
 
ridad 
 
Jefas de Hogar 
 
Existing 
Programmes 
Seguro 
 
Universal 
minimum 
income 
system 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Infantil (SI) 
 
 
 
 
 
Questioning neoliberalism 
Integral 
Poverty vs 
Income 
Poverty 
 
 
Integral 
  
 
Poverty 
 
Income 
Poverty 
 
Cash vs 
Goods and 
Services 
Cash 
Transfers 
Cash within 
Projects 
Cash 
against 
Counter-
provision 
Cash as 
Universal 
Benefits 
Goods and Services 
State/People 
vs 
State/Citizens 
Direct contact with People or 
Social Organisations 
 Indirect Contact with Individuals 
or Families 
NEOPOPULIST APPROACH SOCIAL CAPITALIST APPROACH 
References: ..... Programmes 
 
The Alianza’s first social plan, Plan Solidaridad (Solidarity Plan), focused on 
coordinating existing poverty reduction policies and, to this purpose, the development 
of a registry of beneficiaries. The nutrition pillar of the plan, the programme Unidos 
(United) was the only pillar actually implemented. It distributed food boxes, cash 
subsidies and payments for programme promoters in the form of contributions to their 
expenses (MDSyM, et al. 2001: 8). While these provisions sought to complement 
labour market and social security system deficiencies (MDSyM, et al. 2000: 10), they 
were not presented as income substitutes and were not the central element of the 
programme according to its first design (MDSyM, et al., 2001: 1). Targeting 
continued and was refined in a form of “targeting within targets”. NBI and income 
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poverty indicators were used to select geographical areas, and, within these areas, the 
programme delivered its provisions to selected families using an income proxy called 
Índice de Calidad de Vida (ICV – Quality of Life Index) (MDSyM, et.al. 2001: 6; 
MDSyM et.al. 2000: 23). 
 
In contrast, the last poverty reduction initiative launched by the Alianza, the Pacto por 
la Niñez (Childhood Pact), which included the Seguro Infantil (SI) programme, aimed 
to plant the seeds of a new social security system. Like Solidaridad, SI included 
money transfers, focused on families and the informally employed sectors, used a 
census to compile a list of beneficiaries, and combined NBI and income poverty 
indicators to select its target groups. Unlike Solidaridad, SI was formulated as a 
minimum income programme to be delivered to all those falling within the target 
groups, and monetary subsidies were central. Moreover, SI was not limited to 
coordinating existing programmes and included new actions that required significant 
investment (Cafiero, 2002). The programme introduced a focus on children and it 
regarded the requirements for accessing the benefit – returning to education, 
participation in community activities, and health checks – not as counter-provisions 
but as beneficiaries’ rights (Seguro de Inclusión Infantil, 2001: 1, 2, 9, 10).  
 
The programme Jefas de Hogar (Female Heads of Household) was another attempt to 
develop a minimum income system. It proposed a system of income support for 
children and female heads of household below the poverty line, and unemployed 
young people (STEyAS, 2001: 31). Similarly to SI, while the programme designer – 
Aldo Isuani – aspired to the universalisation of social security, the programme could 
only provide income to everyone within a target population, and ask for the same 
requirements as SI to access to programme’s benefits. (STEyAS, 2001: 30-1). Yet, 
unlike SI, these counter-provisions were considered obligations rather than rights and 
the focus was on the unemployed rather than on the informally employed sectors 
(STEyAS, 2001: 5). Both Jefas and SI differed with Solidaridad in that cash transfers 
were not provided for a specified use such as purchasing food, nor as compensation 
for voluntary work, but were considered as income support. 
 
Of the programmes launched during Menem’s governments, the IDB-funded ones 
most reflected concerns with minimum income objectives. WB-funded PROMIN and 
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FOPAR retained their NBI targeting criteria. Moreover, PROMIN focused on 
coordination as its integration with the National Directorate of Mother and Child 
Health at the Ministry of Health began, and the coordination of action with other 
national programmes and similar ones at the provincial level was prioritised 
(UCEPMIN, 2000: 27-29). FOPAR continued to see poverty as integral and its 
implementation model remained unchanged (FOPAR, 2000: 3). IDB-funded 
PROMEBA did not challenge the targeted approach to poverty and prioritised 
coordination objectives (Pisoni, 2002b). Yet, IDB-funded PAGV and PROAME were 
redefined as Alianza initiatives. Jefas absorbed the “women” component of the PAGV 
and adopted this programme’s inclusion of unemployment as a targeting criterion 
(chapter 6), but both NBI and poverty line were eliminated from the definition of the 
poor and the programme conceived of the latter in terms of 
employment/unemployment (Isuani, 2002). This reformulation of PAGV aligned the 
IDB in favour of the establishment of an initial form of minimum income system. The 
Alianza also attempted to incorporate PROAME into Solidaridad and, later, to merge 
it with SI, because of PROAME’s focus on children. In both cases the aim was to 
absorbe PROAME’s funds (Richards, 2002; Morales, 2002) and since the programmes 
were not fully implemented, the changes attempted had no significant effects. 
Nationally-funded programmes were radically redefined. The PFSC was cancelled 
CENOC reflected all the changes the Alianza tried to introduce into the discourse on 
civil society. 
 
 
c. Actors’ positions in the debates 
 
i. Intra-government disputes 
 
The main advocate of the infrastructure development approach to poverty reduction 
was the President. As soon as he took office, the government created the Ministry of 
Infrastructure and the President appointed one of his most loyal collaborators, 
Ezequiel Gallo, as its head. After the Senate scandal, he put the area under the 
responsibility of the Ministry of Economy, in order to insert infrastructure planning 
into the key area of economic decision-making. These proposals did not prosper 
however, mainly because of insufficient funds and because the government made the 
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SDS a Ministry (MDSyM, Ministerio de Desarrollo Social y Medioambiente – Social 
Development and Environment Ministry), upgrading the institutional status of the area 
in which the neopopulist approach prevailed. 
 
For as long as the Alianza prioritised neoliberal fiscal balance objectives, coordinating 
existing policies was the focus in poverty reduction policy. Yet, intra-government 
disputes, mirroring intra-Alianza struggles, hindered the full implementation of 
coordination initiatives. The MDSyM, whose first head was FREPASO’s Graciela 
Fernandez Meijide, developed the Plan Solidaridad, the focus of which was the 
coordination of poverty reduction policies that the MDSyM would take responsibility 
for. The Health Minister, Héctor Lombardo, from the UCR and close to De la Rúa, 
remained sceptical about Solidaridad and his support was critical because Solidaridad 
coordination responsibilities included that Ministry’s programme PROMIN. (Rovere, 
2002). Moreover, PROMIN was even expected to become part of Solidaridad and its 
new coordinator, Pablo Vinocur, disagreed with Solidaridad, making that 
incorporation more difficult (Vinocur, 2002). Additionally, soon after the launch of 
Solidaridad, the President commissioned his Cabinet Chief – Rodolfo Terragno, from 
the UCR – to carry out a study that led to the Plan Terragno. Although the plan was 
never implemented its proposals  - reducing programmes, redefining the use of 
national and international funds and genering a single register of beneficiaries - 
implied a lack of support Presidential support for Solidaridad since it covered the 
same coordinating responsibilities Solidaridad covered. 
 
Meijide’s difficulties in implementing Solidaridad also stemmed from the loss of 
support from her own party, FREPASO, which proposed a different plan for 
programme coordination. Meijide established a good relationship with the Economy 
Minister, Machinea, from the UCR, in order to gain political leverage within the 
government, but that cost her the support of her own political party. Álvarez, 
FREPASO’s leader, developed the Agencia Social (Social Agency) (La Nación, 8-03-
2001), which focused on coordinating and monitoring poverty reduction action 
(Makón, 2002) and thus implied his lack of support for Meijide’s Solidaridad. 
Meijide left the government because accusations of corruption and inability to 
implement policy found her without supports in her party or the government after 
Machinea left the Economy Ministry. FREPASO’s Marcos Makón then became head 
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of the MDSyM and the creation of the Social Agency was his main objective (La 
Nación, 9-03-2001). However, FREPASO government members’ resignation in 
opposition to López Murphy’s adjustment measures precipitated the end of this 
force’s leadership over the Agency. The idea of the Agency returned to the agenda 
when FREPASO’s Juan Pablo Cafiero was Minister of Social Development but, since 
his main objective was the minimum income progremma SI, the President’s closest 
circle took the lead in promoting the Agency plans, especially the Labour Minister, 
Patricia Bullrich (Isuani, 2002; Cafiero, 2002). 
 
Minister Cafiero’s SI brought the objective of developing a system of minimum 
income support into the limelight. Yet, the programme’s openly stated aim of 
generating an income redistribution system defied the government’s neoliberalism –its 
rejection of intervention in the functioning of the economy and its focus on state 
retrenchment. “A starting point here is the understanding of social policy as a strategy 
for transferring resources to families … creating a scheme for wealth redistribution in 
favour of the most neglected sectors” (Seguro de Inclusión Infantil, 2001). When 
Cavallo announced his “zero deficit” measures the clash became more visible. 
Cafiero’s confrontation with the government also connected with intra- Alianza issues 
– when Cavallo entered the cabinet Álvarez expected to be called back to the 
government, but that did not happen. Cafiero also challenged the government’s lack 
of responses to social protests and travelled without the President’s consent to the 
most conflictive areas.151 Budget cuts planned for 2002, in addition to the 90% cut for 
the MDSyM in the last trimester of 2001, triggered Cafiero’s resignation in October, 
after the Alianza’s defeat in the legislative elections (Cafiero, 2002; La Nación, 12 
and 21-10-2001). A radical replaced him, and coordination objectives using the idea 
of the Agency were once again prioritised. 
 
ii. Intra-ministerial divisions 
 
Inside the MDSyM, divisions based on previous institutional allegiances, as well as on 
partisan and bureaucratic lines, informed the debates about the approach to poverty 
reduction. 
                                                 
151
 Cafiero travelled to Gral. Mosconi and Tartagal to hold talks with the protesters, after two men died in the conflict. (La 
Nación, 23 and 30- 6-2001) 
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The key Secretariats of the MDSyM were distributed among prominent social 
scientists whose views were united, despite their partisan differences, by the fact that 
they had all been members of UNICEF teams in Argentina during Menem’s 
governments, and as such had strongly opposed the 1990s approach to poverty 
(chapter 5). Aldo Isuani (UCR) was Secretary for the Elderly and Social Action for 
the whole of this government, and Eduardo Basualdo (FREPASO), was Secretary of 
Social Policy for the first few months and then Mario Rovere (FREPASO) and later 
Pablo Vinocur (FREPASO) replaced him. Only Rovere had no links to UNICEF, but 
he had been on the staff of UN PAHO (Pan American Health Organisation). Gerardo 
Morales from the UCR, was Secretary for Social Development and was the only non-
UN related Secretary. Once in government, these functionaries’ UNICEF allegiance 
became apparent as the ultimate aim of their policies was to “…stop the 
intergenerational reproduction of poverty ... ‘we have to save the kids’” (Rovere, 
2002). Jefas and SI target groups echoed this view. Isuani explained that Jefas was a 
programme that focused, “among the unemployed, ... [on] the most vulnerable...[:] 
heads of households with children, especially women” (Isuani, 2002). 
 
This UNICEF-related group excluded those who did not share their views, including 
Minister Meijide. As a result, in addition to the inter-ministerial disputes, Solidaridad 
was rejected by UNICEF-related sectors within the MDSyM (Rovere, 2002). As 
Secretary of Social Policy, Vinocur criticised Solidaridad because “it was all about 
funds for social promoters rather than subsidies for the families.” (Vinocur, 2002) and 
because he favoured universalisation within target populations rather than 
Solidaridad’s “targeting within targets”. He explained that “in the field, it was very 
difficult to explain why one family was receiving the subsidy and another wasn’t” 
(Vinocur, 2002). 
 
While lack of funds impeded the full implementation of universal minimum income 
systems, intra-Alianza disputes within the Ministry hindered the implementation of 
even small minimum income system initiatives and of programmes in general. 
Critically, areas in the hands of one Alianza party did not release funds for policies in 
areas that were in the hands of the other. “There was a mosaic of political interests, it 
was just like the Montagues and the Capulets” (Siede, 2002) and “… anything of a 
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different political colour was shelved” (Richards, 2002). Isuani’s Jefas programme 
was particularly affected by partisan divisions. Although he advocated minimum 
income policies and was linked to UNICEF, he was from the UCR. He was excluded 
from the design of programmes with minimum income components, such as Unidos 
and SI. Hence, he designed his own programme, Jefas, but never obtained support 
within the Ministry, except for the brief periods when the UCR controlled the 
Ministry. Isuani explained that Jefas was implemented in only one province because 
of disagreements with Minister Meijide but when she left and Lombardo, Health 
Minister from UCR, and again when Bullrich, Labour Minister and close to De la 
Rúa, took control of the MDSyM the programme had more opportunities to expand 
(Isuani, 2002). 
 
Programme coordinators and programme area coordinators within the MDSyM were a 
source of multiple forms of resistance to change. First, there was resistance to 
coordination initiatives since they could lead to redundancies and budget 
reallocations. Solidaridad and SI, which intended to merge and redirect funds of 
existing programmes, were particularly resisted. SI, in turn, was resisted by 
Solidaridad staff, because SI absorbed Solidaridad funds (Pucciarelli, 2002; Cafiero, 
2002). Second, the state actors that resisted the advances of populism through an 
emphasis on techniques and methodologies in the technopopulist years remained in 
the MDSyM and continued to advocate the neopopulist approach. UNICEF-related 
staff, known for  having long criticised that approach to poverty reduction, had 
difficulties in reaching agreements with those state actors. A good example of this 
difficult co-existence was in the attempts to transform PAGV into Jefas. The first 
PAGV coordinator criticised Isuani’s attempts to reformulate the programme, saying 
that [Isuani’s] ideas were “far from [PAGV] and… the programme was on stand-by 
for four months without funds” (Díaz Muñoz, 2002). 
 
iii. The MDBs 
 
The MDBs and the MDSyM did not establish a good relationship. While in the 1990s 
the Banks were open to accepting domestic policy makers’ proposals if they were 
technically sound, the space for negotiation was limited for the Alianza. This reflected 
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the IFIs’ doubts about the Alianza’s political authority and the general re-orientation 
of the IMF, and specific conflicts between the MDBs and the Ministry. 
 
The MDBs grew increasingly dissatisfied with the MDSyM’s low level of execution 
of loans. Intra-ministerial partisan divisions that impeded the release of funds from 
one area to another and the government’s attempts to comply with the IMF fiscal 
balance targets, wich led to the suspension of the national counterpart funds that the 
MDB loans required to be released, hindered the implementation of MDB 
programmes. Further damaging the relationship, in order to reorganise public 
accounts the government decided to stop borrowing from the MDBs (Makón, 2002). 
Since the MDSyM was established, Meijide, and her Secretaries had rejected 
everything coming from the WB because “they regarded it as synonymous with 
Menem” (Siede, 2002). Nevertheless, MDB programmes approved earlier in the 
1990s stayed and, as one head of the UFI during the Alianza government explained, 
they were needed not only because of their budgetary importance but also because of 
the technical abilities of the personnel tied to them (Siede, 2002).  
 
The MDBs took a stance in the struggles over the redefinition of the approach to 
poverty. Both MDBs favoured a focus on coordination and the continuation of 
targeting. The IDB was more open to the Alianza’s minimum income initiatives. State 
actors involved in the negotiations with the MDBs in these years highlighted the IDB 
interest in “getting involved, collaborating in the redefinition of programmes” 
(Rovere, 2002). The WB, in contrast, insisted on the need to focus on coordination 
and saving state resources. Significantly, while the WB Country Assistance Strategy 
(CAS) for 2001-2004 for Argentina allocated an extra $500 million to the 
“consolidation and simplification of social programmes” (World Bank, 2000f: vi), the 
only minimum income system model it supported was the expansion of existing 
family benefits (asignaciones familiares), which entailed only a redistribution of 
funds already allocated for social benefits. 
 
As a corollary of this relationship, in the last months of 2001 the WB announced its 
withdrawal from the country because GDP per capita was higher than its selection 
criteria (La Nación, 11-8-2001). It also implicitly supported the sectors of the 
Ministry that were in favour of the continuation of the neopopulist approach to 
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poverty reduction and, especially the WB, the social organisations that had been 
involved in programme implementation during the hegemony of the neopopulist 
approach, which is dealt with in more detail in the next section. 
 
 
7. 3. Challenging the neopopulist discourse on civil society 
 
The Alianza tried to redefine the third pillar of the neopopulist approach to poverty – 
the focus on social organisation – and thus tried to redefine the discourse on civil 
society in poverty reduction policy. These attempts encountered resistance from the 
Ministry’s staff, the social organisations that had benefited from the policies of the 
1990s, and the MDBs, particularly the WB, which continued to support the 
neopopulist discourse. Both the attempts to redefine the discourse and the resistance 
of the neopopulist discourse were reflected in the programmes for poverty reduction 
implemented by the Alianza. 
 
 
a. The changes attempted 
 
The Alianza tried to build a discourse on civil society based on the rejection of the 
discourse that was hegemonic in the 1990s – neopopulism, including its 
technopopulist version. The Alianza stressed that during the 1990s this discourse was 
based on a project of state reduction and had led to the artificial creation of 
organisations supportive of Menem. The CENOC coordinator during the Alianza 
government explained that while the 1990s discourse “…emphasised social 
organisations over a failed welfare state... [w]e thought that the state had a very strong 
regulatory role...” (Nosiglia, 2002). The Jefas coordinator held that in the 1990s social 
policy delivery was aimed at constructing political loyalties: 
 
“It was all mediated…by the need to…have face-to-face contact with the 
beneficiaries…it was useful from the political point of view, to give something 
to someone and try to gain their political support through that…We saw a 
world of created NGOs, ‘rubber stamps’” (Isuani, 2002). 
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Therefore, “… the Alianza assumed that all organisations were Menemist by default.” 
(Siede, 2002). Moreover, they pointed out that organisations had “... an infrastructure 
developed on the basis of their relationship with the state...” (Rovere, 2002). The 
Alianza focused on ending this dependency and on dismantling the network of 
organisations loyal to Menemism. They sought to do this by: 
 
1. focusing on other types of organisations rather than on NGOs 
 
2. preferring the state to deliver policies without organisations’ intermediation 
 
3. neglecting the notion of solidarity and trying to establishing state- individual 
citizens relations.  
 
 
Moving away from the neopopulist focus on technical organisations, the Alianza 
prioritised the inclusion in poverty reduction policies of church, human rights and 
social economy organisations, and universities, rather than NGOs. While there was a 
rationale behind the focus on these organisations, for instance, “… we thought that the 
social economy was the only way out of aid-dependence” (Rovere, 2002), the Alianza 
also chose these organisations because they had longstanding relationships with them. 
For instance, the first MDSyM Minister, Meijide, had built her political career as a 
human rights activist and CENOC coordinator, Catalina Nosiglia, came from 
academia and promoted the focus on universities. Part of this redefinition of who was 
part of civil society was the incorporation of the Instituto Nacional de Asociativismo y 
Economía Social (INCAES – National Institute of Associationism and Social 
Economy) into the MDSyM (Gamallo, 2002: 83). 
 
At the same time, the Alianza deviated from the neopopulist focus on state promotion 
of social organisation and tried to deliver poverty reduction policies through the state. 
This meant that provincial and municipal bodies were given a greater role in the 
implementation of poverty reduction policy, deepening a feature of the discourse on 
civil society that emerged in the technopopulist years. Therefore, efforts to strengthen 
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government agencies were reinforced and in the programmes created by the Alianza – 
Jefas, SI, Unidos – provincial and municipal actors had more responsibilities than 
social organisations. But this move also meant that the model of programme 
implementation typical of the 1990s, in which organisations were intermediaries 
between communities and the national state, was under question and the government 
tried to emphasise social organisations’ role as advisers to the Ministry rather than as 
programme implementers.  
 
The Alianza view of social organisations neglected the concept of solidarity because it 
tried to focus on the development of state-individual citizens relationships but also 
because it sought to disarticulate the identities that had emerged around the policies 
with social organisations involvement which had been based on that notion. This 
reflected in the Alianza attempts to involve new organistions in poverty reduction 
policy and in the attempt to channel the state relationship with these social 
organisation beyind programme implementation. However, the Alianza also sought to 
build political support. As the new organisations included in programmes were 
somehow related to the Alianza, the spaces beyond programmes from where 
organisations related to the state were revitalised but adapted to the Alianza. The 
Advisory Council of social organisations (Consejo Consultivo) that had been in 
operation since the mid-1990s acquired central importance but its members  – 
admittedly made up of people from organisations selected for their “similar” views 
(Peña, 2002) – were replaced by organisations or people who shared views with and 
was linked to the Alianza. 
  
  
b. How the attempts to redefine civil society were reflected in programmes 
 
Although all the MDB programmes continued, they became less prominent in the 
Ministry’s portfolio because they were continued because of a need for funds rather 
than because there was agreement with the programmes’ objectives. Among these 
programmes, the greatest modifications were attempted in the PAGV. The rest of the 
MDB programme reflected attempts to redefine the approach to poverty and the 
discourse on civil society, but the changes were limited and the programmes remained 
fundamentally as they were in the 1990s. However, as they lost political support 
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within the MDSyM, these programmes became more open to incorporating different 
views that could emerge from discursive struggles within the Ministry or in the field 
where they were implemented. Nationally-funded programmes were more deeply 
affected. The PFSC was cancelled and CENOC was the programme that best reflected 
the Alianza’s views on civil society. The programmes created during the Alianza years 
also contained these views, but they were never fully implemented. 
 
Regarding the programmes created in the 1990s, the changes made to PROMIN 
reflected the intentions to redefine who constituted civil society and to strengthen 
state institutions. The types of organisations encouraged to participate continued to be 
grass-roots ones but universities and scientific associations were involved in 
consultations such as the Encuesta Nacional de Nutrición y Salud (ENNyS – National 
Survey on Nutrition and Health)(UCEPMIN, 2001: 24). The main change in PROMIN 
was the attempt to integrate the programme to the Ministry of Health structure, 
meaning that the strengthening of the state was prioritised over attempts to redefine 
social participation in the programme, which remained limited to surveys (Barral, 
2002) and was still an unimportant indicator of programme success (Moreno, et al., 
2000: 12, 26). Because the changes did not produce significant programme 
redefinitions and because the high level of execution of the programme during the 
1990s granted it the status of model programme for the WB, the Bank did not object 
to the changes. The main obstacle was the staff, who resisted the attempts to 
incorporate PROMIN into the Ministry’s structure: “there was an …organisational 
culture that had existed already for ten years…they were poking each other’s eyes out 
before I arrived, and that got worse when I put them all together.” (Vinocur, 2002) 
 
FOPAR incorporated social economy organisations and higher education institutions 
into its activities. The inclusion of organisations such as cooperatives and small 
businesses at community level in programme implementation was stated in a FOPAR 
brochure, which said that, together with improving community organisations and 
infrastructure, the programme’s projects had to aim to “improve the productive, 
marketing and management capacity of grass-roots organisations involved in 
economic activities” (FOPAR, 2000: 4). Additionally, FOPAR, together with 
universities and tertiary education institutions, started to provide training and 
internships for students (FOPAR, 2001: 2). Nevertheless, the central role of NuBs in 
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programme implementation remained unchanged. Although the WB did not really 
complain about these reformulations, the FOPAR coordinator in the 1990s resisted the 
changes until she finally resigned. 
 
PROMEBA deepened the late 1990s’ trend of prioritising work with provincial and 
local government professionals and with individual technicians (Pisoni, 2002b), in 
accordance with the Alianza’s preference for strengthening the state rather than 
focusing on the promotion of social organisations. The programme also redefined who 
constituted civil society. It continued to work with community-based organisations 
but tried to avoid working with intermediary and professional NGOs (Pisoni, 2002b). 
Additionally, the programme developed links with several universities: 
 
“…with the General Sarmiento University, the UBA [University of Buenos 
Aires], the Faculty of Architecture. (…) We have done workshops with people 
... [from] industrial design [courses], we have made rubbish bins, bus stops…” 
(Pisoni, 2002) 
 
These changes did not affect the programme’s broad aims and therefore neither state 
actors nor MDBs or social organisations involved in policy implementation 
particularly objected to them. 
 
Jefas absorbed PAGV and the role of social organisations became minimal. Although 
Jefas required participation in social projects as one of the counter-provisions for 
receipt of the benefit, that participation did not have to be framed in social 
organisations (STEyAS, 2000: 41, 42, 43). Universities were included among the civil 
society actors with which Jefas liaised. For instance, “there was a group of university 
volunteers, medical students, doing gynaecology, who saw women with 
gynaecological problems” (Isuani, 2002). Government institutions became more 
important in Jefas. The selection and registration of beneficiaries was in the hands of 
the municipalities, and the public education system played a central role.  
 
“I proposed that it be a tripartite programme, involving the municipalities and 
the provinces. ... the [national] state would give technical assistance and 
provide an income for the women. The provinces provided the adult education 
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system and the municipalities provided the nurseries for the under-fives…” 
(Isuani, 2002) 
 
The 1990s coordinator of PAGV resigned because she disagreed with the new 
proposals (Díaz Muñoz, 2002). The remaining PAGV staff also disagreed and tried to 
resist the changes from within the Ministry, supported by organisations that had 
worked with the programmes in the 1990s (Rovere, 2002). The discontented PAGV 
staff did not find much support in the IDB, despite the fact that the IDB was not 
totally satisfied with Jefas. “[The IDB] wanted the focus to be more on a connection 
with civil society ... [whereas] ‘[t]his [programme, Jefas] entails the state giving out 
cash through salaries’ [the IDB said]…” (Isuani, 2002) 
 
In PROAME, social organisations lost importance as emphasis was placed on the 
institutional strengthening component, which was first implemented in 1999. 
Moreover, when Cafiero became head of the MDSyM, this component focused on 
training provincial and local government staff in children’s rights, rather than on 
managerial issues (PROAME, 2001: 5, 6). PROAME staff from the 1990s who 
remained during the Alianza years disagreed with the new programme direction. They 
considered that the work done up to then to improve the technical skills of provincial 
and municipal government areas working with children was sidelined in favour of the 
construction of political alliances between those levels of government and the national 
government (Richards, 2002). 
 
As for the nationally-funded programmes dealing with social organisations, because 
the PFSC was regarded as the embodiement of the discourse on civil society of the 
1990s and those in control of the MDSyM considered the programme as the core of a 
network of organisations that supported Menemism (Candiano, 2002), the programme 
was cancelled. CENOC changes reflected an emphasis on redefining the programme’s 
conceptual framework rather than on managerial aspects. CENOC kept its database 
and training activities but made changes to their implementation and created new lines 
of action. Universities and government organisations played a larger role in both 
existing and new actions. Organisations’ registration in the CENOC database was no 
longer a requirement for accessing state funds, which reflected a departure from what 
the Alianza regarded as a way of creating corporatist links, but also de-emphasised the 
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focus on the state’s role as promoter of social organisation. Instead, CENOC tried to 
create a network of provincial and local government bodies that promoted social 
organisation at the local level.152 Trainings for social organisations focused on the 
same content as during Menem’s years – for example organisational development, 
fundraising and budget administration – but universities rather than social 
organisations provided them in 2000 and 2001. Universities were central in CENOC’s 
new activities. A competition of new forms of associations funded project proposal 
presented by universities in association with either with civil society organisations or 
municipalities and a new online service for volunteers was directed to the entities 
involved in these competitions. Also a budget line was made available to research 
centres and universities for studies on social organisations. The CENOC coordinator 
argued that working with universities helped to save state resources, but she 
highlighted her own personal connections with academia: “I am a university lecturer 
(…) My background is not only in politics.” (Nosiglia, 2002). The emphasis on 
universities and provincial and local governments reflected a reluctance to establish a 
direct contact between the state and social organisations: 
 
“I worked very little with organisations directly, because that is not the state’s 
role... The role of the state is ... to analyse what strategic questions need to be 
addressed and [for that purpose] sign agreements with universities …  What 
the state has to do is to provide information, links, democratic access to 
information about services ... analyses of civil society...” (Nosiglia, 2002) 
 
 
Plan Solidaridad reflected a redefinition of the focus on social organisations. While, 
as in the neopopulist discourse, Solidaridad documents highlighted the importance of 
social organisation in overcoming exclusion and regarded it as key to guaranteeing 
transparency and sustainability (MDSyM, et al., 2000: 1, 6, 11), families and social 
promoters rather than community or intermediary organisations were the key civil 
society actors in this Plan. These departures from neopopulism, however, built on the 
maintenance of features developed within the technopopulist version of neopopulism 
– the importance of individual leaders over social organisations and the integrated 
work of government and social organisations in the Consejos Sociales Locales (Local 
                                                 
152
 Most of the information on CENOC presented here from interviews with the programme coordinators during the Alianza years 
(Nosiglia, 2002) and during the 1990s (Orlowsky, 2002). 
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Social Councils). These Councils were the institutional space through which social 
organisations could take part in the programme by helping, together with local 
governments, to carry out censuses and programme promotion and supervision, but 
not so much by implementing the programme (MDSyM, et al. 2000: 26-28). Families 
were the unidades receptoras (receiving units) of programme funds and it was held 
that that was where the strengthening of communities should start. The promoters 
were responsible for helping families to reintegrate into their social environment and 
mediated in conflicts. Although promoters could work within the framework of social 
organisations, that was not compulsory  and while social organisations could get 
involved in community projects, in which families were expected to participate as part 
of their reintegration, their involvement was not a requirement (MDSyM, et al., 2000: 
14, 22). 
 
After the pilots had been carried out, complaints emerged about the lack of 
participation by intermediary organisations (MDSyM, 2001a) and within the MDSyM 
the mechanisms for the selection of promoters and the payments they received gave 
those opposed to the Plan more reason to oppose it (Vinocur, 2002). As an advocate 
of the Plan put it: 
 
“The Alianza’s greatest fear was that [Solidaridad] would be managed by 
Peronist punteros, and so the programme was boycotted by the Ministry and 
the government.  But in fact, the programme involved a different way of 
selecting promoters to that used by (…) other programmes.” (Pucciarelli, 2002)  
 
The MDBs agreed with the Solidaridad aim of carrying out a census and of 
coordinating programmes. But they objected to the payments for social promoters and 
to the cash transfers for families, which they viewed as overlapping with employment 
programmes and as an intervention in the functioning of markets. The Alianza sought 
the Banks’ approval of the programme so they could redirect existing loans to cover 
part of its cost. The IDB was more open to the proposal than the WB (Rovere, 2002; 
Pucciarelli, 2002). Nevertheless, for the reasons explained in the second section, the 
Plan was never fully implemented. 
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In SI, as in Solidaridad, social organisations’ role was the same as that of the 
provincial and local governments: to help create a list of beneficiaries and to 
supervise delivery of the programme’s services (Seguro de Inclusión Infantil, 2001: 
11). Yet, the mechanisms by which, and the programme’s aspects in which the 
organisations should get involved, were not specified. The government sought the 
organisations’ advice and support for the launch of the SI but did not propose that 
they get involved in the implementation of the programme (Cafiero, 2002). As for the 
types of organisations that were included in the programme, universities and research 
centres were emphasised in official communications (Seguro de Inclusión Infantil, 
2001: 11). In practice, the organisations that publicly manifested their support for the 
two most important actions of SI - the “Pact for Childhood”  and the approval of the 
law whereby all newborns had the right to a free identity card - were those working on 
children’s and human rights, development organisations specialising in childhood and 
religious organisations. These included, the mothers of Plaza de Mayo and the Centro 
de Estudios Legales y Sociales (CELS – Legal and Social Studies Centre), popular 
soup kitchens (comedores) and members of the Catholic Church and the Jewish 
Mutual. 
 
In addition to the lack of support for SI within the government, the type of 
organisations chosen to give advice and support to the programme did not include 
many organisations that had been involved in poverty reduction policy during the 
1990s, which, therefore, disapproved of the initiative objecting to the programme’s 
lack of a social participation component (Cafiero, 2002). The MDBs’ main objection 
was based on their preference for a model of minimum income support system based 
on the extension of the the asignaciones familiares that were granted to low-income 
earners (Cafiero, 2002). The SI, in contrast, tried to tackle poverty by vindicating a 
right to inclusion and thus sought to guarantee a minimum income for the population 
whether or not they were employed. 
 
 
7.4. Analytical summary and conclusions 
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This chapter has shown how the Alianza tried to challenge the neopopulist discourse 
on civil society in the poverty reduction area. First, they tried to move away from a 
focus on technical intermediary social organisations and to include other types of 
organisations in poverty reduction policy. Second, they rejected the idea of the state as 
promoter of social organisation and instead sought to strengthen the state as the main 
institution for the delivery of policies. In relation to that, the government granted 
provincial and local governments the same roles as social organisations in programme 
implementation, which was preferably as advisers, promoters or supporters rather than 
as implementers. Third, the notion of solidarity was ignored as the Alianza tried to 
focus on the construction of a relationship between the state and individual citizens. 
 
However, the government disarticulated the neopopulist discourse by introducing new 
elements and breaking constituted chains of equivalence and differences, but failed to 
articulate a different discourse on civil society. This failure was directly linked to the 
Alianza’s inability to generate a new hegemony (b) and to articulate a consistent 
approach to poverty (c), which, in turn, were linked to the numerous and deep 
dislocations (a) the government had to deal with but fundamentally originated in their 
failure to rise above internal disputes (d). This combination of failures was behind the 
factors and actors resisting the Alianza’s attempts to articulate a new discourse on 
civil society. Table 6 shows the political factors and the actors resisting change in this 
discourse. 
 
The Alianza encountered several obstacles in redefining the discourse on civil society. 
First, as the approach to poverty reduction (c) remained under debate, it was difficult 
to hegemonise a discourse on civil society within this area. For instance, universal 
systems of minimum income preferred a direct relationship between the state and 
beneficiaries and to reduce interaction between them to the transference of cash. 
Conversely, while the proposal of a Social Agency also focused on making cash 
transfers, most of the implementation of social policies would have been in the hands 
of private and social organisations (Makón, 2002). Second, the government did not 
cancel MDB programmes under implementation and these programmes continued to 
reproduce the neopopulist discourse on civil society (d1). Even if the MDSyM tried to 
introduce significant changes to these programmes through negotiations, the difficult 
relationship between the government and the MDBs (d), especially the WB, hampered  
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TABLE 6: Actors and Factors Limiting Attempts to Change the Neopopulist Discourse on Civil Society 
(2000-2001)  
 
Dislocations (a) 
  
Alianza’s inability to 
rais above internal 
differences (d) 
Challenges  to Neopopulism 
- Provincial 
Pressures 
 
- Social Uprisings 
 
- Macro-economic 
difficulties 
 
 
 
 
Approach to Poverty  
(c) 
-universal coverage vs 
coordination and targeting 
- minimum income 
systems vs integral 
definition of poverty 
- strengthening state 
structures vs focus on 
social organisations 
 Discourse on Civil 
Society 
- new types of 
organisations 
- state delivery of 
policies = more 
government 
involvement, 
organisations in 
advisory roles 
- neglect of solidarity 
 
  Creation of 
Infrastructure Ministry 
  
 
  
Lack of funds for new 
initiatives 
Neoliberalism, but 
inconsistent: 
 
Alternated with a  
Social Capitalist 
political project 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Intra-government 
disputes (g1) 
 
 
 MDBs  difficult 
relationship with the 
government (d) 
 - Low execution of loans 
made them negatively  
predisposed 
 - Toughening of IMF 
position 
 - Doubts about Alianza’s 
political authority 
 
UN-ARTICULATED 
HEGEMONIC 
PROJECT (b) 
 
 across party lines  Continuation of MDB-
funded programmes (d1) 
  
- Increasing direct links 
with social organisations 
(d2) 
 
 Incomplete 
Populism: 
 
Centralised 
decision-making and 
bypassing of 
institutions, but 
intuitionalism rather 
than direct contact 
with people  
 
 SDS upgraded to 
MDSyM 
 
Intra-ministerial 
disputes (g2) 
Across  
- party lines 
- institutional 
allegiances 
(UNICEF) 
- attachment to SDS 
approach  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Programme staff aligned 
with neopopulist approach 
and discourse 
(f) 
 
Social organisations 
linked to programmes in 
the 1990s (e) 
 
 
them. The government tried to escape from the influence of the MDBs’ views by 
refusing to take more loans from them but this only worsened their relationship. 
Third, social organisations involved in policy implementation in the 1990s (f) 
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“…were very angry because [the government was] not supporting them in the way 
they were used to” (Nosiglia, 2002). This was coupled with, fourth, an increasing 
social discontent (a) and the gradual isolation of the government from society (b1 and 
b2) showed in “civil society organisations [that] were starting to have tougher 
demands” (Cafiero, 2002). Fifth, social organisations found support among the 
MDSyM staff who had been part of the SDS and who defended the neopopulist 
discourse on civil society from the Alianza attempts to redefine it and encouraged the 
organisations to demand that programmes continue in their original form (Van Loc, 
2002) (e and f). These state actors remained strong because of the division of the 
MDSyM positions across party and past institutional allegiances lines (g2). Finally, 
these social organisations and staff had the MDBs’ prudent, but crucial, support. 
 
During the 1990s the MDBs had been indirectly linked to civil society organisations 
via the national government programmes, and in the late 1990s they introduced new 
forms of liaising with them that did not involve national governments (d2). The IDB 
was more open to new proposals and and after its representation in the country 
changed, the Bank, in line with the Alianza, became less interested in state-civil 
society collaboration in poverty reduction programmes (Díaz Muñoz, 2002).153 The 
WB, however, shared the international actors’ misgivings about the Alianza’s 
economic plans and governance capabilities explained in section 1. The difficult 
relationship the WB established with the government facilitated the creation of direct 
links between the WB and social organisations that had been key in policy 
implementation in the 1990s in order to counter the Alianza’s attempts to change the 
discourse on civil society.  
 
The development of links between the WB and civil society organisations involved in 
poverty reduction policy implementation in the 1990s concurred with the WB’s 
attempts at that time to establish direct contact with its borrowing countries’ civil 
societies (chapter 4). At that time the WB emphasised the “Small Grants” programme 
in Argentina. It consisted of direct grants from the Bank to social organisations’ 
projects and although the programme was decentralised from Washington to the 
regional office for Chile, Uruguay and Argentina in 1998, it was significantly more 
                                                 
153
 Jorge Elena became the IDB country representative in Argentina in 2000. 
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active in Argentina than in the other two countries. In 1999 and 2000, 90% of the 
projects approved were in Argentina and in 2000 (Larrecochea, 2000: 7). The WB 
Grupo de Trabajo de ONG (GTONG – NGO Working Group)154 (Bosoer, 2002), 
which had been formed after the training courses organised by CENOC in the mid 
1990s and consisted mainly of the stable group of intermediary organisations involved 
in programme delivery during that period, promoted the programme (Martina, 2002; 
Orlowski, 2002; Van Loc, 2002). Additionally, when in 2000 the WB organised the 
first participatory debate in Argentina, on the design of the CAS, again GTONG 
members, rather than state institutions, were key. As the former CENOC coordinator 
put it, on the occasion “...Sandra [Cesilini, WB NGO liaison officer for the WB in 
Argentina] called her friends!” (Orlowsky, 2002).  
 
The WB NGO liaison officer in the country held that the participatory CAS was not 
an attempt to defy the government. However, she acknowledged that there were 
differences between the WB and government approaches to working with civil society 
organisations. She criticised the changes that had been made to CENOC and to the 
Advisory Council (Cesilini, 2002). The government interpreted this participatory CAS 
as a direct challenge, because it was not called to help to organise it (Rovere, 2002). 
The size and scope of the meetings – 4,000 participants, including people from a wide 
range of social organisations, bank staff, business sector representatives and actors 
from provincial and local levels of government (Senderowitsch and Cesilini, 2000: 9) 
– was a demonstration of the mobilisation power of the WB and the NGOs supportive 
of the neopopulistr approach to poverty.155 
 
For all these reasons, the Alianza failed to articulate a new discourse on civil society 
in poverty reduction policy in which its own particular views could aspire to become 
universalised. However, the challenges to neopopulism weakened neoliberalism’s 
predominance within that discourse, paving the way for the continuation of the 
populist project’s colonisation of that discourse, especially as no alternative discourse 
was being successfully organised. Furthermore, the Alianza administration re-inserted 
                                                 
154
 The GTONG was formed in 1998. 
155
 This was so despite the fact that the NGOs were later unhappy with the version finally approved by the WB Board of 
Directors because it had left out several of the key suggestions from the consultation (Rovere, 2002; Martina, 2002). The results 
of the CAS consultation can be found in Bergel, 2000, which main conclusion was that the population demanded action focused 
on the redistribution of income. The WB ignored this conclusion (Bombarolo, 2002). The version of the CAS submitted to the 
Board of Directors is in World Bank 2000f. 
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in the discourse of civil society aspects that had been excluded from the neopopulist 
and technopopulist discourse by including social economy and human rights 
organisations, which had been crucial in the discourse on civil society during the 
hegemony of populism. The neopopulist discourse on civil society had produced an 
interest in social organisation but that interest, combined with the tradition of 
contentious forms of participation in the country, the difficult economic situation, and 
the increasing separation of the government from the population’s demands, 
empowered a wide range of actors. In December 2001 civil society felt it was time 
raise their voices and different forms of civil society organisations flourished, from 
savers’ interest groups to increasingly ideological unemployed “piqueteros” (Iñigo 
Carrera and Cotarelo, 2003) as well as organisations demanding institutional reform 
and practising forms of direct democracy in neighbourhood assemblies (Dinerstein 
2003), together with workers who took over factories (Saavedra, 2005: 177-180).  
 
The contention that the conclusion of the thesis further explores is that these civil 
society demonstrations showed not only that populism managed to survive and to 
gradually colonise the neoliberal hegemony over the neopopulist discourse on civil 
society. It also suggested that when that discourse was challenged and no alternative 
discourse emerged, civil society fell back on its characteristics that had been shaped 
under the hegemony of populism. However, this return showed the resilience not so 
much of Argentinean populism, but of populism as the political alternative par 
excellence to articulate the demands of those oppressed by the established system. 
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Chapter 8 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
The thesis has examined how the longstanding battle between liberalism and populism 
in Argentina manifested in the 1990s’ struggles between neoliberalism and 
Argentinean populism to hegemonise the discourse on civil society in national poverty 
reduction policy. 
 
The thesis has shown that the discourse on civil society in the poverty reduction 
policy area in the Argentina of the 1990s was neopopulist, understood here as the 
articulation of neoliberal and Argentinean populist discourses on civil society. The 
neopopulist discourse, however, was not fixed throughout the decade. It emerged 
between 1990 and 1994 and became hegemonic in the poverty reduction area. In this 
first period, neoliberalism and populism co-existed in a non-conflictive manner within 
the discourse. Between 1995 and 1999 the discourse turned into what this thesis 
characterises as technopopulism, when neoliberalism became hegemonic within the 
discourse but populism increasingly gained importance and made neoliberalism 
retreat to technical and methodological issues in order to retain hegemony. At the end 
of the decade, the Alianza government (2000-2001) challenged the neopopulist 
discourse as a whole by disarticulating the meanings that kept the discourse together. 
However, the Alianza was unable to re-articulate a new discourse and thus paved the 
way for the continuation of an ongoing process of expansion of populism, which was 
further driven by the lack of response from the Alianza to the population’s demands.  
 
Therefore, while neoliberalism predominated within the neopopulist discourse during 
the decade, the mutations of this discourse reflected how it was being gradually 
colonised by populism and how neoliberalism attempted to retain its predominance. 
When the neopopulist discourse as a whole was challenged, and the internal relations 
of equivalence and difference that gave shape to the discourse were disarticulated, 
populism found further opportunities to continue its expansion. 
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This conclusion summarises, in the first section, the main characteristics that the 
neopopulist discourse acquired during the 1990s and specifies how they exposed the 
hegemonic struggle between neoliberalism and populism. The second section 
highlights the main political struggles underpinning the articulation and re-
articulations of this discourse. The third section looks at the contributions of this 
thesis to the study of political phenomena as well as to addressing global governance 
and policy-making issues. The final section discusses the survival of Argentinean 
populism after a decade of neoliberal hegemony and explores the possibility that 
populism could lead to the realisation of an emancipatory political project. 
 
 
8.1. The Neopopulist Discourse in the 1990s 
 
The analyses of the characteristics of the discourse on civil society presented in this 
thesis were based on a comparison of the features that the discourse acquired at 
different points during the 1990s, with both the characteristics of the neoliberal 
political project and discourse on civil society, as articulated by the MDBs, and with 
the characteristics of the Argentinean populist political project and its discourse on 
civil society, as articulated first by Peronism and re-articulated up until the 1980s in 
different historical circumstances. The characteristics of these discourses on civil 
society were significantly opposed at the beginning of the 1990s, as summarised in 
table 7. 
 
However, as chapter 2 explained, the antagonism between neoliberalism and 
Argentinean populism is intrinsic, in that they were constructed as antagonistic 
political projects throughout the history of the country and their normative 
components and predominant logics of discursive construction are opposed. But they 
are not incompatible. Neoliberalism, despite its claims of apoliticism, is after all a 
political project and, although its recommendations are presented as the derivation of 
objective analysis of a knowable reality, as a political project it seeks to universalise 
its views. For that purpose it needs to resort, at least to some degree, to the logic of 
equivalence to dissolve existing political identities and construct political identities 
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TABLE 7: Comparing the Neoliberal and Argentinean Populist Discourses on Civil Society in Poverty 
Reduction Policy 
 
Political Projects’ Components CONTINGENT 
 Neoliberalism Argentinean populism 
 
NORMATIVE 
Public/Private 
Sphere Relation 
Search for organisations to 
permanently supplement the 
state 
 
State supplementation seen as 
provisional 
  Location of organisations in 
the private realm, next to the 
market and separated from 
the state 
Strong links with state – funding 
and guidance accepted and 
sought 
 Individuals vs 
Community 
View of organisations as 
emerging voluntarily 
following individual free will 
and interests  
Organisations’ formation affected 
by political preferences or 
broader worldviews 
  Presupposition that internal 
democratic mechanisms 
would prevail, preserving 
individual members’ 
freedom, but more 
importance given to the 
voluntary character of 
organisations in terms of 
their non-profit character 
Despite increasing endorsement 
of democracy organisations, 
preference for participatory 
mechanisms and non-
hierarchical forms of organisation 
to preserve direct contact 
between members and leader, 
who, nevertheless, is usually 
relatively autonomous from the 
bases 
  Participation is tied to 
particular poverty reduction 
sub-projects 
Participation in social 
organisation involves 
participation in the political 
sphere – including both political 
forces and the state 
LOGICAL  Centrality of technical 
organisations 
 
Despite technification processes, 
political views (and Catholicism) 
are central in defining 
organisations’ orientation 
  Organisations should 
address social demands 
through standardised 
technical methods 
Organisations can address social 
demands in accordance with the 
organisation’s political position, in 
a discretionary way and without 
following established 
institutionalised patterns 
  EFFICIENCY justifications 
are presented as 
underpinning all of these 
features, masking their 
normative content 
CONSTITUTION of POLITICAL 
IDENTITIES is the objective that 
cross-cuts all of these features 
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that relate to the neoliberal project. Populism, for which use of the logic of 
equivalence is so characteristic that it acquires a quasi-normative status, together with 
the vindication of the sovereignty of the people and the rejection of established 
institutions, finds an interstice through which to permeate neoliberalism. In turn, 
populism, due to its anti-institutionalist nature, is highly flexible in adapting to the 
concrete circumstances in which it exists, and therefore can adopt a variety of 
contingent elements and institutional forms. 
 
In exploring how the elements of the neoliberal and Argentinean populist discourses 
were reflected in the articulation of the discourse on civil society, it could be seen that 
the two discourses were mixed together in a neopopulist discourse, which was 
hegemonic throughout the 1990s, but within which the state of the discursive struggle 
between neoliberalism and populism varied. First, when neopopulism took shape 
(1990-1994), as reflected in the Plan Social 1995, the discourses co-existed in 
harmony. Neoliberalism set the boundaries of the discourse, but populism figured 
more in the discourse on civil society than in the approach to poverty into which it 
was inserted. Second, when the neopopulist discourse outlined in the Plan Social 
1995 was put into practice in concrete poverty reduction policies (1995-1999), 
neoliberalism consolidated its hegemony within the neopopulist discourse but was 
soon challenged by the advances of populism and thus forced to retreat to an emphasis 
on formal and technical issues that reflected the neoliberal discourse. Thus, a 
technopopulist discourse on civil society emerged as a version of the neopopulist one 
and neoliberalism could retain hegemony over the discourse on civil society. 
However, that hegemony was weakened because neoliberalism had retreated to formal 
issues and populism thus had the chance to further advance its normative views. 
Finally, the neopopulist discourse was challenged, and with that the neoliberal 
predominance over the discourse was further weakened and populism continued to 
expand. Table 8 compares the main features of the discourse in each of these periods. 
 
In the early 1990s, during Menem’s first presidency (1990-1994), the main pillars of 
the neopopulist discourse on civil society emerged – a focus on social organisation, on 
state promotion of social organisation, and on the notion of solidarity. The approach 
to poverty reduction, into which the discourse on civil society was inserted, had three 
distinctive features: a focus on coordination and targeting, an understanding of 
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TABLE 8: Key Features of the Neopopulist Discourse on Civil Society during the 1990s 
 
1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2001 
Formation of 
Neopopulism 
 
Technopopulism Challenges to 
Neopopulism 
Focus on Social 
Organisation 
 
Focus on Technical 
Organisations  
 
Incorporation of 
Municipalities 
New types of organisations 
incorporated to downplay 
importance of intermediary 
organisations 
State promotion of 
social organisation 
State promotion 
geared towards 
organisations’ 
permanent 
supplementation of 
the state 
State promotion 
generates 
organisations’ 
dependence on the 
state 
State to deliver social 
policies. Focus on 
strengthening of provincial 
and municipal bodies, 
redefinition of the role of 
organisations in policies 
Solidarity Solidarity as 
“voluntary work” 
 
Solidarity as voluntary 
work de-emphasises 
interpretation of 
individual will to form 
organisations 
independently from 
the state (further 
enabling above 
feature) and solidarity 
is stressed as 
motivation to 
undertake “voluntary 
work” 
Solidarity issues neglected 
as the establishment of a 
relationship between state 
and individual citizens is 
sought 
 
 
poverty as an integral phenomenon, and an emphasis on social organisation. Within 
these three features, elements of neoliberalism and Argentinean populism were mixed. 
Coordination and targeting appeared to be in line only with neoliberal aims, yet the 
choice of NBI indicators introduced a key element associated with the period of 
populist hegemony (from 1943 to the late 1980s). Defining poverty as integral called 
for a neoliberal focus on managerial matters such as coordination, but also required 
intervention beyond pure administrative reform. Social organisation was presented as 
being at the service of the neoliberal aim of rationalisation and therefore as limiting 
state intervention in the private sphere. However, this element had more affinity with 
populism, as the characteristics of the discourse on civil society of those years 
indicated. 
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The Plan Social 1995 articulated the neopopulist discourse on civil society around the 
nodal point of social organisation and included two other central features – state 
promotion of social organisation and solidarity. The focus on social organisation 
contributed to the neoliberal focus on saving state resources and aligned the Plan with 
the MDBs’ understanding of who the key civil society actors were. Yet, the Plan did 
not refer to any particular form of social organisation, which implied a broader 
definition of civil society than that of the MDBs and a view of social organisation as a 
process and not just as an entity. The latter opened up the possibilities of interpreting 
social organisation, in a populist fashion, as an alternative to individualist forms of 
political representation. State promotion was geared towards the objective of 
redrawing the dividing line between the private and the public and of helping to save 
state resources by making social organisation a permanent supplement to the state in 
poverty reduction policy, as in the MDBs’ neoliberal discourse. However, the Plan’s 
emphasis on the role of the state in promoting social organisation involved the 
possibility that organisation could become dependent on state funds and guidance, 
which was a characteristic of the Argentinean populist discourse on civil society. The 
meanings given to social organisation and state promotion suggested that the 
government’s discourse agreed with both the neoliberal and the Argentinean populist 
discourses on civil society. But the importance given to the notion of solidarity in the 
Plan showed a preference for views that prioritised the community over the 
individual, which in Argentina had been historically embedded in populism. As such, 
the focus on solidarity implied that populism figured more in the discourse on civil 
society than in the approach to poverty of that period. 
 
Therefore, in this period there was a non-conflictive articulation of neoliberalism and 
Argentinean populism, but neoliberalism set the boundaries for the possibilities of 
discursive articulation. Populism was absorbed by, and framed within, a 
predominantly neoliberal approach to poverty and discourse on civil society. 
However, populism permeated the overall neoliberal orientation of the Plan Social 
and its presence was greater in the discourse on civil society than in the approach to 
poverty in which it was inserted. 
 
When the neopopulist discourse was put into practice in concrete poverty reduction 
programmes during Menem’s second presidency (1995-1999), it acquired more 
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specific characteristics. In the first half of this period, these tipped the balance towards 
neoliberalism and consolidated this political project’s hegemony within the discourse. 
The three distinctive features of the discourse on civil society in those years were: a 
focus on technical organisations; the aim of making state promotion of social 
organisation work contribute to the creation of organisations that could permanently 
supplement the state in implementing poverty reduction policy; and an interpretation 
of solidarity more in terms of voluntary (unpaid) work than in terms of links that 
foster a community identity. However, populism managed to remain part of the pillars 
of the neopopulist discourse. Some political organisations, and organisations moulded 
during the years of populist hegemony, were included alongside mainly technical 
organisations in programme implementation. State promotion of social organisation 
did not strengthen organisations sufficiently for them to become a permanent 
supplement to the state in policy implementation and made them dependent on state 
funds and guidance. Also, as solidarity contributed to interpreting voluntary 
organisations in terms of “voluntary (unpaid) work”, the neoliberal focus on the role 
of individuals’ will and interests in creating organisations independently from the 
state was downplayed, further allowing the development of a blurred dividing line 
between civil society and the political sphere, including the state. 
 
In the second half of this period, however, populism advanced within the discourse 
and neoliberalism retreated to an emphasis on formal and technical requirements, 
which allowed it to retain hegemony over the discourse on civil society, despite the 
fact that this hegemony was significantly weakened. Following the changes in the 
approach to poverty – proposals to implement universal, rather than targeted, poverty 
reduction policies, attempts to introduce employment strategies into these policies, 
and the increasing work with municipalities – new elements were incorporated into 
the discourse on civil society in this policy area. These new elements of the discourse 
were municipalisation, employment strategies, the importance of leaders, and the 
concept of social capital. All of these were only loosely articulated within the 
neoliberal project and thus emerged as floating signifiers available for other discursive 
articulations. Populism progressed within the neopopulist discourse by contributing to 
the resignification of these new features. The inclusion of municipalities was an 
attempt to complement the neoliberal institutional reform of the post-Washington 
consensus years. However, in practice, it constituted a challenge to the neoliberal aim 
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of drawing a clear dividing line between the private and public spheres which had led 
to the exclusion of political organisations. Tackling unemployment became a central 
objective of involving social organisations in poverty reduction programmes, leading 
to the use of funds earmarked for social organisations as a form of wage. This eroded 
the emphasis on unpaid work and revealed a departure of the neopopulist discourse on 
civil society from the neoliberal reluctance to intervene in the economy. The 
emergence of leaders as increasingly more important than NGOs somewhat resembled 
the early neoliberal focus on the individual rather than social organisation. In practice, 
however, it actually revived key distinctive features of the populist discourse – the 
importance of strong leadership and a conception of an intertwined relationship 
between state and civil society. The introduction of the notion of social capital 
suggested a realignment with the neoliberal discourse of the post-Washington 
consensus. However, the notion of social capital was not reflected in concrete policy 
changes at the time and, in the few documents that incorporated it, the notion was 
used in ways that differed from how the MDBs understood it. 
  
Therefore, the emergence of the technopopulist version of neopopulism demonstrated 
that neoliberalism had preserved its hegemony over that discourse by a hegemonic 
operation of transformism, since it aimed to neutralise the antagonistic populism 
through co-opting it and granting it minor concessions (Torfing, 1999a: 111). The 
Argentinean populist discourse, in contrast, utilised an offensive hegemonic strategy – 
expansionism. Populism re-articulated internal discursive elements by constructing 
chains of equivalences and differences through displacement – making the features of 
the neopopulist discourse lose part of their previous meaning but highlighting the 
commonalities between those features the Argentinean populist discourse (chapter 1; 
Torfing, 2003; Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 141).  
 
The Alianza government’s challenge to the neopopulist discourse targeted its first two 
pillars – the focus on social organisations, especially technical organisations, and the 
focus on the role of the state as a promoter of social organisation. The former was 
challenged by introducing new types of organisations in poverty reduction policy, and 
the latter by placing the role of policy delivery within the state. These two challenges 
together meant the deepening of an element of the technopopulist discourse that had 
already been articulated in line with the populist discourse – the incorporation of 
 227 
municipalities in policy implementation. They also entailed a redefinition of the role 
of social organisations in poverty reduction policy, which were now expected to 
become advisers and supporters of these policies rather than policy implementers. The 
importance of solidarity – the third pillar in the neopopulist discourse – was not 
directly challenged, but, as the Alianza preferred to avoid working with social 
organisations it was by default dismissed as an objective. Rather, the Alianza’s 
proposed to favour contact between the state and individual citizens in the framework 
of an approach to poverty that was trying to be redefined in terms of the objective of 
constructing a social capitalist system.  
 
However, the Alianza, as a young and eclectic political coalition, failed to rise above 
its internal disputes and thus failed to generate a new hegemonic discourse and an 
articulated approach to poverty. In this context, the Alianza’s challenges to the 
neopopulist discourse on civil society were not followed by a new articulation of the 
discourse despite the changes to the poverty reduction programmes. As such, the 
Alianza only disarticulated the neopopulist discourse and facilitated the continued 
expansion of populism that had already gained pace in the years of technopopulism. 
The ongoing economic difficulties and the lack of government attempts to address the 
population’s main demands were a further drive for the return of populism. 
 
 
8.2. Institutions and actors in the re-articulations of the neopopulist 
discourse  
 
The thesis has argued that the main avenue that allowed the colonisation of the 
predominant neoliberalism by the neopopulist discourse was the centrality of 
technical and institutional aspects in the neoliberal logic of hegemonic construction. 
Although de-emphasising the political objectives behind the neoliberal 
recommendations was paradoxically neoliberalism’s main tool in universalising its 
views and gaining support from a variety of political positions, neoliberalism’s 
disregard for the articulation of political identities left a space through which the 
intrinsically political populist discourse could permeate the neoliberal hegemony.  
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Dislocations were crucial, however, in enabling the redefinitions of the situation of 
hegemony within the approach to poverty and the discourse on civil society, and the 
government positions towards neoliberalism and populism set the general framework 
of possibilities for these redefinitions. As dislocations in the hegemonic discourse 
emerged, domestic factors and actors, both within and outside the government agency 
dealing with poverty reduction, enabled the Argentinean populist discourse on civil 
society to grow within the neopopulist discourse, partially colonise it, and eventually 
challenge it. 
 
At the beginning of the 1990s the most crucial dislocation that enabled the 
government to decisively implement neoliberal reform was the hyperinflation crises 
of 1989 and 1990. The way in which the adoption of neoliberalism impacted on the 
discourse on civil society in poverty reduction was also affected by the way in which 
the government incorporated the demands of non-partisan groups (UNICEF, the 
Catholic Church and social protesters) to address poverty and by the President’s 
intention to run for re-election. In the mid 1990s, dislocations embodied in the 
persistence of a high unemployment rate, a reorganised opposition, and debt-based 
growth triggered the transformation of neopopulism into technopopulism. More 
markedly than in the previous period, these dislocations were addressed in accordance 
with the government’s priorities, number one of which was the President’s plan to run 
for a second re-election. During the Alianza years, the pressures from the increasingly 
frequent and harsh social uprisings and from provincial governments that were mainly 
in the hands of the opposition, together with the worsening macro-economic 
indicators, were the dislocations that tested the Alianza’s ability to close the discourse 
by addressing them. The Alianza failed to generate a political project that could 
“suture” those dislocations, and that was this government’s main problem in its 
endeavours to articulate an approach to poverty and a discourse on civil society. 
 
Policy makers and implementers, whose profiles combined technical skills with 
deeply embedded populist views, were crucial in the process of articulating and re-
articulating the discourse on civil society. These were the actors providing the 
discourse with its specific features, either by negotiating programme designs with the 
MDBs or by incorporating into the programmes experiences gained in the field where 
they were implemented. During Menem’s first government, policy makers were the 
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more important of these two state actors and were particularly significant in the 
definitions of the discourse since the government maintained a non-interventionist 
stance towards dealing with poverty. This government stance meant that the creation 
of an agency to deal with poverty, the SDS, lacked sufficient political support, but it 
also meant a large degree of freedom for policy makers involved in the SDS to define 
the characteristics of this agency, including its discourse on civil society. In the 
second period of the 1990s, the time of Menem’s second government, both policy 
makers and implementers were important in redefining the discourse on civil society. 
The functioning of the SDS and the way in which the approach to poverty and the 
corresponding discourse on civil society were redefined were more affected by the 
President’s determination to run for a second re-election than in the previous period. 
While policy makers incorporated views from the Argentinean populist discourse, 
drawing on their own backgrounds and the experiences observed during policy 
implementation, they also emerged as important advocates of the neoliberal discourse 
and contributed to its retreat to a focus on technical requirements in order to remain 
hegemonic. During the Alianza government, it was state actors within the MDSyM 
who attempted to advance their particular views on civil society. Their failure to 
hegemonise the discourse on civil society was due to the Alianza’s unarticulated 
hegemony, but that same lack of articulation could have served as fertile ground for 
any particular view gaining hegemony. To this extent, it was the MDSyM actors’ own 
failure to come up with an articulated discourse on civil society that impeded the 
fundamental re-articulation and appropriation of the neopopulist discourse, which 
most of the Alianza MDSyM functionaries appeared to desire. 
 
The MDBs set the conditions of possibilities of the discourse on civil society. Yet, it 
must be borne in mind that the important role that the MDBs played originated in the 
government’s adoption of a non-interventionist stance towards poverty, which led 
policy makers in the SDS to resort to MDB funds. Moreover, the MDBs’ discourse on 
civil society was not fixed during the 1990s and the Banks grew more interested in 
listening to countries’ proposals in order to guarantee sustainability and the efficient 
use of their resources. This listening on the part of the MDBs, however, may have 
been no more than a sophisticated tool for the expansion of their own views, in that 
the countries’ views were heard and then adapted to the MDBs’ own perspectives. In 
fact, the MDBs’ fundamental perspectives remained unchanged. For example, it 
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remained difficult to introduce income redistribution measures, demonstrated by the 
difficulties the author of the WDR2000 had in including this proposal, the reluctance 
of the MDBs to incorporate minimum income systems – as some programmes 
attempted to do during the Alianza years – and the neglect of similar demands 
following a consultation regarding the 2000 WB CAS in Argentina. 
 
Although civil society participation appeared as a central MDB objective, the MDBs 
ended up paying lip service to this issue, providing an important opportunity to policy 
makers and implementers to decide on the direction of programmes in this respect. 
For instance, participation was not so central in the evaluation of loans. Additionally, 
the WB and the IDB presented different opportunities to advance non-neoliberal 
perspectives on civil society, despite the former being more rigidly neoliberal and the 
latter more open to the incorporation of countries’ proposals. Also, in the negotiations 
with the MDBs, there were differences between MDB staff in their interpretations of 
the MDBs’ positions on civil society participation, especially since participation was 
only a recommendation and was not compulsory. All these factors that enabled the 
combination of other views with those of the MDBs contributed to the MDBs’ 
neoliberal discourse mixing together with the Argentinean populist one, and even 
enabled the latter to colonise the former. Nevertheless, the most important of these 
factors was the fundamental neoliberal focus on technical and efficiency issues, 
outlined at the beginning of this section and explained in detail in this thesis. 
 
 
8.3. Relational discursive institutionalism, global governance and 
populism 
 
Both the relational ontology that guided this thesis and the research findings provide 
new insights into the analysis of political phenomena, contributing to the enrichment 
of new institutionalism, and lead to a number of recommendations for global 
governance policy making and, in particular, for civil society promotion in the field of 
poverty reduction. These policy recommendations regard the processes that lie 
between policy design and policy outcomes and which may lead to unintended 
consequences, as well as to the thesis’ underlying concern with seeking interstices for 
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the possibility of policy ownership on the part of borrowing countries and their 
populations. In particular, the thesis’ view and findings regarding populism suggest 
taking into account, in future research and policy design, populism’s emancipatory 
potential. 
 
The first point worth making is that the thesis findings highlight the importance of 
everyday discursive articulations in shaping policy, which indicates the critical weight 
of gradual change in specific policy fields. Adopting a relational ontology meant 
stressing the intrinsic openness of discourses, in particular institutions and policies, 
and led to a focus on mapping processes of discursive articulations rather than on 
seeking causal links. This focus contributed to pinpointing processes of fundamental 
change beyond crises, and it emerged that everyday political struggles that articulate 
and re-articulate policies and the multiple factors and actors involved in these 
struggles are crucial in defining the direction and content of change. The thesis 
findings highlight that, while crises may expose the dislocations or inherent openness 
of discourses, change in particular policy fields, such as that of poverty reduction, 
occurs gradually. 
 
Moreover, state actors emerged as central in defining the characteristics of the 
changes that follow the emergence of dislocations and in the everyday shaping and re-
articulation of institutions and policies. However, the research showed that state actors 
were not mere translators of MDB or central government recommendations, as non-
relational discursive institutionalism holds, nor did they merely reproduce established 
or available approaches to poverty and discourse on civil society. Thus, the changes 
they produced did not lead to a gradual “punctuated evolution” nor did they imply 
resorting to “interpretation” or a “garbage can” of values or rules linked to their 
institutions or the broader paradigms in which the latter were inserted. Since actors 
are seen here as subjects/agents of “open” social structures, they are constantly re-
articulating their relationship with the multiple discourses that constitute their 
identities. Therefore, state actors deal with discursive struggles that lead to the re-
articulation of institutions and policies in accordance with a multiplicity of partially 
closed discourses, including their technical background and political allegiances as 
well as their experiences of social participation and even their private lives. In the 
framework of this constant process of identification, state actors articulate, in a wide 
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variety of forms, external agencies’ recommendations, domestic political disputes, 
and views from the field where policies are implemented. 
 
Second, the thesis has shown that policy ownership on the part of borrowing countries 
is possible despite the MDBs’ refinement of their strategies in order to hegemonise 
their views. Rather than looking at how MDBs managed to impose their agendas, 
which may respond to the structure and interests of international powers, as critical 
political economists would put it, the thesis traced how state actors re-articulated the 
MDBs’ views and sought out interstices through which domestic (and potentially 
emancipatory) views persisted within external agencies’ agendas. The research 
highlighted that dislocations and state actors’ everyday discursive re-articulations are 
crucial not only for those seeking to expand and consolidate a hegemonic project but 
also for those trying to advance a counter-hegemonic project. At the same time, 
considering institutions as highly sedimented but still only partially closed discourses 
enabled the MDBs and state agencies dealing with poverty reduction to be seen as far 
from monolithic and static, and therefore vulnerable to the colonisation of counter-
hegemonic projects. 
 
Crucially, the thesis highlighted that neglecting the impossibility of insulating policies 
from the political was a double-edged sword in the MDBs’ strategies for 
hegemonisation. The thesis findings showed that the most critical avenue for the 
Argentinean populist project’s colonisation of the MDBs’ neoliberal project was that 
the latter’s focus on its technical aspects and efficiency objectives masked and 
neglected the project’s political character. As a political project, neoliberalism 
constructed political identities through policy recommendations, but, by neglecting its 
political character, this project could not articulate those political identities to its 
policy objectives. Populism, political par excellence, conquered the space available 
for the discursive articulation of those identities. Therefore, the neoliberal project 
could improve its hegemonic strategies if it appeared more openly political and that 
could, at the same time, contribute to opening up the debate to counter-hegemonic 
political projects. A more democratic system, rather than an assets-based one, of 
global representation could help to make the MDBs appear more openly political. In 
policy making processes, keeping in mind that political struggles are inextricable from 
them would pave the way for the inclusion in those struggles of political projects that 
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articulate the demands of the poor and the oppressed. That would make it clear that 
policy making processes are not merely technical and therefore not exclusively in the 
hands of experts.  
 
Third, the thesis suggests that the survival of populism could contribute to the 
emergence of a counter-hegemonic project that is emancipatory for the poor in 
countries where populism is deeply historically rooted and where the existing 
institutions fail to respond to the poorest sectors’ demands. Global governance 
agencies’ awareness of the strategic importance of state actors in the everyday re-
articulation of policies for the hegemonisation of their views is evident in their focus 
on policy diffusion activities such as network building and seminars. Yet, they are 
also concerned with these actors’ reproduction of the vices of populism. Indeed, the 
thesis showed that while state actors have helped to introduce neoliberal approaches 
to poverty reduction policy and to construct a civil society favourable to the success 
of the neoliberal project’s struggles for hegemony, they have also contributed to the 
survival and eventual expansion of the populist project within the hegemony of 
neoliberalism. This thesis, however, regarded populism as a project with 
emancipatory potential because of both the priority it grants to articulating people’s 
demands and its anti-status quo character. While the persistence of inequality and 
inherited practices linked to the contingent elements of populism may enable the 
continuation of the political manipulation of the poor by governors and leaders, 
populism’s essentially anti-status quo character makes it the most feasible political 
project for challenging an established social order that crystallises the oppression of 
the poor. Because of populism’s accent on non-institutional forms of channelling 
demands, the survival of populism opens up the possibility of emancipation in the 
sense of subverting those institutions that are unfavourable to the poor. Moreover, if, 
as in the case of Argentina’s Peronism, a populist project is deeply rooted, especially 
in the popular sectors, and thus constitutes a central “relational system of 
signification” (or discourse) when the people engage in political action, these 
projects’ main elements should be taken into account in any attempt to take on board 
the subordinate sectors’ views. 
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Fourth, civil society and poverty reduction policy areas are crucial fields from which 
states and external agencies, usually regarded as the oppressive actors, can contribute 
to the emergence of a populist emancipatory project.  
 
Poverty reduction policies connect state actors with the most subordinated sectors of 
society, thus making the discourses of these sectors part of the discourses that traverse 
and constitute the identity of these actors. While challenging inequality may be at the 
basis of subversive political projects, this structural condition needs to be articulated 
as a political identity for the project to emerge. The MDBs’ interest in fostering civil 
society participation in their programmes and key strategic documents as well as the 
WB’s interest in hearing the “voices of the poor” (World Bank, 2002) appeared to 
reflect an interest in incorporating the poors’ demands into MDB policy 
recommendations. However, these MDBs’ actions did not contribute to the emergence 
of the emancipatory political project that would be necessary to trigger a structural 
change favourable to the poor. The MDBs’ lack of openness regarding the political 
character of their policy recommendations limits both debate and the articulation of 
content for the political identities their policies could trigger. As a result, the MDBs’ 
policy recommendations do not contribute to the articulation of chains of equivalence 
between discrete demands and merge them in a political project aimed at changing the 
structure of society and the position of the poor in it. Moreover, the MDBs’ normative 
preference for institutionalised responses curtails the possibilities of direct contact 
between the people and those leaders who may challenge the established institutions 
that reflect the oppression of the poor. Populism’s anti-institutionalism is usually 
accused of leading to the predominance of contingent elements of historically shaped 
populisms, such as centralised decision making or clientelism, which may jeopardise 
the emergence of a democratic system that responds to the poor’s demands. Yet, a 
populist political project developed with a focus on the essentially anti-status quo core 
logic of populism could favour the development of new forms of relationship between 
the people and institutions, which would challenge established institutions that are 
unfavourable to the poor, including those less formal institutions that constitute the 
contingent features of populism. State actors’ contact with the people and their 
experiences within populist political projects can help in the articulation of a populist 
emancipatory project. The research showed that state actors in the poverty reduction 
policy field were crucial in keeping the political within policy making and retaining 
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non-institutionalised contact between the people and their leaders. The significance of 
everyday policy re-articulations and the central role of policy makers in them stresses 
how critical their role can be in shaping a political project. For this project to be 
emancipatory, state actors should focus on keeping in touch with the grassroots and 
on enabling the emergence of chains of equivalences between different demands from 
the poor. 
 
Measures to strengthen civil society are crucial for the articulation and success of 
emancipatory projects. The thesis has emphasised the politically constructed character 
of civil society and its critical importance as the arena where hegemonic struggles 
take place. It stressed, therefore, that defining civil society is defining the conditions 
of possibilities for political struggles. Throughout the 1990s the MDBs increasingly 
focused their agendas on strengthening civil society, including the development of 
direct contacts with social organisations. Yet, in line with their neglect of the political 
aspects of their proposals and their antagonism with the populist project, the 
neoliberal project’s policy recommendations in this respect were guided by avoiding 
state and civil society sectors regarded as contaminated by politics. This implied, in 
turn, an a-priori and idealised view of civil society as a locus governed by the rules of 
the market rather than those of the political sphere. Scholars have argued that the 
obstacles to the emergence of this ideal civil society were structural inequalities and 
inherited political habits (chapter 1), which required a significant degree of state 
reform because even the state actors that promoted the neoliberal discourse on civil 
society were influenced by the populist discourse. But the thesis emphasised that it 
was thanks to this influence that the Argentinean populist political project could 
colonise the neoliberal one and pave the way for the inclusion of the views of the poor 
in the measures aimed at strengthening civil society. Therefore, policies to strengthen 
civil society should not be aimed at constructing an a-priori model of civil society. 
Instead, these policies should focus on guaranteeing that discursive struggles for the 
definition of that arena leave spaces open for the emergence of new and excluded 
political projects, such as the articulation of a political project that addresses the 
demands of the poor and the oppressed. 
 
However, and as a final note, in order to unleash their emancipatory potential, 
populist projects may need to be re-articulated. This re-articulation needs to consider 
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that populist projects are one political project among others and that their logic may 
be used by other political projects with similar normative but different contingent 
elements. State actors in the poverty reduction policy area can be crucial in 
articulating an emancipatory political project for the poor and can therefore be crucial 
in the re-articulation of populism and the fostering of its emancipatory potential. But 
those leading this re-articulation should keep in mind that a political project needs to 
struggle constantly for hegemony and accept the existence of other particularities. 
Seeing populism as a discursive logic that exists in concrete social contexts as 
political projects that operationalise that logic can help in this re-articulation.  
Populism can only exist as a political project in which the populist logic and 
normative core – the focus on the sovereignty of the people and its non-institutionalist 
preferences – prevail and the contingent elements – its operationalisation in policy 
proposals during hegemonic struggles, and institutionalisation, if it succeeds – vary. 
This view highlights populism’s ubiquity and the fact that it traverses all political 
projects to different degrees. It also helps to avoid dismissing it as a general malaise 
of politics and, more importantly, contributes to the understanding that to re-articulate 
populism it is necessary to identify its specific tempo-spatial particularities and to 
focus on its core logical component. On this basis, a populist project can lead to 
improved democracy in countries where populism is deeply embedded and where the 
poor’s demands are neglected. 
 
 
8.4. Populism’s survival and its emancipatory potential in the case of 
Argentina 
 
The civil society demonstrations in December 2001 showed that populism had 
survived a decade of neoliberal reform and proved that it had colonised the neoliberal 
hegemony over the neopopulist discourse on civil society. The neopopulist discourse 
on civil society was indeed accompanied by a flourishing of social organisations, but 
this was framed in a discourse in which elements of the Argentinean populist 
discourse still survived and actually gained importance through the whole of the 
1990s. Therefore, the difficult economic situation at the end of the decade and the 
increasing separation of the Alianza government from the population’s demands 
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easily triggered the return of populist forms of social organisations. But this was not a 
sudden revival, it was rather a corollary of the increasing presence of populism within 
the neopopulist discourse on civil society that had been hegemonic in poverty 
reduction action in the 1990s. 
 
However, the return of populism did not show so much the resilience of Argentinean 
populism but rather emphasised the viability of populism as a political alternative for 
articulating the demands of those oppressed by the established system. In fact, civil 
society showed its preference for channelling demands to the state through non-
institutionalised mechanisms but it did not do so by resorting to what had been the 
most prominent institutions of the populist project until the 1980s, such as trade 
unions. Therefore, the Argentinean populist discourse on civil society emerged as 
changed at the end of the 1990s, but its normative and logical components retained 
validity. It was in that particularity that the realisation of the emancipatory promise of 
populism appeared to have been given a chance in December 2001. 
 
Civil society in early 21st century Argentina preferred non-institutionalised forms of 
channelling demands to the state rather than the strengthening of liberal democratic 
forms of representations, as many expected would have been the result of including 
civil society organisations in poverty reduction policies (chapter 1). Acknowledging 
that the expectations that working with civil society in poverty reduction policy had 
not led to improvements in liberal democracy in the developing world, in 2002 the 
IDB talked about democracies under stress in Latin America and, in 2003, the WB 
noted that the poor were still unable to channel demands for change (Pearce, 2004: 
483-4). Some observers have evaluated negatively the re-emergence and resilience of 
non-institutionalised forms of channelling social demands. Levitsky and Murillo, for 
instance, regarded the period that followed the crisis as being on the brink of anarchy 
and feared the collapse of the party system. They noted with relief that democracy 
managed to survive that chaos (Levitsky and Murillo, 2003: 152).  
  
However, as Pearce notes, people’s participation in politics was never deficitarian in 
Latin America, although it has usually been of the contentious rather than the 
institutionalised type (Pearce, 2004: 485). Therefore, if democracy is about people’s 
participation in the definition of the policies that govern them democracy should not 
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have been seen as under threat in Argentina following the civil society demonstrations 
of December 2001. The return of populist forms of organisations should be seen as the 
opening up of possibilities for democratisation more attuned to the country’s reality. 
As some theorists of populism have argued, “populism and democracy are equally 
based on the principle of popular sovereignty and ... by giving a voice to ordinary 
people who feel excluded from the political order populism has a strong 
democratising logic” (Panizza, 2008: 87). Populism, moreover, has the added value of 
a potential for becoming a democracy highly responsive to the population since it 
focuses on addressing the demands of those in subordinated positions. 
 
Indeed, December 2001 presented an aggregation of dislocations and a situation of 
unaddressed social demands that constituted an opportunity for populism to emerge as 
a form of democracy focused on responding to the subordinates’ demands. A question 
that stems from this observation but which goes beyond the scope of this thesis and 
should be left for further research is whether the survival and re-emergence of 
populism led to the realisation of populism’s transformative democratic power of 
radical populism (Panizza, 2008: 89). As a tentative answer, it is suggested here that 
there was a populist rupture with the established neoliberalism and leaders who 
claimed to be more responsive to the popular demands gained support. Yet, while 
Levitsky and Murillo argue that Peronism “saved” Argentina from the collapse of its 
democratic and political party systems (2003: 123), the contention here is that the 
absence of a new political actor may have actually jeopardised the realisation of 
populism’s transformative potential. Peronism’s continued hegemonisation of the 
populist appeal involved the continued association of populism with what has here 
been characterised as Argentinean populism. Nevertheless, the possibility of 
unleashing the democratisation potential of populism in Argentina may still depend on 
Peronism. Peronism has historically embodied populism in the country and it would 
be difficult for non-Peronist political actors to appropriate the special association that 
the Peronism project has with the people. Thus, Peronist political actors may need to 
focus on the normative and logical components of populism and then develop new 
contingent elements to unleash the radical democratic potential of populism. 
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Annex I: Tables and Charts 
 
 
Figure 0 - World Bank Lending for Argentina by Sector (1983 – 2001) 
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Source: author’s own, based on WB Annual Reports. 
See notes in figure 2 on the classification of sectors. 
 
Figure 00 – IDB Lending for Argentina by sector (1983 – 2001) 
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Source: author’s own, based on IDB Annual Reports. 
See notes in figure 1 on the classification of sectors. 
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Figure 1 – IDB Lending by Sector (1983-2000) 
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Source: author’s own, based on IADB Annual Reports. 
Note 1: The classification of projects follows the criteria used in the IADB Annual Reports. 
Note 2: Productive Sectors includes Agriculture and Fisheries; Industry, Mining and Tourism; Export Financing; and Science and Technology. Physical Infrastructure includes: Energy; and Transport and 
Communications. Social Sectors includes Water and Sanitation; Urban Development; Education; Social Investment; Health; Micro-enterprise; and Environment.
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Figure 2 – WB Lending in Latin America by Sector (1982-2001) 
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Source: author’s own, based on WB Annual Reports. 
Note 1: The criteria for classifying projects have varied from year to year in the WB Annual Reports, particularly in the last decade. As far as possible the latest criteria were used. 
Note 2: The projects are classified in accordance with their main objective, but in many cases (eg urban development projects) they have large components that relate to other sectors. 
Note 3: Productive Sectors includes Agricultural and Rural Development; Industry; Small-Scale Enterprise; and Private Sector Development. Physical Infrastructure includes: Energy; Telecommunications; and 
Transportation. To homogenise the data, Social Sectors is a broad category based on IADB criteria including: Urban Development; Water Supply and Sewerage; Education; Health, Nutrition and Population; Social 
Sector or Social Protection; and Environment. 
Note 4: Industry includes mining and other extractives, and tourism. 
Note 5: Energy includes oil, gas and power. 
Note 6: The subcategory Social Sectors was introduced in 1994, and its name was changed to Social Protection in 1999, when there was a reclassification of loans. 
Note 7: Environment was only introduced in 1993 and, in line with the IADB classification criteria, is presented here as a subcategory of Social Sectors. 
Note 8: Public Sector Management was introduced in 1990. 
Note 9: Economic Policy and Private Sector Development first appeared in the 2000 Annual Report. 
Note 10: Multisector replaced Non-Project in 1994 and Technical Assistance ceased to exist in the same year.
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Figure 3 – Social Expenditure (total for social welfare at all levels of government) 
 
 
Source: Beccaria, L. and Carciofi R. (1996) "Políticas Públicas en la Provisión y Financiamiento de los Servicios Sociales. Aportes 
para una agenda de los años noventa" in Minuijin A. (ed.) (1996), from Vargas de Flood, M. and M. Harriague (1993) El Gasto 
Público Consolidado. Documento de Trabajo GP/01. (corrected edition with updated GDP data) Buenos Aires: Secretaría de 
Programación Económica (junio). 
 
 
Figure 4 – Structural Poverty 
 
Households and population living with NBI 
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19.9 
Source: INDEC, based on census data. 
Note 1: In 1980, households = houses; in 1991, households = total of houses + households in tenements, hotels or hostels. 
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Figure 5: Income Poverty 
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Source: INDEC, based on October EPHs. 
 
 
Figure 6 – Urban Unemployment Rate in Argentina (1985-1995) 
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Source: Beccaria, L. and N. Lopez (1996) "Notas sobre el comportamiento del mercado de trabajo urbano" in Beccaria L. and N. 
Lopez (eds.) pp. 26-27. Based on EPHs-INDEC. 
Note: 1985, data from November; 1990, data from October; 1991, data from June; 1992-1995, data from May. 
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Figure 7 - Urban Unemployment Rates (1995-1999) – Selected Conglomerates  
 
Conglomerates 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Great Buenos Aires (excluding 
City of Buenos Aires) 22.6 20.4 18.6 15.8 17.5 
Gran Rosario 20.9 19.7 16.1 13.8 14.9 
Gran Santa Fe 20.9 21.2 18.4 15.5 16.9 
Tucuman-Tafi Viejo 19.9 18.6 16.1 14.8 19.2 
Jujuy-Palpala 12.7 12.7 18.0 16.1 16.3 
Mar del Plata 
-- 20.1 19.3 15.4 18.2 
Bahía Blanca 20.2 20.5 19.5 14.0 8.8 
Gran La Plata 15.4 19.1 17.2 15.4 12.3 
Concordia 
-- 20.6 13.6 13.6 13.8 
Gran Córdoba 15.2 17.2 18.6 12.5 14.2 
Total 18.4 17.1 16.1 13.2 14.5 
Source: INDEC, based on May EPHs. http://www.indec.mecon.ar/nuevaweb/cuadros/4/shempleo4.xls, downloaded: September 2005. 
 
 
Figure 8 – Social Expenditure (only on social assistance, and at all levels of 
government) 
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See figure 9 for notes and source. 
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National Expenditure in Social Assistance and 
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Figure 9 – Social Expenditure (social assistance at the national level only) 
 
 
 
Source: Dirección de Análisis de Gasto Público y Programas Sociales – Secretaría de Política Económica, Ministerio de Economía, 
Argentina http://www.mecon.gov.ar/peconomica/docs/gp_nac.xls, downloaded: September 2005. 
Note: this expenditure excludes public expenditure managed by provinces or municipalities; Fondos Fiduciarios, expenditure 
corresponding to the devolution of the discounted 13% in wages and pensions in previous years, and pensions and health services 
from obras sociales. 
(*) estimated (**) provisional. 
 
 
Figure 10 – Social Expenditure (social assistance, proportion of municipal 
expenditure) 
 
 
Sources: Gasto Público Consolidado. Dirección de Análisis de Gasto Público y Programas Sociales – Secretaría de Política 
Económica, Ministerio de Economía, Argentina (http://www.mecon.gov.ar/peconomica/docs/gp_nac.xls, downloaded: September 
2005) and Gasto Público de los Gobiernos Municipales. Ibid (http://www.mecon.gov.ar/peconomica/docs/gp_muni.xls, downloaded: 
November 2005). 
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Figure 11 – Income and Structural Poverty 
 
Income poverty (Indigency and Poverty line) and structural poverty (NBI) (1988-
2002)  
 
 Poverty Line 
(1) 
Indigency 
(1) 
NBI 
(2) 
1988 32.3 10.7 27.7 (3)  
1989 47.3 16.5  
1990 33.7   6.6  
1991 21.5   3.0 19.9 
1992 17.8   3.2  
1993 16.8   4.4  
1994 19.0   3.5  
1995 24.8   6.3  
1996 27.9   7.5  
1997 26.0   6.4  
1998 25.9   6.9  
1999 26.7   6.7  
2000 28.9   7.2  
2001 35.4 12.2 17.7 
2002 54.3 24.7  
Sources: (a) “Porcentaje de hogares y personas por debajo de la línea de pobreza en el aglomerado GBA, desde mayo 1988 en 
adelante”. (b) “Porcentaje de hogares y personas por debajo de la línea de indigencia en el aglomerado GBA, desde mayo 1988 en 
adelante”. (c) “Total de población en hogares particulares y población en hogares con Necesidades Básicas Insatisfechas (NBI), por 
provincia. Total del país. Años 1980, 1991 y 2001.” All at www.indec.gov.ar; link: “condiciones de vida”, consulted: July 2005. 
Notes: (1) Income poverty data for GBA conglomerates for October each year, based on EPH; (2) NBI data based on census, data are 
therefore national; (3) data from 1980 census. 
 
 
Figure 12 – Urban Unemployment Rates (1999-2002) – Selected Conglomerates  
 
Conglomerates 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Great Buenos Aires (excluding City of 
Buenos Aires) 17.5 17.9 18.7 24.2 
Gran Rosario 14.9 18.5 20.1 24.3 
Gran Santa Fe 16.9 16.1 16.5  
Tucuman-Tafi Viejo 19.2 19.9 18.4  
Jujuy-Palpala 16.3 18.8 18.6  
Mar del Plata 18.2 14.6 19.0 24.6 
Bahía Blanca 
  8.8 16.5 17.7 22.3 
Gran La Plata 12.3 14.8 16.8 22.1 
Concordia 13.8 22.4 18.5  
Gran Córdoba 14.2 13.4 12.7 25.3 
Gran Catamarca 
 19.6 22.3 25.5 
Total 14.5 15.4 16.4 21.5 
Source: INDEC. Table based on EPH for May each year. http://www.indec.mecon.ar/nuevaweb/cuadros/4/shempleo4.xls, 
downloaded: September 2005. 
 290 
Figure 13 – Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in Argentina – Totals and Percentage 
Annual Variations (1990-2001) 
 
Year Totals (in millions of $) % variation 
1990 185.548 -2.5 
1991 202.495 9.1 
1992 218.567 7.9 
1993 236.505 8.2 
1994 250.308 5.8 
1995 243.186 -2.8 
1996 256.626 5.5 
1997 277.441 8.1 
1998 288.123 3.9 
1999 278.123 -3.4 
2000 276.173 -0.08 
2001 263.997 -4.4 
Source: INDEC. Tables “PRODUCTO INTERNO BRUTO a precios de mercado SERIE EMPALMADA 1980-2005, millones de 
pesos a precios de 1993, Valores Agregados Brutos Sectoriales a precios básicos” and  “PRODUCTO INTERNO BRUTO a precios 
de mercado SERIE EMPALMADA 1980-2005 a precios de 1993, Variación porcentual respecto a igual período del año anterior”. All 
at www.indec.gov.ar, link: “cuentas nacionales”, PBI, Serie Histórica, Serie empalmada 1980-2005, consulted: July 2005. 
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Annex II: Methodology  
 
 
The selection of programmes analysed in the thesis is based on crosscutting information from the MDBs’ 
annual reports and project documents, programme monitoring and evaluation information from the SDS 
area (SIEMPRO) and insights gained from interviews. 
 
The interviews were carried out with programme staff of programmes selected as follows: 
 
Forty projects approved by both the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank in Argentina 
in the 1990s contained some form of civil society involvement, according to either the Banks’ Annual 
reports or the project documents. These comprised: Eighteen (18) IDB programmes: Development of 
Municipal Institutions and Social Investment Programs, Sector Program in Support of Fiscal Adjustment 
and Social Reforms, Barrio Improvement (PROMEBA), PAGV, Youth Productivity and Employability 
Support (inc. BECAS), Federal Program for Women, Program to Support Children in Specially Difficult 
Circumstances in Nine Provinces (PROAME I), Program to Assist Children and Adolescents at Risk 
(PROAME II), Strengthening of Banking System Safeguards, Primary Health Care Reform, la Pampa, 
Córdoba and Salta (PROAPS), Support for Fiscal Balance and Social Management, Modernising Córdoba 
Provincial Government, "Rosario Habitat": Comprehensive Program for the Rehabilitation of Unregulated 
Settlements, Support to Growth and Fiscal Discipline, AES Parana, Aguas Argentinas, Rosario-Victoria 
Bridge, Border Crossing and Integration Corridors; and twenty five (25) WB projects: Provincial Reform 
Projects Tucuman (1), Rio Negro (2), Catamarca (3), Córdoba (4), Santa Fe (5), Provincial Agricultural 
Development Project (PROSAP), Maternal and Child Health and Nutrition I and II (PROMIN), Forestry 
Development, Small Farmer Development, Pollution Management, Flood Protection, Mining Development 
Technical Assistance I and II, Social Protection I, II, III, IV (inc. SIEMPRO, FOPAR and TRABAJAR), 
Buenos Aires Urban Transport, Native Forests and Protected Areas, AIDS and Sexually Transmitted 
Diseases (LUSIDA), Secondary Education Reform II and III, Province of Buenos Aires, Public Health 
Surveillance and Disease Control (VIGIA), Sustainable Fisheries Management, Indigenous Community 
Development, Special Structural Adjustment Loan, Repurchase Facility Support Loan, Health Insurance for 
the Poor, Family Strengthening and Social Capital Promotion. Projects approved for the same national 
programme are considered as one programme. Maternal and Child Health and Nutrition Project I and II is 
one project, since both loans were used for PROMIN. Support for Children in Specially Difficult 
Circumstances in nine Provinces and Program to Assist Children and Adolescents at Risk were used for 
PROAME; WB Social Protection Projects, four approved during the 1990s, are considered in terms of the 
components funded: SIEMPRO, FOPAR and TRABAJAR, hence four loans count as three projects. 
Therefore, the 43 programmes approved by the Banks in the 1990s resulted in 40 national programmes with 
MDB funds. 
 
A closer look at the programmes that used the loans approved by these Banks shows that many of them did 
not have the civil society involvement claimed in the Banks’ reports or project documents. Therefore, a 
number of programmes were not covered by the interviews: 
  
1. All the state reform loans claimed to include some form of civil society participation, especially 
through citizenship charters and the signing of “commitment letters”. In an interview by the 
author, Marcos Makón (2002), who led state reform programmes under Menem and the Alianza, 
explained that the inclusion of civil society in decisions regarding state reform was nil. Therefore, 
two IDB programmes and five MDB programmes with civil society involvement according to the 
Banks are not considered here (-7). 
2. In the projects dealing with infrastructure or environmental issues the Banks recommended some 
form of civil society involvement. However, this involvement was usually limited to consultations 
during the design stage, which consisted of surveys that were rarely taken into account in the face 
of more technically justified reasons for intervention. In the case of two WB environmental 
projects, WB Annual Reports considered that there was some form of civil society involvement, 
and five IDB infrastructure development projects with environmental impact show that 
participation is limited to consultation at the design stage. These seven loans are not considered in 
this research (-7). 
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3. The loans aimed at the financial sector or the maintenance of fiscal balance claim to include some 
form of civil society participation. That reflects the start of the WB’s inclusion of social concerns 
in its structural loans and, in the particular case of Argentina, of some agreements reached with the 
government about guaranteeing funds for social policies. These loans did not result in new 
national programmes. Two WB and three IDB programmes fell intro these category and were 
therefore excluded. (-5)  
4. Three further programmes were excluded, despite civil society participation appearing as central 
in the project documents. Social Protection Loans 2 and 3, corresponding to TRABAJAR 
programme, were excluded because, on closer inspection of the programme documents and media 
information, and after interviews with key informants during the exploratory research, it emerged 
that the programme was channelled through municipalities and civil society organisations had no 
formal role. The Indigenous Community Development Project, although small in terms of budget, 
was all about civil society participation. However, at the time of the first interviews (June 2002) 
the programme had not yet started. The Family Strengthening of Social Capital Promotion Project 
is a similar case. (-3) 
5. Six projects were excluded because of their small budgets - Forestry Development, Mining 
Development, two projects each; LUSIDA; Sustainable Fisheries Management Development. (-6) 
6. Five projects were excluded because of their limited geographical coverage - Flood Protection; 
Pollution Management; two projects for Secondary Education Reform; Rosario Habitat. (-5)  
7. Two projects were excluded because they were cancelled - Youth Productivity and Employability 
Support and Health Insurance for the Poor. (-2) 
 
As a result, 12 MDB projects were considered for interviews. 1 
 
Regarding nationally funded programmes, according to SIEMPRO data (SIEMPRO, 1998 and 2001) ten of 
the programmes with civil society involvement that emerged during the 1990s in the social sector were not 
MDB funded: PFSC; CENOC; Nosotras; FONCAP; PSA; ProHuerta; Unidos; Solidaridad; Seguro 
Infantil (SI); and Programa para Menores Marginados en el Gran Buenos Aires (PROAMBA). The latter 
was the only programme excluded from the fieldwork, because its geographical coverage was only the 
surrounding areas of Buenos Aires. It is noteworthy that although being mainly nationally funded, PSA and 
ProHuerta had funds from PROSAP and Small Farmer Development Project respectively, and some 
CENOC special initiatives were funded with MDB monies (Orlowski, 2002). 
 
As a result, the interviews that inform this thesis were carried out with policy-makers and implementers 
related to the following programmes: 
World Bank 
 
1. PROSAP (a component of PSA) 
Interviewee: Gaston Bordelois (Programme Coordinator PSA) 
2. Maternity and Child Health and Nutrition Programme (PROMIN) 
Interviewees: Pablo Vinocur (designer of original project, Programme Coordinator, Alianza); 
Maria Laura Barral (Monitoring and Evaluation Coordinator); Carlos Anigstein (Health and 
Community Participation Coordinator); Juan Reichenbach (Programme Coordinator after 2001) 
3. Small Farmer Development Project (funds parts of PSA and ProHuerta). Interviewee: Daniel Díaz 
refused several times to be interviewed. 
4. Social Protection Project 1 (SIEMPRO and FOPAR)  
Interviewees: Irene Novacovsky (Programme Coordinator SIEMPRO, Menem’s governments); 
Ana Etchegaray (Programme Coordinator FOPAR, Menem’s governments); Carlos Flood 
(Community Participation Coordinator FOPAR); Alberto Calamante (Programme  Coordinator 
FOPAR after 2001) 
5. Social Protection 4 (SIEMPRO and FOPAR) 
As above. 
                                                 
1
 For a list of the interviews done, see Reference section. 
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6. Public Health Surveillance and Disease Control (VIGIA) 
Interviewees: Hugo Fernández (Coordinator Epidemiology Component, Alianza); Raul Pitarque 
(Community Participation Area Coordinator) 
 
IDB 
 
8. Barrio Improvement Programme (PROMEBA) 
Interviewee: Carlos Pisoni (staff member at the beginning of the programme, Programme 
Coordinator, Alianza) Lucia Pucci (Community Participation Coordinator, Alianza), Eduardo Tau 
(Programme Coordinator after 2001) 
9. Programme in Support of Vulnerable Groups (PAGV) 
Interviewees: Ana Rita Diaz Muñoz (Programme Coordinator, Menem’s second presidency and 
Alianza) María del Carmen Tamargo (Monitoring and Evaluation Area Coordinator, Menem’s 
second presidency) 
10. Federal Programme for Women (operating as the National Council for Women) 
Interviewee: Gloria Abán (Programme Coordinator) 
11. Programme to Assist Children and Adolescents at Risk (PROAME) 
Interviewees: Beatriz Harretche (Programme Designer, IDB); Ariana Vacchieri (Communications 
Coordinator, Alianza); Marjorie Richards (Technical Assistant for Community Participation, 
Menem’s governments); Elba Luna (Programme Coordinator, first loan); Stella Maris Morales 
(Programme Coordinator after 2001) 
12. Primary Health Care Reform (PROAPS) 
Interviewee: Federico Tobar (Programme Coordinator after 2001) 
 
Nationally-funded programmes 
 
13. Programa de Fortalecimiento  del Desarrollo Juvenil (PFDJ) 
Interviewee: Lara Manóvil (Community Training Coordinator) 
14. PFSC 
Interviewees: Roberto Candiano (Programme Coordinator, Menem’s governments); Mabel Denis 
(Director of Community Organisation, Menem’s and Alianza governments) 
15. CENOC 
Interviewees: Beatriz Orlowski de Amadeo (Programme Coordinator, Menem’s governments) 
Catalina Nosiglia (Programme Coordinator, Alianza) Guillermo Mayer (Area Coordinator, 
Menem’s governments) 
16. FONCAP 
Interviewee: Juan Peña (Programme Coordinator, Menem’s governments)  
17. PSA (see above) 
18. ProHuerta (see above) 
19. Solidaridad 
Interviewee: Pablo Pucciarelli (Programme Coordinator, Alianza) 
20. SI 
Interviewees: Juan Pablo Cafiero (Ministry of Social Development, Alianza); Pablo Vinocur 
(Programme Designer) 
21. UNIDOS 
Interviewee: Aldo Isuani (involved in programme design) 
 
 
Although insights obtained from the interviews with staff of all these programmes are used throughout the 
thesis, the focus of the analyses of the discourse on civil society in poverty reduction policy excludes: 
 
Among MDB-funded programmes (both fully and partially MDB-funded): 
 
- PSA and ProHuerta, because they operated autonomously from the agency created to deal with 
poverty reduction policies – the SDS. The former was under the Agriculture and Fisheries 
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Secretariat, and the latter under the remit of the Instituto Nacional de Tecnología Agropecuaria 
(INTA – National Institute of Farming Technology).  
- VIGIA, because it was under the remit of the Ministry of Health and, according to the 
interviewees, civil society participation in the programme was minimal.  
- Federal Programme for Women, because it did not directly fall under the remit of the SDS and the 
loan was used to create a state agency – National Council for Women – which implemented 
initiatives on demand and did not have, at the time of the interviews a fixed set of policies.  
- Primary Health Care Reform (PROAPS), because it was not under the remit of the SDS and it was 
not implemented until late 2002. 
- SIEMPRO, because, while it was a key SDS programme, civil society participation had no role in 
this institutional strengthening and monitoring programme. 
 
Among nationally funded programmes: 
 
- FONCAP, because according to its Coordinator the programme did not consider any form of civil 
society participation. It was a programme aimed at promoting and financing micro-enterprises. 
 
 
Therefore, ten programmes constitute the core focus of the thesis’ analysis:  
 
1. PROMIN 
2. FOPAR 
3. PROMEBA 
4. PAGV 
5. PROAME 
6. PFSC 
7. CENOC 
8. Solidaridad 
9. SI 
10. UNIDOS 
 
PROMIN is included despite not being under the remit of the SDS – it was formally part of the Ministry of 
Health – because it maintained close links with the SDS. Talks about transferring the programme to the 
SDS were common during the 1990s (Barral, 2002). Moreover, the literature on civil society participation 
in social programmes considers it a model programme it this respect (eg Acuña and Tuozzo, 2000a and 
2000b) and the WB presents it as an example of civil society involvement in social projects (World Bank, 
1996). Solidaridad, SI and UNIDOS were not fully implemented, but they were the only programmes 
designed by the Alianza administration and, along with the changes the Alianza made to existing 
programmes, they are crucial to the analysis of the Alianza approach to poverty and the corresponding 
discourse on civil society. 
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Annex III: Programmes analysed 
 
 
 
a. Summary of Programmes Analysed for 1995-2001 
 
 
Programme Period/Budget(*) Brief Description Type of Civil Society Involvement 
PROMIN 
 
1993-1998: $160m 
(100m WB/60m local) 
  
1998-2004: $171m  
(100m WB/71 local - 54 
nation/17 prov) (World 
Bank, 1997: 1) 
The objective of the programme was to improve the primary care level 
of health and nutritional services for children and mothers in deprived 
areas. It consisted of two components – Health and Childhood 
Development. Within each component there was a Nutrition 
subcomponent. Designed originally to strengthen the National 
Directorate of Child and Maternal Health (Barral, 2002). 
The programme built community health centres in areas with high NBI. 
Community development actions were part of both components of 
the programme but worked better in Childhood Development. The 
community organised and managed soup kitchens and nurseries, 
and aimed to transform them into childhood development centres. 
Grass-roots organisations promoted the programme. Intermediary 
NGOs were involved, through receiving funds for publicity (Barral, 
2002). 
FOPAR 1996-1997: $36.7m 
(pilot) (a) 
 
1999-2003: $42m per 
year (b) 
The objective was the development of local capacities through the 
involvement of local organisations in a community infrastructure project 
funded by the programme (Siempro, 2002). Projects received a 
maximum of $100,000 (WB, 1995: 28) and targeted municipalities with 
30%+ NBI population. 
 
According to programme documents, grass-roots organisations were 
involved in the design, implementation and administration of the 
projects. To enable their sustainability the programme supported 
organisations them through training and technical, administrative 
and financial assistance. (Siempro, 2001). The programme worked 
with community organisations and groups that were organised ad 
hoc – NUBs (núcleos de beneficiarios). NGOs were involved in the 
training and support given to the grass roots and members could be 
part of a NUB (Calamante, 2002). Programme funds were 
transferred to the NUB after it signed an agreement with FOPAR 
(Etchegaray, 2002). 
PROMEBA 1997-2001: $170m 
($102m IDB/ 68m local) 
for 5 years. (IDB, 1996: 
1) (c) 
 
 
The aim was to provide basic infrastructure for deprived urban areas 
through projects that involved local community organisations. It 
consisted of three components. First, infrastructure projects, including 
urban improvement and tenure rights legalisation ($s156m); second, 
social intervention actions to be executed by NGOs or consultancies 
($20m); and third, institutional strengthening for the governmental 
agencies involved ($12.5m) (IDB, 1996: 1). According to the Project 
The sub-projects financed by the programme were “integral” (PEI, 
Proyectos de Ejecución Integral) meaning that the infrastructure 
work had to include a social project, such as footpaths, communal 
productive initiatives, etc, which involved training and community 
organisation and promotion. Civil society organisations did not 
participate in the infrastructure work directly, which was allocated to 
private companies (Tau, 2002; Pucci, 2002). Social intervention 
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Loan Document the target was “population with unsatisfied basic needs 
that face severe housing deficiencies” and which are shown to be in 
the lowest income quintile (IDB, 1996:1; 32). Projects funds were 
$150,000 per neighbourhood. 
actions consisted of trainings for grass-roots in organisational 
strengthening, negotiation skills for their leaders, and workshops to 
reach agreement on starting the projects, and also to undertake 
participatory evaluation. Other actions included the creation of a 
community social fund (FSC) – which did not succeed – and 
technical assistance for building-related and administrative skills. 
NGOs and/or consultancies provided these services (IDB, 1996: 2). 
PAGV 1997-2001: $60m 
($33m IDB loan, $5m 
IDB grant, $22 local) 
(IDB, 1997: 1) 
 
The general objective was to contribute to reducing exposure to social 
risks for the most vulnerable groups – women heads of household, 
young and elderly people and the disabled – in the poorest populations 
in urban conglomerates, and indigenous communities (Siempro, 2001). 
The programme financed projects designed by neighbourhood 
organisations (Barrial or Multibarrial projects) or indigenous 
communities organisations (CAPI component), which included housing 
improvements, recreational activities, soup kitchens, job training, 
community infrastructure and school grants for women (Siempro, 2001) 
and provided technical assistance for the diagnosis and design of 
projects. The targeting criteria combined NBI with unemployment and 
the poverty line (IDB, 1997: 42, 43). 
The specific objective of the programme was the institutionalisation 
of participatory planning processes (PPP) and the strengthening of 
organisations – governmental or otherwise – involved in the projects 
(IDB, 1997: 1) through the mobilisation of those actors for the 
promotion, preparation and implementation of the projects (Alonso, 
et al., 2003: 112). Grass-roots organisations were the “executing 
organisations” (Organizaciones Ejecutoras – OEs) and the 
intermediary organisations or NGOs were “support organisations” 
(Organizaciones de Apoyo – ODAs). The latter provided technical 
support to OEs and evaluated the projects, for which they received 
financial support (Alonso, et al. 2003: 114). In multi-neighbourhood 
projects the provincial unit of the PAGV (Unidad Ejecutora Provincial 
- UEP) and the local units (Unidades Ejecutoras Locales – UELs) 
provided support and evaluation. Municipalities could be OEs. 
PROAME 1996-1998 – PROAME 
I: $27.14m ($19.72 
BID/1.42m local/ $6m 
"direct executors" (IDB, 
1995: 1) 
 
1999-2003 - PROAME 
II: $43.3m ($30m BID, 
$13.3 local) (IDB, 1998: 
1,4) (d) 
 
The objectives of PROAME I were to improve the living conditions of 
minors in particularly difficult circumstances and to consolidate and 
strengthen social organisations working in the field, including the 
fostering of networks of organisations that could face eventual crisis in 
the sector (IDB, 1995: 1). The programme financed projects in nine 
provinces of the north-west and northeast in areas with high NBI. 
PROAME II incorporated the objective of strengthening governmental 
organisations working in the field and expanded its coverage to new 
provinces ($27m for projects and $12m for institutional strengthening of 
governments. In addition to NBI, the selection criteria included 
vulnerable populations in flood-affected areas. 
In both cases the programme financed projects that included after-
school classes, nutritional provision, recreational activities, employment 
training, health support, and building and infrastructure improvement 
(Richards, interview; IDB, 1995: 3-5). 
PROAME I: One of the objectives of the programme was to 
strengthen social organisations working in the field of children and 
adolescents at risk. The budget for the first loan included the 
contribution to the programme that would come from the inclusion of 
NGOs and grass-roots organisations, defined as “direct executors” 
(IDB, 1995: 1, 4). 
In PROAME II, civil society organisations continued to be “chiefly 
executors” of projects (IDB, 1998: 2) and provincial or municipal 
governments areas dealing with children and adolescents’ issues 
presented separate projects for institutional strengthening 
(PROAME, 1999: 9). They tried to introduce "associated 
management" (gestión asociada) but it did not work (Richards, 
2002). 
PFSC 94-95: unused The purpose of the programme was to train human and organisational The leaders were proposed by civil society organisations, some 
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PROSOL funds 
1997: highest budget: 
$12m (Candiano, 
interview) 
 
 
resources to be used in other programmes (Candiano, 2002). In 
addition to the training and educational activities, PFSC financed 
projects with the purpose of providing opportunities for newly  acquired 
skills to be put into practice. It included several components that 
developed over time. First, “Animadores Comunitarios”, which included 
Initial Education, Complementary Education (training of trainers), and 
Internships. Second, “Madres Cuidadoras”, who were also community 
leaders. These projects had to be presented by mothers’ organisations 
(Candiano, 2002).  
The programme allocated $144,800 per province (g):  $44,800 for 
training workshops and $100,000 for projects, with a maximum of 
$5,000 per project. (Candiano, 2002). 
times even by informal "solidarity groups". These organisations each 
sent two representatives to the training workshops twice a year (20 
areas/organisations = 40 animadores). The leaders were trained to 
restore or set up social solidarity networks (PFSC, 1996: 8, 9). 
Intermediary organisations – NGOs – administered the funds 
transferred for training or projects (PFSC, 1996: 19). 
In the first years the focus was on community development. By 1998 
the programme had been reformulated to focus on  citizenship, and 
incorporated the notion of social capital (Paiuk and Georges, 1998). 
CENOC $1m a year (e) The aim of the programme was to improve the relationship between 
social and community organisations and the national state. To achieve 
that objective it undertook a number of actions of which the most 
important were the development of a Database of Community 
Organisations, a Computerised Network of Community Organisations 
(RENOC – Red Nacional de Organizaciones Comunitarias) and a 
distance training programme (PECAD – Programa de Capacitación a 
Distancia). There were several other small initiatives taken together 
with organisations dealing with voluntary work, or social problems such 
as HIV/AIDs (Orlowsky, 2002). 
Civil society organisations were the programme’s direct 
beneficiaries. Inclusion in the database was voluntary, although to 
access the funds of any SDS programmes an organisation had to be 
registered with CENOC. The database included informal groups as 
well as highly professionalised NGOs. In PECAD there were local 
tutors and “organizaciones madrinas” (intermediary NGOs). The 
training content was defined by CENOC and the NGOs promoted 
the programme, proposed the tutors, administered the funds and 
carried out the evaluation. They received $5,000 for each module. 
 
(*) $1=US$1 throughout the period 
Notes: (a) The loan, approved in November 1995, was Social Protection I. The total was $152m (WB), $14.4m for SIEMPRO a project for the monitoring and 
evaluation of poverty-reduction policies and the rest for several targeted social programmes (World Bank, 1995: 7, 28, 94). (b) The loan was Social Protection 
IV, for FOPAR and SIEMPRO. The total was $132.9m for five years (WB: 90.8; local: 40.1) (World Bank, 1998: 1, 5). (c) The funds were not executed until 
1999 because of the need to reach an agreement with the province regarding the need to become indebted to access the programme (Pisoni, 2002). (d) Additional 
funds came from loans approved following floods in the north-east (Richards, 2002) and a part of the original loan was used for the SISFAM – a project to 
construct a database of beneficiaries of targeted policies – managed by SIEMPRO (Morales, 2002). (e) They obtained funds from the MDBs on at least one 
occasion for a training programme for organisations from indigenous communities – a $180,000 grant from the World Bank (Orlowsky, 2002). (f) The PAGV 
loan had three components: a Componente de Viabilización del Acceso a los Servicios Sociales (CVASS – Component for Facilitating Access to Social Services), 
a Componente de Atención a la Población Indígena (CAPI – Component of Assistance to Indigenous Populations) (Siempro, 2001; Alonso, et al., 2003: 113; 
Diaz Muñoz, 2002: 19), and a third component destined for the SISFAM project. (g) There were exceptions to this PFSC rule: provinces in particularly difficult 
conditions of poverty received double that amount. 
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b. Summary of Programmes added in the analysis for 2000-2001 
 
 
Programme Period/Budget(*) Brief Description Type of Civil Society Involvement 
Plan 
Solidaridad 
 
(incorporating 
Unidos 
programme) 
 
Announced: July 
2000  
Pilots: Sept 2000 – 
March 2001 
 
Budget Unidos: 
$2,158,987 (pilot, 
excl. admin. 
expenses) (2) 
 
 
The objectives were policy coordination and the provision of food boxes and 
cash subsidies (Plan Unidos, Ministry of Social Development), scholarships 
(Plan Escuelas Prioritarias, Ministry of Education) and health assistance 
(PROMIN, Ministry of Health). As counter-provisions the families were to send 
their children to school and have regular health checks. The money transfers 
were $120 for the southern provinces, $80 for the northern ones and $100 for 
the others. (2) 
Targeting criteria: Areas were selected according to NBI indicators and 
provincial governments’ views. Families were selected based on census within 
these areas, carried out in the framework of the SinTys (MDB-funded) to 
identify families below the poverty line. 
Coverage: The aim was 2,000,000 people. It started with pilots in 24 areas 
covering 25,000 families (125,000 individuals) and the second stage planned 
to cover 200,000 families (1,000,000 individuals). (1) 
Families, social promoters and Consejos Sociales 
Locales (Local Social Councils), where grass-roots 
and intermediary social organisations worked 
together with governmental and other social 
organisations in publicising and supervising the 
Plan. 
  
Seguro Infantil 
(SI) 
Initial measures 
started Sept 01, Oct 
01 subsidies 
 
$2,000 million (3) 
The objective was the provision of a monetary subsidy of $50 to $100 for 
families with offspring under 18, that were living below the poverty line and 
with no access to family benefits. The counter provisions required were health 
checks and children’s attendance at school. The programme was part of a 
Pact for Childhood, which included other actions such as the approval of free-
of-charge identity cards for newborns and a plan for street children. 
Targeting criteria: 1st stage, NBI; 2nd, below $500/month; 3rd, $500-
$1,000/month. Required census of beneficiaries. 
Coverage: 1st stage, 850,000 families; 2nd, +450.000 families; 3rd, +450,000 
families (3) 
In documents, undefined role. In practice, backed 
the initiative. Organisations to integrate their work 
with provincial and municipal actors. Key bodies 
involved: universities, human rights organisations. 
Families and not social organisations received 
funds. 
 
(*) $1=US$1 throughout the period 
Sources: (1) La Nación, “Otro anuncio en busca de una ‘buena noticia’”, 19-07-2000, by Mariano Obarrio; La Nación, 19-07-00, “Lanzaron un plan contra la 
pobreza” and Ministerio de Desarrollo Social, et. al. 2000: 2, 25, 35; (2) Ministerio de Desarrollo Social y Medioambiente, et. al. 2001: 8-18; (3) La Nación, 
“Cafiero, la voz disonante que contradice el discurso oficial”, 12-8-01, La Nación, “Por los más desprotegidos: los niños”, (editorial) 18-6-01 and Seguro de 
Inclusión Infantil, 2001: 5, 13. 
 
